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1 Introduction 
This dissertation contributes to several fields of international macroeconomics which have 
received a lot of attention recently. Chapter 2 of this study analyses the choice of invoicing 
currency in international trade. In international macroeconomics the transmission via 
exchange rates and trade has traditionally been based on the assumption of producer currency 
pricing.  The exchange rate transmission via expenditure switching effects and the so called 
“beggar-thy-neighbour” policy depend on the assumption that export prices expressed in the 
currency of the importing country fluctuate with the exchange rate. Both the traditional 
Mundell-Fleming model (Mundell 1962, Fleming 1962), but also the basic New Open 
Economy Macroeconomics model developed by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) are based on this 
assumption. However, empirically the transmission of the exchange rate in international trade 
is not as unambiguous as most of the theoretical literature has assumed so far. This is why, 
when international linkages through the trade channel are analysed, it is important to first 
establish a pattern of currency invoicing. The currency in which trade is invoiced is crucial as 
it determines whether and to which extent the economy and the trade of a country react to 
exchange rate movements. Recent theoretical contributions to the New Open Economy 
Macroeconomics literature have explored the implications of alternative invoicing 
assumptions on the international transmission of business cycles (e.g. Bacchetta and van 
Wincoop 2003). Exporters might wish to avoid expenditure switching effects because they 
fear that a competing product becomes cheaper in another currency due to exchange rate 
movements. Therefore they might choose to set the price of their export good in the currency 
of the importing country (local currency pricing) or in a third currency (vehicle currency 
pricing) because their competitors also price in this currency and the relative price to the 
competing product is not affected by exchange rate movements. Existing empirical evidence 
for a few countries suggests that local currency pricing (often also referred to as pricing to 
market) and vehicle currency pricing are important empirically. For some goods, e.g. oil, all 
trade is invoiced in a vehicle currency, in general the U.S. dollar. The second chapter of this 
study presents a new dataset and new evidence on the invoicing pattern in international trade 
for a large panel of countries. It goes into detail explaining the motivation to set prices in 
different currencies, with a special focus on the role of the euro as invoicing currency. 
Another development in international macroeconomics is the renewed interest in the effects 
of oil prices on the global economy. Chapters 3 and 4 of this study focus on the impact of oil 
prices on oil-exporting countries, a topic which has received far less attention than the impact 
on industrial countries. Chapter 3 analyses the import behaviour of oil exporting countries 
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and its potential role in the resolution of global current account imbalances. While the world 
economy seems to have coped well with the most recent oil price increase the major focus has 
shifted to global imbalances. The United States which has always been at the centre of the 
discussion on oil price shocks is running high current account deficits. At the same time, oil 
exporting countries are running high current account surpluses. It is often argued that because 
oil exporting countries are running high current account surpluses they can contribute to the 
reduction of global imbalances especially if they let their currencies appreciate. However, as 
their major export good oil is almost exclusively invoiced in U.S. dollar, expenditure 
switching effects of the appreciation can only work via imports. Accordingly, this study 
analyses whether increased import demand in oil exporting countries can significantly 
contribute to reducing global imbalances. It is analysed whether increased import demand in 
oil exporting countries due to higher oil revenues can compensate for the negative terms of 
trade shock hitting oil importing countries. 
Chapter 4 analyses the effect of oil price changes on the economy of the world’s largest oil 
exporting country, Russia. While previous studies focused on the analysis of oil importing 
industrial countries among others due to data availability issues, this study shows the dynamic 
reaction of the economy of an oil exporting country to an oil price shock. Particular attention 
is paid to the long-run, as oil price increases might lead to Dutch Disease phenomena in oil 
exporting countries. The main reason is that oil price increases may lead to a substantial 
appreciation of the real exchange rate. This in turn may entail expenditure switching away 
from domestic goods towards foreign imported goods and may, thus, hurt the non-oil tradable 
sector in oil exporting countries. On the other hand, an appreciation of the real exchange rate 
has beneficial effects as it helps to dampen the stimulus from rising oil prices and to avoid an 
overheating of the economy. 
The fifth chapter looks at the international transmission of monetary policy shocks, paying 
particular attention to the question whether countries with flexible exchange rates react 
differently to monetary shocks than countries with fixed exchange rates. One important 
transmission channel is the trade channel which comes into effect when the exchange rate of 
two countries and relative prices of domestic and foreign goods are affected by monetary 
policy. This trade channel comes only into effect if 1) exchange rates are free to adjust and 2) 
the invoicing pattern of trade is such that relative prices of foreign to domestic products are 
affected at all by exchange rate movements. In other words, the trade channel is operational 
under producer currency pricing but not under local currency pricing. The remainder of the 
Introduction gives a more detailed summary of the individual chapters of this study.  
 3
The Euro as Invoicing Currency in International Trade 
What determines the choice of currency in which international trade is invoiced? This 
question has attracted the attention of economists worldwide for decades but the limited 
availability of data has meant that little is actually known beyond a number of broad stylised 
facts. Chapter two of this study presents a newly constructed dataset on currency invoicing in 
trade for 42 countries and analyses the main determinants of the choice of invoicing currency. 
A special contribution of this chapter is to explore the use of the euro in invoicing of 
international trade and to compare the role of the euro and the role of the U.S. dollar as world 
vehicle currencies.  
Until recently it was commonly assumed in the theoretical literature that exporters 
preferred to set prices in their own currency. However, another important phenomenon to 
consider is the business practice of “pricing to market.” This term captures the behaviour of 
monopolistic firms that, exploiting their ability to take advantage of differences in demand 
elasticities across countries, are able to set different prices in different national markets. In 
principle, exporters could price to market regardless of whether they invoice in their own 
currency (known as “producer currency pricing”) or in the currency of the local market where 
the products are sold (“local currency pricing”). However, the combined effect of flexible 
exchange rates and the menu costs of changing nominal prices imply that exporters facing a 
competitive local market may opt to use the local currency in their pricing so as to avoid that 
exchange rate fluctuations result in a loss of competitiveness. The combination of market 
power and nominal rigidities has brought the issue of the choice of invoicing currency to 
centre stage, not least since full local currency pricing of imports would also imply no 
passthrough from the exchange rate to domestic inflation for the importing country, at least in 
the short run. The choice of the currency in which international trade is invoiced, thus, has 
important implications both at the micro- and macroeconomic level. At the firm level, the 
profit maximization of firms engaged in international trade is affected by their choice of 
currency while at the macroeconomic level the currency of invoicing in international trade 
affects business cycle correlations between countries and the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy. 
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Table 1: Share of euro and U.S. dollar invoicing in exports
euro USD euro USD euro USD
2000 41.3 40.4 49.4 36.6 6.3 74.6
2001 45.2 38.8 47.1 37.1 3.1 78.2
2002 50.6 34.0 53.5 35.2 4.1 79.1
2003 55.5 31.2 56.9 30.4 4.4 76.4
2004 58.0 30.6 56.0 30.4 8.8 75.9
Note : Data describes unweighted average of available data for countries as described in chapter 2.
Other European CountriesEuro Area Asia Pacific
 
The question of what determines the choice of currency in international trade has become 
all the more topical given the increase seen during recent years in the use of the euro in 
international trade by a number of countries, primarily EU Member States and EU acceding 
and accession countries (Table 1). There is also some evidence that the increase in the use of 
the euro may partly reflect the growing role of the euro as a vehicle currency, i.e. a currency 
used between two counterparties outside the country or area of issuance of the currency.  
The theoretical literature on the choice of currency invoicing is quite extensive.1 The most 
important finding is that the sensitivity of foreign demand to prices matters, which can be 
approximated by the homogeneity or differentiation of the product. When demand is sensitive 
to prices the market share of the exporting country, or more specifically, the currency used by 
the competitors matters. When the optimal currency choice depends on the currency used by 
competitors, herding in the same currency is optimal. Also, currencies of countries with 
monetary stability are more likely to be chosen as invoicing currency.  
The main finding of chapter two is that the euro is increasingly used as invoicing currency 
both for bilateral trade and for vehicle currency invoicing. This is particularly true for the 
countries with the prospect of adopting the euro at some point in the future. The membership 
or prospective membership of the EU leading to the future introduction of the euro and 
whether the country is in a hard peg with the euro play a decisive role in the choice of the 
euro as invoicing currency in its trade. The introduction of the common currency in the euro 
area increased the invoicing in euro at the expense of the U.S. dollar. The increased invoicing 
in euro can be found for vehicle currency pricing as well as for producer and local currency 
pricing. The role of the euro as vehicle currency seems to be limited, however, when 
compared to the U.S. dollar. The estimation results show that higher monetary instability 
reflected in a high inflation differential, and a low differentiation of exports lead to less euro 
invoicing, while the contrary is true for the U.S. dollar, which supports the impression that the 
U.S. dollar is the preferred vehicle currency. There are some signs for the role of the euro as 
                                                 
1 See for example Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2005), Goldberg and Tille (2005), Donnenfeld and Zilcha (1991) 
and Friberg (1997). 
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vehicle currency, however. Countries with no forward market for their currency are not only 
more likely to invoice in U.S. dollar but also to invoice in euro. Also, if a country exhibits 
high exchange rate volatility vis-à-vis the euro it is more likely to invoice in euro.  
This chapter significantly contributes to the literature in several aspects. First and foremost, 
a large new dataset on the invoicing currency in international trade of 42 countries is created. 
With this extensive dataset a panel analysis is performed with a special focus on the role of 
the euro while previous studies focused on the role of the U.S. dollar (Goldberg and Tille 
(2005)) and the domestic currency (country studies on Canada, Sweden and the Netherlands)2. 
The estimation results for this large panel of countries generalise findings that have so far 
only been found in individual country studies and at the same time they give new insights into 
the prospects of the euro as vehicle currency.  
Petrodollars and Imports of Oil Exporting Countries 
The third chapter deals with the impact of oil prices on global imbalances. The pricing of 
oil is a particularly good and prominent example of a market that is dominated by one vehicle 
currency, namely the U.S. dollar. Increasing oil prices and current account surpluses of oil 
exporting countries have brought these countries to the centre of interest. Oil prices have risen 
sharply since 1999. This seems to have exacerbated global imbalances. High oil prices have 
worsened the current account deficit in the United States through higher oil import bills. At 
the same time, oil exporting countries benefited from the higher oil prices and used their 
export revenue windfalls to accumulate financial assets or to buy foreign goods. However, 
additional import spending seems to fall short of the export revenue windfall. Thus, while the 
current account deficit in the United States widens, oil exporting countries are running record 
current account surpluses. Is there a mechanism to dampen this commodity price effect and 
are there second round effects in this world commodity price channel? If additional oil 
revenues in oil exporting countries are spent on importing goods, there could be a 
redistribution of oil revenues. This is particular likely if the real exchange rate of oil exporting 
countries reacts with an appreciation to this positive terms of trade shock. This way oil 
exporting countries would not only import more due to their increased wealth through the 
higher oil prices but also due to the fact that foreign goods become cheaper relative to 
domestic goods. Could this reduce the negative effect of high oil prices on industrial 
economies and how does the economy in the oil exporting countries react? The imports of oil 
exporting countries are likely to be invoiced in vehicle currency (the U.S. dollar) or in 
                                                 
2 See Donnenfeld and Haug (2003) for a study on Canadian import invoicing, Wilander (2004) for a study on 
Swedish export pricing and Silva (2004) for a study on invoicing in Dutch Trade. 
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producer currency (the currency of the exporting country). Therefore the pass-through from 
exchange rate movements into import prices is likely to be very high. This is a case where the 
expenditure switching mechanism can fully unfold and exchange rates adjust to reduce 
disequilibria. 
 
   Figure 1.1: Current Account Balances as Share of World GDP 
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Euro Area USA Oil Exporters  
Note: Oil exporters includes countries as described in chapter 3.  
Source: IMF (2006), own calculations. 
 
This has led to increased interest in the effect of higher oil prices on global imbalances.3 
There were voices to be heard in the international community that oil exporting countries 
should be made to participate in reducing global imbalances by increasing their import 
demand. First and foremost it was stated that oil exporting countries should let their exchange 
rates float which would lead to real appreciations and help reduce global imbalances by 
stimulating demand for foreign products in oil exporting countries. There are several 
questions arising from this statement. First of all, the direct impact of oil prices on import 
demand should be analyzed. How much do imports in oil exporting countries increase due to 
the higher oil revenues and the increased wealth? A further question is whether and to which 
extent a real appreciation stimulates imports in these countries. Third, it is important to look at 
other factors influencing import behaviour in oil exporting countries. In particular what 
distinguishes oil exporting countries’ import behaviour from that of industrial countries? 
Finally, the possible import increase should be put into the perspective of global imbalances. 
How much can oil exporting countries contribute at all to reducing global imbalances? 
                                                 
3 See for example IMF World Economic Outlook (2006), Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco (2006), U.S. 
Department of the Treasury (2006).  
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This chapter focuses on the trade channel of petrodollar recycling. Especially in times of 
high oil prices the use or “recycling” of these petrodollars attracts interest. Oil exporting 
countries can also spend their oil revenues in the domestic economy. However, as the 
production in most oil exporting countries is not well diversified, the domestic economy 
cannot absorb all oil revenues. This is particularly true in times of high oil price increases 
when the domestic economy is unable to adjust to the higher demand in the short run. 
Therefore a large share of the petrodollars is recycled abroad. Apart from the trade channel 
there are two financial channels of petrodollar recycling. The first is the asset accumulation 
channel. Oil exporting countries use part of their oil revenues to accumulate foreign reserves. 
In 2005 portfolio investment seems to have replaced reserve accumulation as most important 
source of capital outflow. The majority of the capital outflows are going to the United States. 
The second financial channel is the debt reduction channel. Many oil exporting countries 
accumulated a stock of debt in the past part of which is international debt. Lately, especially 
Russia used a large share of its petrodollars to repay outstanding international debt liabilities. 
These two financial channels are often linked to the question of who is financing the U.S. 
current account deficit. Chapter 3, however, focuses on the trade channel of petrodollar 
recycling. While foreign asset accumulation serves to finance global imbalances, increased 
trade could serve to correct global imbalances.  
The literature on trade in oil exporting countries so far has focused on the current account 
and terms of trade effects. Oil price increases are found to have positive effects on the current 
account in oil exporting countries (IMF 2005). This study separates the effects of the oil price 
increase and the real exchange rate on real imports in oil exporting countries. The behaviour 
of real imports is analysed rather than the current account which includes nominal imports 
and exports. The literature on import demand equations is substantial. Focus has, however, 
usually been on industrial countries. In large country panels only a small number of oil 
exporting countries is considered. Also, the special characteristics of oil exporting countries 
are not taken into account in these panel studies on import demand. In general, studies (e.g. 
Goldstein and Kahn 1985, Clarida 1994, Reinhart 1995, Senhadji 1998) find a positive long-
run relationship between imports and the measure of the real exchange rate (often composed 
of the real effective exchange rate or the terms of trade). For industrial countries estimates 
have been close to unity (or above), while estimates for developing countries were usually 
found to be much smaller, implying that for substantial expenditure switching to take place 
large exchange rate movements are needed. While these studies focus on real import demand, 
they do not include special features that are likely to be important determinants of import 
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demand in oil exporting countries. In particular, the fiscal side is always excluded because for 
countries not depending on a single commodity, the fiscal sector usually plays a negligible 
role in foreign demand. For oil exporting countries, however, import demand can be 
influenced by fiscal policy as the decision on spending or saving oil export revenues plays a 
crucial role for import demand.  
In chapter 3 an empirical model of the import demand of oil exporting countries is set up. 
The analysis is based on a panel cointegration model including 24 oil exporting countries for 
the period from 1980 to 2005. Estimation results show that import demand in the region 
depends positively on domestic demand and exports, the real exchange rate and the price of 
oil. Fiscal balances reduce the demand for imports. The long run elasticities of imports with 
respect to the oil price and with respect to the real exchange rate are both found to be around 
0.2. With higher oil prices and a real appreciation imports in the region are significantly 
expanded. However, the impact on global imbalances seems to be limited. While an oil price 
increase leads to higher spending on the oil bill of oil importing countries the positive second 
round effects of higher exports to oil exporting countries cannot compensate for this negative 
impact on the current account. For the United States only around 7 percent of the increase in 
the oil bill are compensated for by higher exports to the region of oil exporting countries. In 
contrast, the Euro area’s oil bill increase is compensated for by almost 40 percent. Due to the 
structure of trade the euro area rather than the United States benefits from the increased 
demand in the region. Also, the share of oil exporting countries’ imports in overall trade is 
relatively small. Even though these countries are running record current account surpluses at 
the moment, their import demand only plays a minor role in the global system of current 
accounts. Thus, for the moment the role of oil exporting countries in reducing global 
imbalances seems to be rather limited.  
This analysis of the import demand in oil exporting countries contributes to the literature in 
several ways. First of all, the special characteristics of the oil exporting countries are taken 
into account in the estimation. In particular, fiscal policy, which plays a major role in oil 
exporting countries because in many countries the oil producing sector is state-owned or 
subject to large royalties, is included in the model. Furthermore, the study distinguishes 
between price effects of oil price increases and wealth effects of oil price increases by looking 
at real imports rather than at the current account (including nominal imports). A real effective 
exchange rate approximation is calculated for all the countries as an approximation for the 
real exchange rate rather than including the terms of trade which are often used in the import 
demand literature. The terms of trade is not a good approximation for the real exchange rate in 
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oil exporting countries as imports and exports are unlikely to be substitutes and the terms of 
trade include price effects of the major export good oil. Another innovation of the analysis is 
that this study is based on a cointegration analysis which establishes long run relationships 
between the oil price, the real exchange rate and import demand.  
Has Russian GDP Growth Become Less Dependent on Oil? 
While the previous chapter focused on the international transmission of commodity prices on 
oil exporting countries and the second round transmission channel of trade through 
petrodollar recycling, chapter four takes a closer look at the commodity price channel for the 
overall economy of an oil exporting country. Traditionally, studies on the impact of oil prices 
on the economy have focused on the effect of higher oil prices on oil importing countries, in 
particular, the largest oil importing country, the United States (Hamilton 1996, 2003). While 
there is ample evidence on the negative effect of oil prices on GDP of oil importing countries 
the positive effect on GDP of oil exporting countries is more controversial. In a study on 
OECD countries Bjørnland (2000) finds that Norway benefits from oil price increases while 
the United Kingdom is negatively affected. Especially in the long-run, the possible negative 
effects of Dutch Disease phenomena in countries relying on commodities as the major source 
of export revenue have to be taken into account. Oil revenue windfalls might result into real 
appreciations and resource shifts to the oil exporting sector leaving the non-oil industrial 
sector uncompetitive.  
The fourth chapter of this study presents a country study of the largest oil exporting country 
Russia and analyses whether an increase in oil prices has a positive effect on Russian GDP in 
the long-run.4 While the previous chapter focused on the external impact oil exporting 
countries have on global imbalances with increasing oil prices and real exchange rate 
movements, this chapter focuses on the domestic effects of oil prices on the Russian 
economy. In particular, it is analysed whether Russia’s dependence on oil decreased with 
increased trade openness, increased diversification of the economy and last but not least the 
introduction of the oil stabilization fund in 2004. Almost all of the economies exporting oil 
are highly dependent on the price of their main export good. In the panel of oil exporting 
countries, Russia seems to be among the countries with the highest diversification of the 
economy.5 The question then is, whether Russia has achieved higher independence from oil 
prices in recent years.  
                                                 
4 With a share of 1.7 percent in world GDP in nominal USD dollars for the year 2005, Russia’s economy is more 
than twice as large as the second and third largest oil exporting economies Saudi Arabia and Norway.  
5 According to official numbers, the share of mining (petroleum and gas production) in GDP was only 10.4 
percent of GDP in 2005. According to estimations of the World Bank (2004) these numbers underestimate the 
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Figure 1.2: Oil Prices and Russian GDP Growth 
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Figure 2 shows the oil price and Russian GDP growth from 1996 to 2006. At first sight the 
figure suggests that the relationship between oil prices and Russian GDP has become weaker 
over time. However, simple bivariate correlations can be misleading and the empirical 
analysis shows that this is the case. Simple correlations do not take into account feedback of 
the endogenous variables and they might fail to include the effect of variables which play a 
major role for the analysis. The major candidate for such a variable is the real exchange rate. 
Rising oil prices can trigger real appreciations in the long-run and these appreciations can 
reduce the positive impact of oil prices on the economy. Another question regarding the 
Russian economy is, whether high oil prices lead to a real appreciation in the long-run 
dampening the positive direct effect of oil on the economy.  
Against the backdrop of the prominent role of the oil and gas sector in the country’s exports 
and, to a lesser extent, in GDP one would expect a close relationship between Russia’s GDP 
growth and oil prices. Indeed, empirical studies have found a significant impact of the oil 
price on Russian GDP growth with long-run elasticities ranging from 0.15 to 0.2 percent.6 To 
shed light on the question of Russia’s dependency on oil a Vector Error Correction Model 
(VECM) is estimated. In particular, I set up a model including GDP, the real exchange rate, 
the price of oil and real government revenues. The analysis of the cointegration coefficients 
suggests that Russia’s dependency on oil has not become smaller but has stayed more or less 
constant over time. When considering the long-run impulse response functions of a permanent 
                                                                                                                                                        
true share of oil in Russia’s production process. The true share is rather somewhere between 20 and 30 percent 
(according to the World Bank the true share according to input output calculations amounted to 20 percent in 
2000). 
6 See for example IMF (2002) in which the magnitude of this effect depends on policy reactions, and Rautava 
(2004). 
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increase in the oil price an elasticity of 0.24 is found. This figure compares with other 
estimates for Russia’s long-run elasticity with respect to oil even though most of these studies 
use different and sometimes less sophisticated estimation methods. In particular, most 
previous studies did not account for the exchange rate effects of oil price increases. Rising oil 
prices stimulate Russian GDP growth while an endogenous real appreciation resulting from 
the higher oil prices in the long run offsets the positive effect on GDP to some extent.  
The contribution of this study is to provide a systematic analysis of the long-run effects of 
oil price changes on the Russian economy, the world’s largest oil exporting country, while 
most of the existing literature has focused on the effects of oil price changes on oil importing 
industrialised countries. It provides a cointegration analysis which takes into account that only 
a relatively small sample is available. In addition, an extensive sensitivity analysis is carried 
out in order to show that the main estimation results are robust and stable over time.  
The International Transmission of Monetary Policy Shocks 
The fifth chapter presents a study on the different transmission channels of monetary 
policy. This paper examines the international transmission of monetary policy shocks both in 
the context of flexible exchange-rate regimes and in the case where one country adopts 
unilaterally fixed exchange rates. There are two potential transmission mechanisms of 
monetary policy. The first is the financial channel via the interest rate parity and a co-
movement of interest rates. The other channel is the trade channel which comes into effect 
when the relative exchange rates of two countries and relative prices of domestic and foreign 
goods are affected by monetary policy. While the financial channel transmission of monetary 
policy works via the interest rate parity and takes place as long as economies are financially 
liberalized, the trade channel comes only into effect when 1) exchange rates are free to adjust 
and 2) the invoicing pattern of trade is such that relative prices of foreign to domestic 
products are affected at all by exchange rate movements. Chapter five analyses in a two 
country set up the effect of a contractionary monetary shock in one country on the economy 
of the second country. In the context of fixed exchange-rate regimes analysed with the 
example of Germany and Austria and the Netherlands one would expect a negative effect on 
the economies of Austria and the Netherlands when Germany conducts a contractionary 
monetary policy, e.g. by raising interest rates. For these countries the German Mark acted as a 
more or less fixed anchor before the introduction of the European Monetary Union so that the 
contractionary shock translated directly into their economies. As a consequence we would 
expect a decline of output in these countries synchronized with a decline in German output. 
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With a Vector Autoregression (VAR) analysis I show that there is, indeed, a negative reaction 
of output for all countries following an interest rate increase in Germany.  
In the context of flexible exchange rates the contractionary monetary policy in one country 
need not have contractionary effects on the economy of the second country. Exchange rates 
can adjust. In particular the exchange rate of the second economy can depreciate to create 
expectations of an appreciation for the interest rate parity to hold. In this way exports of the 
second economy could become cheaper relative to products of the country conducting the 
contractionary monetary policy. The second country could, thus, profit from an expenditure 
switching effect towards its exports. If the exports of the second country are priced in local 
currency (or “priced to market”) this mechanism would, however, not take place. The 
estimation results of the exercise including the United States, which raises the interest rates, 
and Germany and Japan which react to this contractionary policy of the U.S. show that the 
contractionary effect of the depressed demand of the United States seems to prevail. Even for 
these countries with flexible exchange rates a synchronized decline in output with the U.S. 
can be observed. This could also be due to the fact that exports of Germany and Japan are 
likely to be invoiced in local currency (the U.S. dollar) so that the positive effects of an 
exchange rate depreciation are limited. The contribution of this paper is that it compares 
transmission effects between countries with a flexible exchange rate regime and countries 
with a fixed exchange rate regime highlighting possible differences in the adjustment to 
monetary policy shocks. 
 
 
 13
2 The Euro as Invoicing Currency in International Trade 
The choice of the currency in which international trade is invoiced has important implications 
both at the micro- and macroeconomic level. At the firm level, the profit maximization of 
firms engaged in international trade is clearly affected by their choice of currency while at the 
macroeconomic level the currency of invoicing in international trade affects business cycle 
correlations between countries and the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. The 
consequences of currency invoicing on the pass-through of the exchange rate have been 
analysed in a series of theoretical and empirical papers and are at the core of the New Open 
Economy Macroeconomics literature. While traditional macroeconomics assumed that the 
price of exports is set in the currency of the exporter so that exchange rate fluctuations lead to 
expenditure switching away from the appreciating currency’s goods, the new macroeconomic 
literature allows for the possibility of pricing to market, where prices are set in the local 
currency and do not fluctuate with the exchange rate.1 While the early literature just assumed 
that exporters prefer to price in their own currency to avoid price uncertainty (monetary 
habitat), the more recent theoretical literature models the choice of currency invoicing as a 
decision between price uncertainty and quantity uncertainty. Exporters pricing in their own 
currency know the price they will receive, but the quantity they sell is uncertain because the 
price in the local market fluctuates with the exchange rate. When the demand for the 
exporter’s good is very sensitive to price changes, the exporter may prefer to set the price in 
the currency of the competitors.  
The choice of currency invoicing is, thus, central both for profit maximization at the firm 
level and for the transmission of monetary policy. Due to a lack of data there have been, 
however, only a few econometric studies on the choice of invoicing currency so far. These 
studies consist almost exclusively of country specific evidence on Canada, the Netherlands 
and Sweden.2 The use of a macroeconomic multi-country database is, however, important to 
show the general applicability of the results as compared to single country studies. Goldberg 
and Tille (2005) give first empirical findings on a broader set of countries. They mainly focus 
on the role of the U.S. dollar as invoicing currency, though. The dataset compiled for this 
paper is considerably larger. It consists of 35 countries and more than 150 observations for 
__________
1 Betts and Devereux were among the first to include PTM into a NOEM model (1996, 2000).  
2 Donnenfeld and Haug (2003) analyse Canadian import invoicing, Wilander (2004) examines Swedish trade 
and Silva (2004) performs an analysis on Dutch invoicing data.  
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invoicing in U.S. dollar and of 29 countries and around 150 observations for invoicing in 
euro. Most data concerning EU countries have been collected by the European System of 
Central Banks (ECSB). Early data for EU countries and data on non-EU countries was 
assembled from different national sources like central banks and statistical offices.3 Besides 
the new dataset, the main innovation of this paper is that it has a special focus on the role of 
the euro as vehicle currency. In particular, I analyse whether the launch of the third stage of 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) changed the invoicing patterns in international trade 
and the potential role of the euro as a vehicle currency. I also shed a light on the question 
whether an increasing share in euro invoicing is due to economic fundamentals or to the 
prospects of eventually adopting the euro by most Central and Eastern European Countries.  
The main finding is that the membership or prospective membership of the EU leading to 
the future introduction of the euro and whether the country is in a hard peg with the euro play 
a decisive role in the choice of the euro as invoicing currency in its trade. The introduction of 
the common currency in the euro area increased the invoicing in euro at the expense of the 
U.S. dollar. The increased invoicing in euro can be found both for vehicle currency pricing 
and for producer and local currency pricing. The role of the euro as vehicle currency seems to 
be limited, however, when compared to the U.S. dollar. The estimation results show that 
higher monetary instability reflected in a high inflation differential, and a low differentiation 
of exports lead to less euro invoicing, while the contrary is true for the U.S. dollar, which 
supports the impression that the U.S. dollar is the preferred vehicle currency. There are some 
signs for the role of the euro as vehicle currency, however. Countries with no forward market 
for their currency are not only more likely to invoice in U.S. dollar but also to invoice in euro. 
Also, if a country exhibits high exchange rate volatility vis-à-vis the euro it is more likely to 
invoice in euro. All in all, the euro is increasingly used as invoicing currency both for bilateral 
trade and for vehicle currency invoicing. This is particularly true for the countries with the 
prospect of adopting the euro at some point in the future.  
__________
3 For an overview of the data and its sources see the section on data description as well as Table A2.1 of the 
appendix.  
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2.1 Theoretical Literature 
The main focus of the early literature on currency invoicing in international trade focused 
primarily on transactions costs and the stability and attractiveness of the major currencies. 
Already in 1968, Swoboda established that the U.S. dollar could be considered a vehicle 
currency as it was used in trade even if the U.S. was not involved. Swoboda (1968) argued 
that highly liquid currencies with low transactions costs will be chosen as medium of 
exchange. In the same way McKinnon (1979) argues that homogenous goods and primary 
commodities are likely to be invoiced in a single vehicle currency with low transaction costs. 
Setting the prices of these goods in one currency increases the international comparability of 
these prices and the transparency of the market. The advantage of a vehicle currency like the 
U.S. dollar, McKinnon argues, is also due to its long history and familiarity. Similar lines of 
reasoning can be found in Magee and Rao (1980). They make a distinction between strong 
and weak currencies according to low and high inflation currencies. The intuition behind this 
being that in trade between low inflation industrial and high inflation developing countries, 
the low inflation currency of the industrial country dominates. Also, for trade in primary 
products a vehicle currency might be optimal. The importance of the choice between different 
currencies came back into the economic discussion when major exchange rates became 
flexible after the breakdown of Breton Woods in 1973. The first question of interest was then, 
who was to bear the exchange rate risk in trade when exchange rates were flexible. It was 
assumed that a risk-averse exporter preferred to invoice in his own currency - producer 
currency pricing (PCP). This was then considered the dominant strategy as the exporter was 
the one who initiated and first set the trade contract. Also, importers were assumed to be more 
indifferent towards the pricing strategy as imports tend to be a lower proportion of importer’s 
spending than export sales are for exporter’s revenues (Page 1977, 1981). Viaene and de 
Vries (1992) take strategic bargaining considerations into account and introduce a forward 
market. In their model, exporters and importers bargain over the invoicing currency. Both are 
assumed to prefer their own currency, respectively. Viaene and de Vries find that the 
dominance of the exporter’s currency can be due either to the first mover advantage of the 
exporting firm or to the monopoly power of the exporter who is more likely to have 
bargaining power as the firm faces a wide spread demand and not many competitors. 
Summing up the early literature, the main findings are that traders seek to avoid currency risk 
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by using their own currency and that, in trade between industrialised countries exporters are 
in general more likely to be able to avoid the currency risk.  
When currencies are free to fluctuate there is, however, not only the issue of price 
uncertainty but also demand uncertainty. If prices are set before the exchange rate fluctuations 
are known and orders are placed after the shock to the exchange rate4 then the exporter faces 
demand uncertainty if he prices in his own currency (PCP) as the “seller does not know the 
effective price at the time the importer will make its purchases” (Baron 1976, p.427). There 
is, thus, price uncertainty when exports are priced in the local currency (LCP) as the exporter 
does not know which price (in his own currency) he will receive and demand uncertainty 
when the exporter chooses producer currency pricing (PCP). McKinnon (1979) provides the 
intuition on what could be the decisive factor in the choice between price and demand 
uncertainty. He distinguishes two types of tradables. For a differentiated good a firm can set 
the market price as it faces a downward sloping demand curve, while for homogenous goods 
the exporter is a price taker and more likely not to choose the own currency. There are 
therefore two distinctive sets of determinants for invoicing. One reason to choose a specific 
currency of invoicing can be to avoid demand uncertainty due to exchange rate fluctuations 
(LCP is chosen). The choice of LCP is therefore determined by microeconomic 
considerations concerning the demand and cost structure of the exporting firm as will be 
illustrated in the following. If an exporter is more concerned about price uncertainty because 
the demand for his goods is less price sensitive macroeconomic considerations as discussed 
before and further formalized in the theoretical literature will play the decisive role. 
Donnenfeld and Zilcha (1991) present a first formal model in which a firm’s choice of 
invoicing currency is analysed. They are also among the first to develop a model on the 
microeconomic level in which the firm optimizes its profits.5 The main finding of Donnenfeld 
and Zilcha is that LCP is optimal for the exporting firm if the total revenue curve is concave 
in the foreign price. This is the case when the sensitivity of demand with respect to prices is 
not much higher the higher the price level.6 That is, if the price is set in producer currency and 
increases (in foreign currency) due to an appreciation of the exporting firm’s currency, profits 
__________
4 This is the assumption usually made in the theoretical literature.  
5 Giovannini (1988) presents a similar model; his emphasis is, however, not on the firm’s invoicing decision.  
6 When the “elasticity of the slope of demand for exports is not too large” (Donnenfeld and Haug 2003, p.335) 
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will fall because demand will be reduced by more than the increase in profits due to the 
higher price received. In the case of a depreciation, demand is not extended enough to 
compensate for the lower price the exporting firm receives, because demand is less sensitive 
to the price at the lower price level. If this is the case, higher variability in foreign prices, 
which comes with higher volatility in the exchange rate under PCP, lowers expected profits. 
Thus, under these conditions, high exchange rate volatility would lead the exporting firm to 
choose LCP.  
Friberg (1997) extends the literature by including into the model a forward currency market 
and the possibility to set prices in a third currency: vehicle currency pricing (VCP). As in 
Donnenfeld and Zilcha the choice of the optimal currency setting is closely linked to the price 
elasticity of foreign demand. The second best currency pricing strategy depends on the 
relative exchange rate volatilities. If the exchange rate towards the vehicle currency exhibits 
low volatility compared to the bilateral exchange rate of the exporter and importer, VCP is 
preferred and vice versa.  
Johnson and Pick (1997) elaborate on the Donnenfeld and Zilcha model by including the 
possibility of VCP and introducing competition from other countries’ exporters. Like in 
Donnenfeld and Zilcha the exporting firm has power of price discrimination, but it now faces 
competition from another exporting firm (this is mostly the case in commodity markets where 
there are two sorts or brands of goods). Now, even under LCP the demand for the firm’s 
product is uncertain because the competitors might not price in local currency. In such a case 
fixing the relative price of the competing products can be important to the exporters so they 
might choose a common vehicle currency. 
This finding of choosing the currency of the competitor is also common to a number of 
other studies. In particular, Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2002) use a NOEM model to analyse 
the optimal pricing strategy of exporters.7 In a very elaborate general equilibrium framework 
that also takes into account exchange rate dependent costs they derive similar conclusions to 
those of Donnenfeld and Zilcha. The driving factors for exporters to care about their relative 
prices are the demand sensitivity of costs and the price sensitivity of demand. It can be said 
that the higher the product differentiation, the lower the price sensitivity of demand. Exporters 
__________
7 One of the main assumptions in NOEM is that prices are sticky. Hence, in the short run the exporter’s price can 
only stay the same under exchange rate movements if it is set in the local currency. This explains the close 
relationship between the PTM literature and the currency invoicing literature.  
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will, thus, prefer to invoice in their own currency if their products are highly differentiated, 
while they will pay attention to holding their relative prices constant if their products are less 
differentiated. This does not mean that less differentiated products are always invoiced in 
LCP, however. Bacchetta and van Wincoop build into their model the market share of the 
exporting country in the foreign market – that is, the share of the market that is accounted for 
by firms from a particular country or monetary area. Demand risk is minimized by invoicing 
in the currency that is most “similar” to the average invoicing currency chosen by competitors 
(Bacchetta and van Wincoop 2002, p. 15). For a monetary union, it is the market share of the 
entire currency union that matters and not the market share of an individual country. Exports 
of a monetary union are therefore more likely to be priced in producer currency, and imports 
to a monetary union more likely to be priced in local currency, because the monetary union’s 
market share is more likely to be dominant. 
Goldberg and Tille (2005) call this behaviour of choosing the currency of the competitor a 
“herding effect”. In their partial equilibrium three country model a dominant share of a 
currency other than the one of the exporter or the importer can make vehicle currency pricing 
the optimal choice. This herding effect takes place for industries with homogeneous goods 
where producers aim at keeping their prices relative to the competitors stable. Goldberg 
(2005) elaborates on this model by including a covariance between marginal cost and 
exchange rates. There is then also a “hedging motive” to choose a currency so that the 
exchange rate is correlated in such a way to shocks to exporters’ costs that marginal costs are 
positively correlated with marginal revenue.  
The most elaborate model so far was introduced by Devereux, Engel and Storegaard 
(2003). Using a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model with sticky prices, these 
authors analyse the implications of endogenous exchange rate pass-through. Their results 
show that the degree of pass-through depends on the relative stability of monetary policy; 
countries with relatively low monetary volatility experience low rates of exchange rate pass-
through. The reason is that firms in both countries have an incentive to set their prices in the 
currency of the country with the low monetary volatility.8 As a consequence, the country with 
low monetary volatility is shielded against exchange rate movements.  
__________
8 This result is comparable to the general equilibrium model by Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2002) where they 
find that inflationary currencies are less likely to be used as invoicing currency.  
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Engel (2005) analyses the export pricing behaviour of firms in a static model, both in an 
environment with flexible and with fixed prices. He shows that the choice between producer 
currency pricing and local currency pricing is independent of the degree of sluggishness in 
price adjustment. Under flexible price adjustment, producer currency pricing is optimal if the 
variance of the export price in the firm’s own currency is less than the variance of the price in 
the local currency of the importer. The same holds in an environment of fixed prices.  
Summing up the theoretical literature, the most important finding is that the optimal pricing 
strategies are very sensitive to the set of assumptions. In particular, the level of risk aversion 
and the existence of forward markets to hedge exchange rate risks matter for the results. First 
and foremost, however, the sensitivity of foreign demand to prices matters, which can be 
approximated by the homogeneity or differentiation of the product. When demand is sensitive 
to prices the market share of the exporting country, or more specifically, the currency used by 
the competitors matters. When the optimal currency choice depends on the currency used by 
competitors, herding in the same currency is optimal. Also, currencies of countries with 
monetary stability are more likely to be chosen as invoicing currency. 
2.2 Stylized Facts and the Empirical Literature 
Data on currency invoicing has been very scarce to date. This is the reason why many studies 
rely on simple and often static comparisons of data and anecdotal evidence. Other studies 
analyse the pass-through of exchange rates to import and export prices because this data is 
more readily available. The data on exchange rate pass-through can provide some evidence on 
PCP and LCP. If the pass-through is complete as assumed by most early models this indicates 
full PCP, whereas zero pass-through stands for LCP as prices do not react to the exchange 
rate. To my best knowledge, there are only four econometric studies on currency invoicing. 
The first one is Donnenfeld and Haug (2003) who present an analysis on Canadian import 
invoicing. Wilander (2004) and Silva (2004) are yet unpublished studies on the invoicing 
practices in Swedish exports and Dutch Trade respectively. These three studies use industry 
specific micro data on a disaggregated level. The most comprehensive study on the 
determinants of currency invoicing in terms of empirical data is Goldberg and Tille (2005). 
Here, aggregated data on invoicing practices is collected for 25 countries. Donnenfeld and 
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Haug (2003) and Wilander (2004) use multinomial logit (probit) models for their analysis, 
while Silva (2004) uses fixed and random effects and GLS estimations. Goldberg and Tille 
(2005) perform a cross section regression.  
Before I elaborate on the econometric findings of these formal econometric invoicing 
studies, I present an overview of the early literature and conclusions drawn from the exchange 
rate pass-through (ERPT) literature.9 In 1968 Swoboda established the vehicle currency 
hypothesis claiming that the use of a currency in trade was mainly determined by transactions 
costs. The dominant role of the U.S. dollar was taken as evidence. The first empirical finding 
on local versus producer currency pricing by Grassman (1973) regarding Swedish foreign 
trade was that Swedish exports are mostly invoiced in Swedish kronas and Swedish imports 
are mostly invoiced in the exporter’s currency, while the U.S. dollar was not often used as 
invoicing currency. These findings contradicted the vehicle currency hypothesis and were 
later generalized and called Grassman’s law. This law states that PCP is dominant for 
manufacturing trade between industrialized countries. Trade in primary products is mostly 
denominated in U.S. dollar, while trade between developing and industrialized countries is 
predominantly invoiced in the industrialized country’s currency. The intuition behind 
Grassman’s law is that a firm with more bargaining power will choose its own currency to 
avoid exchange rate risk.10  
There is anecdotal evidence linking the use of a currency to the level of product 
differentiation. Tavlas (1991) finds that PCP is more likely if products are differentiated. He 
gives this as an explanation why invoicing in Deutschmark increased from 1980 to 1987 even 
though Germany reduced its trade with developing countries which per se would lead to a 
reduction in PCP. Oi, Otani and Shirota (2004) who discuss possible influences on Japanese 
export invoicing strategies find that the Yen is more often used in industries with 
differentiated products like the automobile industry. Sasaki (2002) and Sato (2003) find in an 
exchange rate pass-through analysis that PTM elasticities are highest in Japanese exports to 
the USA. Sasaki draws the conclusion that this is due to the U.S. market and U.S. products 
__________
9 There are several empirical studies on the exchange rate pass through (ERPT) which are closely related to the 
invoicing literature. There are two studies on the ERPT into Japanese export prices (Sasaki 2002, Sato 2003), 
one on the ERPT into Korean exports by Fukuda and Ono (2004) and one study by the Bank of Finland on the 
ERPT in Finnish trade. Campa and Goldberg (2005) present a study on ERPT in 25 OECD countries. 
10 For overviews on stylized facts regarding currency invoicing see also Bilson (1983) and Hartmann (1998). 
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being more competitive than the Japanese market and Japanese products, so that Japanese 
exporters are forced to price in local currency or in a vehicle currency, notably the U.S. dollar 
in the Asian Region. In their ERPT analysis on Korea, Fukuda and Ono (2004) highlight the 
importance of market share. Exporters would want to price their goods in the currency of the 
competitor to reduce quantity uncertainty, because then demand for their product is less 
sensitive to exchange rate movements. If the market share of local firms is small and the 
competitors are other foreign firms as is the case in some import goods to Korea, then pricing 
in a vehicle currency can be optimal. These findings confirm the theoretical results that firms 
prefer to price in their own currency so that they do not bear the exchange rate risk if they 
have market power and demand is more insensitive to their prices, while they prefer to use the 
same currency as their competitors (either LCP or VCP) in case they do not have market 
power and the demand for their product is very price sensitive.  
There is also some evidence that monetary stability and financial institutions play a role. 
Tavlas (1997) provides some support for the dominance of stable currencies. Germany has 
had a very stable currency and monetary policy for a long time and German imports and 
exports were mostly invoiced in DEM before EMU. The DEM was also the only currency 
apart from the U.S. dollar which was used more often in trade than the share of world trade 
would indicate and thus might be called a vehicle currency (Page 1977, 1981). Tavlas argues 
that the currency also has a store of value function and thus currencies with low inflation and 
inflation variability will be preferred as invoicing currency. However, Campa and Goldberg 
(2005) find in their ERPT analysis that inflation and monetary growth cannot explain cross-
country differences. 
Most models in the ERPT literature make an explicit assumption as to whether all exports 
are either invoiced in the local currency (LCP and PTM) or in the producer currency (PCP). 
Under complete LCP or VCP there is zero pass through from exchange rates to export prices; 
while under PCP there is full pass-through to export prices. Freystätter (2003) and Campa and 
Goldberg (2005) provide econometric evidence on the incomplete pass through of exchange 
rates. Campa and Goldberg (2005) show in a country study for 25 OECD countries that 
neither complete LCP nor complete PCP is plausible which stands in contrast to the 
theoretical literature where mixed exchange rate strategies are mostly sub optimal.  
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The first econometric analysis on the currency choice of Canadian imports was performed 
by Donnenfeld and Haug (2003). They claim to find support for the finding by Donnenfeld 
and Zilcha (1991) that higher exchange rate risk promotes the use of LCP and discourages the 
use of PCP and VCP. Their results are, however, fragile as almost all estimates are 
statistically insignificant.11 They run a multinomial logit model on the choice of currency in 
different industries in Canada. Their explanatory variables consist of exchange rate risk, a 
distance variable and the size of the partner country. Out of 24 estimations on local currency 
pricing (2 estimations on 12 industry levels, one including trade with the U.S., one excluding 
trade with the U.S.) only two estimates for exchange rate volatility are significant12 and show 
a positive relationship between LCP and exchange rate volatility. As discussed above, high 
exchange rate risk only leads to LCP if the products are not highly differentiated. Even though 
Donnenfeld and Haug (2003) have a dataset on the industry level, they do not test for the 
effect of product differentiation in the industry. In the theoretical models, distance plays a role 
only in so far as it increases the exchange rate risk. They do, however, find some significant 
results for the positive relationship between distance and LCP. If, as is the case for 
Donnenfeld and Haug (2003), there is not sufficient support for the impact of the exchange 
rate risk on LCP, then the evidence of a substantial influence of distance on LCP cannot be 
due to the increased exchange rate risk as motivated by the theory.13 Donnenfeld and Haug 
(2003) find a negative relationship between the exporter’s country size and invoicing in a 
third currency (VCP). In this study, country size is interpreted as a sign for market power with 
the following reasoning: The larger the country, the larger the size of the firm, the more 
market power for the firm.14 Thus, a firm from a large country is more likely to price in own 
currency and less likely to price in a vehicle currency.  
Wilander (2004) performs a similar econometric analysis on currency invoicing in Swedish 
exports by industry15 for the years 1999 to 2002. His findings on exchange rate risk are, 
however, contrary to the evidence of Donnenfeld of Haug (2003). In particular, he finds a 
__________
11 They do find, however, some significant results for the positive relationship between the exporter’s country 
size (and therefore possibly market power) and the invoicing in PCP. 
12 One at the 5 percent, one at the 10 percent significance level.   
13 See Donnenfeld and Zilcha (1991).  
14 This argumentation is, thus, essentially different from the “herding effect” as discussed by Bacchetta and van 
Wincoop. 
15 Very large firms like Ikea are excluded from this analysis.  
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negative relationship between exchange rate volatility and local currency pricing. There are 
two possible reasons for this. First of all, he uses exchange rate volatility as the measure of 
exchange rate risk, whereas Donnenfeld and Haug (2003) use a mixture of forward and ex-
post future spot rate. Second, his analysis is on Swedish exports while Donnenfeld and 
Haug’s analysis is on Canadian imports data. Wilander (2004) finds that local currency 
pricing is promoted by low inflation, by the presence of a stable financial market, and the 
absence of capital controls and a black market. His hypothesis that less differentiated products 
are less likely to be invoiced in the producer currency is not explicitly tested, but the pattern 
in the Swedish exports, where the paper and pulp industry invoices only around 25 percent of 
its exports in Swedish kronas as compared to around 60 percent in the motor vehicle industry, 
seems to point into that direction. The amount of LCP is, however not higher in the industries 
with less differentiated products. On the contrary, LCP is highest in the motor vehicles 
industry.  
In his analysis on Dutch invoicing practices, Silva (2004) finds evidence contrary to 
Grassman’s law, which states that exports are predominantly invoiced in the currency of the 
exporter. He finds that for Dutch exports to industrialized countries, the currency of the 
trading partner, and not the Dutch guilder, was dominant. Furthermore, the strength of a 
currency, the depth of the financial market and the absence of high inflationary tendencies 
enhance the use of a country’s currency. Exchange rate volatility and exchange rate 
expectations do not prove to be decisive in the choice of the invoicing currency. Silva (2004) 
does not find evidence for the use of a vehicle currency in commodity trade. He gives as a 
reason that his sample is predominantly composed of OECD countries, thus, not including 
traditional exporters of raw materials.  
As described in the previous section, there are, however, convincing arguments why a 
vehicle currency should be used in trade with primary commodities. First and foremost, 
primary commodities are homogenous goods, so that the exporters of these commodities do 
care about the price of the competitors and are therefore likely to choose a common currency. 
Furthermore, in official markets there are transaction costs considerations. Especially 
information cost is an important factor why commodity exporters would want to price in the 
same vehicle currency to make prices more comparable. Goldberg and Tille (2005) highlight 
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the importance of organized exchange and reference pricing16 in the role of the U.S. dollar as 
invoicing currency. They find that the dollar’s use in these markets can explain most of the 
dominance of the U.S. dollar as vehicle currency. They also point out that the declining 
importance of organized exchanges and referenced prices could be the reason for the U.S. 
dollar’s declining importance as a vehicle currency.  
What does the literature say about the dominance of the U.S. dollar as a vehicle currency? 
In 1991, Black (1991) found evidence that the U.S. dollar lost attractiveness as invoicing 
currency while the DEM gained somewhat in importance during the 1980s. A similar result is 
found by Tavlas (1991) who claims that the DEM gained importance between 1980 and 1987. 
Wilander (2004) finds that the euro was more often used as vehicle currency from 1999 to 
2002, while this was not at the cost of the U.S. dollar but rather there was less invoicing in 
producer’s currency (the Swedish krona). Goldberg and Tille (2005) observe that the U.S. 
dollar is still the dominant currency with U.S. exports and imports to Latin America, China, 
Mexico, and most small countries being almost exclusively invoiced in U.S. dollar. While 
U.S. exports to other countries are exclusively invoiced in U.S. dollar, exports to Germany, 
the UK and Japan are to a small amount invoiced in local currency. Goldberg and Tille (2005) 
also find evidence for a strong role of the U.S. dollar as vehicle currency, especially in Korea, 
Thailand, Japan, Australia, the UK17 and Greece. They find, however, a declining importance 
of the U.S. dollar as vehicle currency due to a reduction in organized trade. In her analysis on 
accession countries Goldberg (2005) argues that the accession countries are using the euro to 
a degree that is higher than optimal given their trade partners’ composition of trade and the 
variance and covariance of macroeconomic conditions vis-à-vis the trading partners.  
Altogether it has to be said that empirical evidence is still very scarce due to the lack of 
internationally comparable data. To get more robust results on the determinants of invoicing 
strategies and the possible development of the euro as an invoicing currency, I considerably 
expand the data base of Goldberg and Tille (2005).  
__________
16 Reference pricing refers to goods which are not necessarily centrally traded, but for which there are common 
price quotations for example in insider journals. Goldberg and Tille (2005) use an index created by Rauch 
(1999). For further details see next section.  
17 While UK exports to non-U.S. countries do not exhibit this strong bias to the use of the dollar as vehicle 
currency, this pattern can be observed with UK imports from non-U.S. countries. 
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2.3 Empirical Findings 
The main reason why there has not been more empirical research on the invoicing currency in 
trade is the scarcity of the data. As discussed in the previous section there are only a few 
econometric studies on the choice of invoicing currency and these include only evidence on 
Canada, the Netherlands and Sweden. While these studies are very valuable as country studies 
it is necessary to take in the broader picture of as many countries as possible. Goldberg and 
Tille (2005) give first empirical findings on a broader set of countries. My dataset is much 
larger18 and I will focus on the role of the euro as invoicing currency. While I also consider 
U.S. dollar invoicing, I will put it into a framework where the launch of the euro plays a 
decisive role.  
2.3.1 The Invoicing Database 
Annual aggregated data on currency invoicing is taken from national central banks, 
statistical offices and from a survey by the ECB.19 For an overview of the complete set of 
invoicing data see Figure 2.1 and Table A2.1 of the Appendix. The currency of invoicing is in 
most cases approximated by the currency of settlement.20 In some countries data was 
collected by the central banks with a reporting system covering cross-border payments (e.g. 
the Netherlands until 2002), other countries conduct a survey (e.g. Germany). In some 
countries the data on invoicing is an approximation retrieved from the currency structure of 
foreign exchange receipts and payments (e.g. Slovakia). If a distinction is possible, data for 
trade in goods is chosen as compared to trade in services.21 For the very rare case that there is 
no distinction between exports and imports only overall trade is reported, this is taken as an 
__________
18 While Goldberg and Tille (2005) use data on 25 countries for one point in time, my dataset consists of 42 
countries and more than 150 observations.  
19 For details see Table A2.1 of the Appendix. Data from the “ECB data request” is data collected by the 
European Central Bank (ECB). For details see also Review of the International Role of the Euro published by the 
ECB (2005) in December 2005.  
20 For some data it is unclear whether reference is to currency of invoicing or settlement. However, the 
differences in the two are likely to be negligible according to Page (1977, 1981). For convenience, I will 
hereafter refer to invoicing data, bearing in mind the above qualifications. 
21 For most of the EU countries data on services exists. This data is not included in this paper. It is available in 
the Review of the International Role of the Euro published by the ECB (2005) in December 2005.  
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Figure 2.1: Average share of currencies used in exports and imports by region  
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Note: Before 1999 euro stands for the euro area legacy currencies. Other (currencies) is calculated as residual. 
Source: See Appendix A1, data for euro area based on extra-euro area trade, own calculations. 
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approximation for both export and import invoicing.22 Before 1999 invoicing in euro is 
defined as invoicing in the euro area legacy currencies.23 Altogether the database includes 
data on 42 countries. Some data is available already for a longer time period. I cover an 
estimation period from 1994 until 2004. The dataset is, however, unbalanced over time so that 
for some countries there are up to 10 observations and for others only 1.  
As can be seen from Figure 2.1, the use of invoicing currencies differs considerably 
between regions.24 The U.S. dollar is by far the dominant currency in the Asia Pacific region, 
while the euro has become the dominant invoicing currency for trade of EU-25 and candidate 
countries (excluding euro area countries). The share of euro invoicing has increased over 
time, both for EU-25 countries and for extra euro area trade of euro area countries. This seems 
to be at the cost of U.S. dollar invoicing. The British Pound (GBP) and the Japanese Yen 
(JPY) only play a minor role for currency invoicing in trade. 
To assess the development of the invoicing practices in world trade I compare the new data 
on invoicing currencies with the projections of currency invoicing by Hartmann (1998). In his 
study Hartmann considers different scenarios implying different shares of euro invoicing. The 
column in Table 2.1 labelled “Hartmann (EU-11) 1992” gives the share of euro invoicing he 
projected for 1999 based on the assumption that countries have the same share of home 
currency invoicing as in 1992 (58%). Comparing this number to the number resulting from 
the new dataset for 1999 (column three), it can be seen that it is very similar to the projections 
made for the start of the monetary union under the assumption of no change in behaviour 
(1992). The column labelled “Hartmann (EU-11) like USA” gives the share of euro invoicing 
Hartmann projects in his most optimistic scenario based on the assumption that EMU 
countries increase their share of home currency invoicing to U.S. levels (92%). In this case he 
projects that the share of euro invoicing would rise to 25 percent.25 The data provided in this 
paper shows that the share of euro invoicing in 2004 was higher than this number (27.7) even 
though the share of home currency invoicing remained at around 60 percent in EMU countries 
and thus was still much lower than in the U.S. Since the increase in the share of the euro is not 
__________
22 This is the case only for Slovakia, data from Latvia for the years 1994 to 2000 and for Malaysia for the years 
1999 to 2003.  
23 For some countries only data on the share of some legacy currencies (mainly the DEM) is available.  
24 Unfortunately, there is no data at all for Latin America. Presumably, the U.S. dollar is by far the dominant 
currency of invoicing in this region.  
25 For a detailed description of this scenario see Hartmann (1998, p. 435).  
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due to its use as home currency it must be due to the use of the euro as vehicle currency. In 
particular, the use of the euro as vehicle currency in Central and Eastern European trade is 
much higher than Hartmann expected.26  
 
Table 2.1: Trade Invoicing Comparison with Hartmann (1998) 
 Hartmann Hartmann 1999a 2004b
  
(EU-11) 1992 (EU-11) like USA (EU-12)  (EU-12)  
USD invoicing in "extra-
EMU" world exports (in %) 55.7 / 55.4 49.1 
Euro invoicing in "extra-
EMU" world exports (in %) 18.8 25 20.8 27.7 
  Sources: Hartmann (1998), 1999 and 2004 author's calculations.   
Note: The author’s calculations of the 1999 and 2004 shares are based on real data coverage of 67 percent of 
“extra-EMU” world exports for euro invoicing and 58 percent for U.S. dollar invoicing. The remaining share 
of trade was estimated by taking the invoicing share of Portugal as approximation for the remaining EMU 
countries without data coverage (Austria, Finland and Ireland). As the data coverage for European countries is 
very high and there is no data at all for Latin America, the rest of the not covered trade was approximated 
using the share of currency invoicing of Thailand. This should be on the lower side of possible euro invoicing.  
a For 1999, if data for 1999 was unavailable the data points closest to 1999 were taken.  
b For 2004, if data for 2004 was unavailable the latest available data was taken.  
 
When comparing the share of euro invoicing to the share of U.S. dollar invoicing in Table 
2.1 it is evident that the dollar is still the dominant currency in world trade and that the euro is 
not likely to challenge the leading role of the U.S. dollar in the foreseeable future. However, 
there is evidence not only of the increasing importance of the euro as world currency but of 
the slightly diminishing role of the U.S. dollar. The following empirical analysis tries to shed 
some light on the role of the U.S. dollar and euro as vehicle currencies and how these are 
interacting. While the new dataset is a very important benchmark for the analysis of currency 
invoicing in international trade, the main shortcomings of the dataset are that for such a broad 
set of countries no bilateral data on currency invoicing is available. This is a problem insofar 
as the distinction between PCP, VCP and LCP becomes difficult and for most countries 
__________
26 Hartmann (1998) assumes a subdued scenario for interregional trade in the Central and Eastern European 
Countries. He already mentions, however, that a resurgence of trade in the region “may give a boost to the euro” 
(p. 440). 
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impossible.27 In the following analysis, I control for this by including each country’s share of 
exports to and imports from the U.S. for the U.S. dollar invoicing regressions and from the 
euro area for the Euro invoicing regressions. In a further step, I conduct an analysis on home 
currency invoicing with a reduced dataset for all those countries where data is available.  
2.3.2 The Explanatory Variables 
First of all, some explanatory variables concerning bilateral trade are created. To control for 
the exports and imports to and from the U.S. and the euro area I include the respective shares 
of exports and imports of a country’s total exports and imports. The data are taken from the 
IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. This database is also used to create a measure of market 
power created as the share of a country’s total exports to world exports, which should reflect 
the size of a country’s firm. Following the approach in Goldberg and Tille (2005), to take into 
account the share of trade in differentiated products a variable is created according to the 
Rauch (1999) definitions.28 The data on commodities is taken from the UN Comtrade 
database. The definition of the group of products is very precise in the sense that it does not 
only divide into aggregated groups of commodities and non commodities, but it is detailed up 
to the fourth digit code of the SITC.29 The share of exports and imports of differentiated 
products in total exports and imports is calculated for the year 2004.30  
To capture the influence of exchange rate risk, I set up a variable on exchange rate 
volatility. I construct a four-month moving average standard deviation of the nominal 
exchange rates of a country’s currency vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar and vis-à-vis the euro (vis-à-
vis the DEM before the introduction of the euro in 1999) respectively. As variable describing 
a country’s monetary stability I use the inflation differential to the U.S and to the euro area (to 
__________
27 Most countries just provide data on invoicing in U.S. dollar and Euro. For all non-U.S and non euro area 
countries this leaves the possibility that the invoicing is in vehicle currency, in LCP (for exports going to the U.S 
and the euro area) or in PCP (for imports coming from the U.S. and the euro area). 
28 Rauch (1999) classifies all commodities by “looking them up in International Commodity Markets Handbook 
and The Knight- Ridder CRB Commodity Yearbook (to check for organized exchanges) and Commodity Prices 
(to check for reference prices, e.g., price quotations published in trade journals such as Chemical Marketing 
Reporter).” Products belonging to one of these categories are “organized exchange” or “reference price” goods, 
all others are differentiated goods.  
29 Codes are taken from http://www.macalester.edu/research/economics/PAGE/HAVEMAN/Trade.Resources 
/TradeData.html#Rauch and are based on the liberal classification of Rauch (1999).  
30 The share is assumed to be constant over time as the structure of trade is not likely to change from one year to 
another. See Table A2.2 of the Appendix.  
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Germany before 1999). Monthly data for both the inflation and the nominal exchange rates 
are taken from the IMF International Financial Statistics database.  
I then specify a set of dummy variables. In particular, I construct a dummy that takes on the 
value of 1 for all countries which are either part of the European Union in 2005 (EU-25) or 
are formally recognized as EU candidate countries and 0 otherwise.31 In addition, to take into 
account structural changes due to the introduction of the euro, I create a step dummy that 
takes on the value of 1 from 2002 on. This is when the euro currency was introduced and the 
the use of the national legacy currencies was discontinued.32 To mirror the availability of a 
currency on the forward market a dummy is created that takes on the value 1 for all those 
countries (currencies) which had a forward market in 1999.33 Two other dummies are created 
that take on the value 1 for all those years in which a country had a hard peg either to the U.S 
dollar or to the euro respectively.34 For a complete list of variables see the Appendix.  
2.3.3 Empirical Methods 
As my dataset covers both a cross-sectional and a time-series dimension, I estimate a panel 
model. The first estimation method I use is a one-way random-effects GLS panel. The random 
effects model is preferred to the fixed effects model as country specific constants would result 
in a considerable loss of degrees of freedom. More importantly, I also want to consider time-
invariant explanatory variables, which is not possible in a fixed effects model. The Breusch-
Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test for a zero variance of the individual errors could be rejected 
for every estimation. This implies that my dataset cannot be pooled. At the same time I 
choose a one-way as compared to a two-way random effects model because my panel is 
highly unbalanced on the time dimension. To test whether the estimators are biased I perform 
a Hausman test comparing the coefficients of the fixed and the random effects estimation. The 
null hypothesis of no systematic differences cannot be rejected in almost all of the cases, so 
__________
31 This dummy variable is not time-variant as it tries to capture the group of countries that have been, throughout 
the period under consideration, part of the EU or widely seen as prospective members of the EU.  
32 I also experimented with having the dummy take on the value of 1 starting in 1999. This leads to very similar 
results. There are, however, only a few observations before 1999. This is why the 2002 dummy is preferred.  
33 The choice of the year 1999 is somewhat ad hoc, but it is chosen to coincide with the introduction of the 
forward market for the euro in 1999. 
34 In particular, this is for the euro (DEM before 1999): Estonia (from 1992), Bulgaria (from 1998) and 
Lithuania (from 2002). For the U.S. dollar: Lithuania (from 1994 to 2001) and Malaysia (from 1999).  
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that the random effects coefficient estimates should be consistent and asymptotically efficient. 
As a second estimation method I report the results for a fixed effects estimation to show the 
robustness of the results. The third estimation method I use is a Prais-Winston estimation with 
panel corrected standard errors. This controls for possible heteroscedasticity across the panel 
and panel specific autocorrelation. The last estimation method I apply is a Prais-Winston 
regression with importance weights. As the dataset includes data on very diverse economies, 
it is interesting to see whether the inclusion of the GDP of the country as importance weight 
makes a difference to the estimation results. While it would also be interesting to estimate a 
logit or probit model, the nature of the new dataset makes it a sub-optimal choice as there 
would be a loss of observations both over time and over countries as only a few countries 
report both the share of U.S. dollar and of euro invoicing and even less report the share of 
own currency invoicing. Likewise, the limited time dimension of the panel does not allow for 
a study of the dynamics of the panel. This would have been an interesting analysis especially 
with respect to the possible persistence of currency invoicing. 
2.3.4 The Empirical Model for U.S. Dollar Export Invoicing 
I first examine the cross-sectional and intertemporal variation in U.S. Dollar (USD) invoicing 
for exports of around 30 countries over a period from 1994 to 2004. The data is highly 
unbalanced as for some countries there is only 1 observation while for others there are up to 
10 observations. The most general one-way random effects model I estimate is the following: 
usdexBitB = β B1 B + β B2 Bshexus BitB + β B3 BeurinstBi B + β B4 Beuroint BitB + β B5 Brauex Bi B + β B6 Busexvol BitB + β B7 Businf BitB 
+ β B8BfmdumBi B + β B9 BusdpegBitB + uBitB, (2.1) 
where i= 1,…30, t = 1, ….10 (highly unbalanced) and uBitB = v Bi B + e BitB , where v Bi B is the random 
error attributable to countries and eBitB is a white noise residual. In this specification usdex is the 
share of exports invoiced in U.S. dollar in percentage terms and shexus stands for the share of 
a country’s exports to the U.S. relative to a country’s total exports. I expect a country to have 
a higher share of U.S. dollar invoicing the higher the share of trade with the U.S. T35T  
__________
T
35
T In this sense the variable should capture all local currency pricing to the U.S.  
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Eurinst is a 0/1 dummy taking on the value 1 for all EU-25 and candidate countries while 
euroint is a 0/1 dummy taking on the value 1 for all observations from 2002 onwards 
mirroring the introduction of the euro currency and the discontinuation of the legacy 
currencies. These two dummies should reflect whether being a (prospective or actual) member 
of the EU, even for those who are not yet participating in the monetary union, makes a 
difference in their choice of invoicing currency. The second dummy tries to capture the 
individual effect attributable to the introduction of the common currency. I expect both 
variables to have a negative impact on USD invoicing. In particular, the “herding effect” 
brought forward by Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2002) and Goldberg and Tille (2005) 
implies that because a monetary union has a higher “country” share than the individual 
country before, invoicing in that currency is more likely and makes the use of the USD less 
likely. 
The impact of the variable usexvol is ambiguous. As discussed at large in the previous 
section, the evidence on the impact of exchange rate risk is very ambiguous. In particular the 
influence depends on the level of product differentiation. While for differentiated products, an 
exporter would want to avoid a foreign currency to limit the fluctuations of the price he 
receives, for less differentiated products the exporter wants to limit his quantity uncertainty 
and tends to set prices in the same currency as the competitor.  
As I cannot distinguish between differentiated goods at the industry level, I set up a 
variable capturing a country’s share of differentiated trade. Rauex is the time invariant share 
of a country’s differentiated products in total exports.36 This variable is constructed to 
account for the possibility of different pricing strategies for differentiated and non-
differentiated goods, the exporter being more likely to want to keep its relative prices stable in 
the case that his exports are non-differentiated.37 The most likely assumption is that there is a 
natural herding in USD (also reflected in the goods traded in world markets or goods with a 
referenced price). Thus, rauex is expected to have a negative influence on USD invoicing 
since the higher the share of differentiated goods the more likely the exporter can set the price 
in the own currency.  
__________
36 Defined as total exports minus exports of goods priced on world markets and referenced goods. For a more 
detailed description see the section on data description.  
37 For a more detailed explanation see the section on the theoretical literature.  
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Usinf reflects the monetary stability of a country. A high inflation differential with respect 
to the U.S. stands for economic instability, which makes the use of that country’s currency 
less likely. The forward market dummy fmdum reflects the presence of a forward market. If a 
forward market for their currency exists, exporters are more likely to be able to use their own 
currency as the importer can hedge the exchange rate risk. I take the presence of a forward 
market (already in 1999) as a sign that this country’s currency is available easily and at low 
cost. The existence of a forward market implies more invoicing in that currency (PCP) and 
less invoicing in USD (VCP). Usdpeg is a 0/1 dummy that takes on the value 1 for periods 
where a country’s currency is in a hard peg with the USD.  
Table 2.2 summarizes the results of the regression. As discussed in the section on 
methodology the table reports several estimation methods as a robustness check. When 
discussing the regression results the main focus will be on the random effects regression while 
always checking for possible discrepancies to the other estimations. Since the dependent 
variable is expressed in percentage points, the coefficients of the dummy variables can be 
directly added or subtracted. The coefficients of the other variables have to be multiplied with 
the value of the variable to give the percentage point impact.38  
Both in the random effects and in the fixed effects specification the share of exports going 
to the U.S. does not have a significant impact on USD currency invoicing. This is likely due 
to the fact that for most countries the use of the U.S. dollar as a vehicle currency is much 
more important than its use in bilateral trade with the U.S.39 Being part of the EU, as defined 
above, significantly reduces the average share of exports invoiced in U.S. dollar (by around 
35 percentage points). Likewise, the introduction of the euro currency in 2002 reduced export 
invoicing in USD by around 4 percentage points. This could point at some substitution of 
vehicle currency use from USD to the euro. It could, however, also be that countries of the 
euro area which previously relied more on USD invoicing are now able to invoice in their 
own currency. We will see more evidence on the role of the euro as vehicle currency in the 
sections on euro invoicing. 
__________
38 The constant need not be between 0 and 100. The economic interpretation being that it is the share of 
invoicing in the currency given the explanatory variables take on their average value. Thus, as is the case for 
euro invoicing, the constant can take on a negative value.  
39 In an alternative specification, I include the exports by Asian countries not only to the U.S. but also those 
going to the East Asian Dollar Block. This variable then has a significant positive impact on U.S. dollar 
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Table 2.2:     
U.S. Dollar Export Invoicing     
Dependent variable: share of exports invoiced in U.S. Dollar (in percentage points) 
 
Regression random fixed PWa weightedb
Constant 94.95*** 49.21*** 92.29*** 96.80*** 
 (9.39) (18.79) (19.38) (18.35) 
Share of exports to U.S  0.04 0.04 0.17*** 0.16*** 
 (0.23) (0.18) (2.64) (4.15) 
EU-25 and candidates -36.16***  -22.20*** -20.05*** 
 (-5.58)  (-5.56) (-14.95) 
Introduction of the euro (2002) -4.56*** -4.63*** -2.71*** -2.00*** 
 (-6.38) (-6.32) (-3.24) (-4.58) 
Share of differentiated exports -0.35*  -0.51*** -0.46*** 
 (-1.81)  (-5.34) (-3.92) 
Exchange rate volatility to U.S. -23.40 -22.15 -14.37 32.61 
 (-0.82) (-0.76) (-0.42) (1.22) 
Inflation differential to U.S.  0.32*** 0.32*** 0.17** -0.02 
 (5.39) (5.27) (2.45) (-0.15) 
Forward market -5.63  -8.01*** -16.70*** 
 (-1.13)  (-3.15) (-2.98) 
Peg to USD 9.56*** 9.33** 9.67*** 6.38 
  (2.70) (2.61) (2.69) (0.34) 
Number of observations 176 176 176 176 
Number of countries 36 36 36 36 
Wald chi2 188.7  655.0 2474.0 
R squared overall 0.69 0.03 0.94 0.98 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
a Prais-Winston regression with heteroscedastic panel corrected standard errors and panel specific AR1. 
b Prais-Winston regression with het. panel corrected standard errors. Importance weighted with GDP. 
 
The share of differentiated products in exports has a significantly negative effect on the 
share of exports invoiced in USD for all estimations. This confirms the findings of Goldberg 
and Tille (2005). The product differentiation does matter as expected by the theory. The 
exchange rate risk, however, does not have a significant impact on the invoicing decision in 
any estimation and, as expected, yields ambiguous results.40 It could be that the exchange rate 
__________
invoicing while not affecting the other results. As the trade between East Asian Dollar Block countries still has 
to be considered as vehicle currency invoicing this confirms the role of the U.S. dollar as vehicle currency. 
40 Goldberg (2005) suggests for example that rather than on the exchange rate volatility the invoicing decision 
depends on a covariance between marginal cost and exchange rates. 
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volatility is not significant because the effect of exchange rate uncertainty depends on the 
degree of product differentiation. To test for this I include an interaction variable of exchange 
rate volatility and the share of differentiated products. This variable is, however, also highly 
insignificant.41 Countries with a hard peg to the USD should have a 9 percentage points 
higher share of exports invoiced in USD. All the dummy variables are straightforward in their 
interpretation as they take on the value of one for all data points included in that group. This 
means that the coefficients for dummy variables directly show the impact of belonging to this 
group on the dependent variable, while the size of the coefficients for the other variables does 
not necessarily say something about their importance as they have to be multiplied with the 
variable. Thus, the coefficient of the share of differentiated products seems to be very small. 
However, a country like Germany with around 70 percent of its exports being differentiated 
should ceteris paribus have around 25 percentage points less USD invoicing compared to a 
country like Algeria with almost no differentiated exports.  
The financial stability of a country also matters for the choice of currency in trade. High 
inflation differentials to the U.S. significantly increase USD invoicing.42 A country like 
Indonesia with an average inflation differential to the U.S. of around 6 percentage points 
(from 2000 to 2004) should on average invoice around 2 percentage points more of its exports 
in U.S. dollar than a country with the same inflation rate as the U.S. The existence of a 
forward market for the country’s currency reduces the invoicing in USD by around 5 
percentage points. This result is, however, only statistically significant in some of the 
equations. In other specifications not reported in the table, the measure of market power, that 
is a country’s export share in total world exports, was also included. While this did not change 
the other results, neither the market power of a single country nor the market power of the 
whole euro area were found to be significant. The same is true if GDP is taken as a measure of 
a country’s market power. It is not significant in any of the estimations.43  
__________
41 I also experimented with including adaptive exchange rate expectations modelled as the 4 year average of the 
exchange rate, but this variable was insignificant. Likewise, the spread with the U.S. dollar was also 
insignificant. Results are available on request.  
42 In the case of the inflation differential variable (as for exchange rate volatility), extreme data points are 
excluded because in relation to these extreme points, other country and time specific differences are likely to be 
dominated. Also, I did not want my estimations to be driven by some extreme data points. This is only the case 
for Indonesia in 1998.  
43 This is the case not only for the U.S. dollar estimations, but also for the estimations for euro and home 
currency invoicing. Likewise, I experimented with including inflation volatility and money volatility as measures 
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I also perform estimations on U.S dollar import invoicing. While from a theoretical point of 
view the currency of import invoicing reflects the choice of the exporter rather than the 
importer on the micro level, the macro level evidence of the importing country’s 
characteristics still give interesting insights. In general, the results of the export invoicing 
estimation are confirmed. In particular, the results concerning the importance of the variables 
related to membership in the EU and introduction of the euro give qualitatively the same 
results. The exchange rate volatility is still insignificant as is the share of imports coming 
from the U.S., while the forward market dummy is this time inconclusive (see Table A2.3 of 
the Appendix). Highly differentiated goods are again significantly less likely to be invoiced in 
U.S. dollar. High inflation differentials to the U.S again increase the share of imports in USD. 
Of course from the theoretical point of view, it does make a difference whether the exporter or 
the importer exhibits high inflation differentials, but as the invoicing in USD is interpreted as 
vehicle currency invoicing it just shows that when either the exporting or the importing 
country’s currency are instable, pricing in vehicle currency is more likely. While the role of 
the euro as vehicle currency is not easy to infer from these estimation results, I have a closer 
look at this in the following section. 
2.3.5 The Empirical Model for Euro Export Invoicing 
The estimation is structured in the same way as the USD invoicing estimations:T44T  
eurexBitB = β B1 B+ β B2 Bshexeur BitB + β B3 BeurinstBi B + β B4 BeurointBitB + β B5 BrauexBi B + β B6 BeurexvolBitB + 
β B7BeuroinfBitB + β B8 BfmdumBi B + β B9 BeurpegBitB + uBit B,     (2.2) 
where eurex is the share of exports invoiced in euro and shexeur the share of exports going to 
the euro area, eurexvol the exchange rate volatility vis-à-vis the euro, euroinf the inflation 
differential to the euro area and eurpeg is a 0/1 dummy variable that takes on the value 1 for 
all those periods in which a country had a hard peg vis-à-vis the euro.  
__________
of financial stability. While the qualitative results were quite similar, these variables were not significant in any 
specification.  
T
44
T The euro area countries are left out in the euro invoicing estimation, of course. This data will be part of the 
home invoicing estimations. 
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Table 2.3 presents an overview of the estimation results. It shows that being part of or a 
candidate for the EU increases euro export invoicing by around 17 percentage points. When 
comparing this coefficient with the coefficient on eurinst in the USD estimations, we can see 
that it is smaller. The explanation for this is straightforward, as in the euro specification the 
share of exports going to the euro area does have a significant positive effect as expected.45 
This does already show that unlike the USD which is mainly used as vehicle currency, the use 
of the euro might rather be concentrated in bilateral trade. It is also interesting to see that 
being part of Europe does seem to have an impact on euro invoicing which is not necessarily 
linked to the higher trade share of these countries with Europe.46 The introduction of the 
common currency increased the share of exports invoiced in euro as compared to the share of 
exports invoiced in legacy currencies before by around 6 percentage points. This coefficient is 
comparable to the reduction of U.S. dollar invoicing which comes with the introduction of the 
euro in the USD export invoicing equation.  
How important is the role of the euro as vehicle currency? The table reveals that the share 
of the differentiated products (rauex) has a significant and positive impact on euro export 
invoicing. This is an interesting finding in the question on whether the euro is used as a 
vehicle currency. If the euro were substantially used as a third currency in trade, less 
differentiated goods would be more likely to be invoiced in euro and products with higher 
differentiation would be invoiced in euro to a lesser amount.47 The contrary is the case, and 
the results, thus, just reflect the lower share of U.S. dollar invoicing for more differentiated 
products. Or to put it the other way around, it reflects the higher share of USD vehicle 
currency pricing in less differentiated products like primary commodities. 
__________
45 A country like Estonia with around 40 percent of its exports going to the euro area has an around 20 
percentage points higher invoicing in euro in addition of the around 16 percentage points due belonging to the 
EU. 
46 I also experimented with including a geographical measure of distance. The geographical distance in 
combination with shexeur and eurinst is not significant. Only when either shexeur or eurinst are excluded is the 
measure of distance significant. The other results do not change qualitatively. This analysis was performed to 
control for possible collinearity between the share of exports and the dummy for being part of or a prospective 
member of the EU25. As both variables are significant, however, this should not be a problem but can be kept in 
mind when interpreting the ceteris paribus impact of the two variables.  
47 The impact should still be negative even if it reflects bilateral trade with the euro area (for which I try to 
control), as it should make local currency pricing (the exports to the euro area invoiced in euro) less likely.  
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Table 2.3:     
Euro Export Invoicing     
Dependent variable: share of exports invoiced in euro (in percentage points) 
 
Regression random fixed PWa weightedb
Constant -20.59* 20.78*** -28.66*** -2.44 
 (-1.92) (4.35) (-5.73) (-0.29) 
Share of exports to euro area  0.47*** 0.31** 0.67*** 0.44** 
 (4.66) (2.53) (9.24) (2.37) 
EU-25 and candidates 16.99**  15.50*** 7.28 
 (2.4)  (4.17) (0.93) 
Introduction of the euro (2002) 6.34*** 6.27*** 4.20*** 1.73** 
 (7.43) (7.33) (4.82) (2.05) 
Share of differentiated exports 0.49**  0.52*** 0.17** 
 (2.45)  (4.38) (2.54) 
Exchange rate volatility to euro 70.26* 80.41** 18.95 37.65 
 (1.95) (2.23) (0.53) (0.98) 
Inflation differential to euro area  -0.30*** -0.33*** -0.18*** -0.07 
 (-4.53) (-4.91) (-3.06) (-0.32) 
Forward market -7.59  2.92 -8.78 
 (-1.34)  (1.09) (-1.52) 
Peg to euro 12.95*** 13.64*** 8.54** 15.54 
  (3.53) (3.53) (2.56) (0.99) 
Number of observations 152 152 152 152 
Number of countries 29 29 29 29 
Wald chi2 234.4  894.8 105.1 
R squared overall 0.76 0.47 0.93 0.76 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
a Prais-Winston regression with heteroscedastic panel corrected standard errors and panel specific AR1. 
b Prais-Winston regression with het. panel corrected standard errors. Importance weighted with GDP. 
 
The possible role of the euro as vehicle currency could also be reflected as a higher share of 
euro invoicing for an economy which displays high exchange rate volatility and high financial 
instability. The impact of the exchange rate volatility is significantly positive unlike in the 
case for U.S. dollar invoicing, although this finding is not stable over the different estimation 
methodologies. This result confirms that the findings for exchange rate risk are quite 
ambiguous.48 At the same time it gives some evidence for the theoretical argument that a 
more stable currency is preferred. There is, thus, a role for the euro as a vehicle currency in 
__________
48 Silva (2004) also points out this lack of evidence on the impact of exchange rate risk. 
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trade between countries with high exchange rate volatility. At the same time, if a country 
exhibits monetary instability it should be more likely to invoice in a vehicle currency, so that 
there should be a positive impact of inflation differentials on euro invoicing if the euro were 
used as a vehicle currency. The inflation differential with the euro area does have a 
significantly negative impact on euro export invoicing, however. This shows that if countries 
choose a vehicle currency, the choice is most likely the USD. This is then a convincing 
argument against a leading role of the euro as compared to the U.S. dollar. It could, however, 
be argued that the estimation results only reflect the choice between USD and euro invoicing, 
while the euro might be preferred in the choice between own currency and vehicle currency. 
When setting the share of export invoicing in relation to the (approximated) share of home 
currency invoicing leaving out USD invoicing, the inflation differential has an insignificantly 
positive impact on euro invoicing. It is also interesting to see that in this estimation the share 
of exports going to the euro area, being part or a candidate of the European Union, the 
introduction of the euro and the dummy for a hard peg to the euro still have significant 
positive effects. The share of differentiated products does still have a positive, albeit 
insignificant effect on euro invoicing. Another interesting finding is, that countries without a 
forward market are – in this specification significantly so – more likely to invoice in euro.49 
Thus, there does seem to be a case for the euro as vehicle currency even though in comparison 
with the U.S. dollar the role of the euro as vehicle currency seems to be limited.  
The estimation results for euro import invoicing (see Table A2.4 of the appendix) confirm 
the finding that the euro is not extensively used as a vehicle currency as compared to the U.S. 
dollar, but that there are signs of a growing role of the euro as vehicle currency.50 Altogether 
it can be said that the findings of the euro import invoicing estimation are compatible both 
with the export estimation and with the results for U.S. dollar import invoicing. They indicate 
that the role of the euro as vehicle currency is still rather limited, especially in comparison 
with the role of the U.S. dollar as a vehicle currency. There are, however, strong signs of an 
__________
49 The latter results have to be interpreted with the utmost care, however, as the transformation of data cannot be 
performed consistently due to a lack of bilateral data. Especially the variables including relative trade shares are 
critical, while the interpretation of the inflation differentials and the forward market dummy should be 
unproblematic. Results are available on request.  
50 For the import specification the forward market dummy is significantly negative in some of the estimations, 
implying that for a country with a forward market there is less euro invoicing. This shows that the euro is used as 
a vehicle currency for countries lacking a forward market. Other results are qualitatively the same as in the 
export estimations.  
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increasing importance of the euro both at the cost of the U.S. dollar as vehicle currency and at 
the cost of local currencies.  
2.3.6 The Empirical Model for Home Currency Export Invoicing (PCP) 
Unlike the estimations for U.S. dollar and euro invoicing, this estimation is a straightforward 
test of the PCP theory, as it tests the extent to which exports are denominated in a country’s 
own currency. The observations are mainly based on the home invoicing of euro area 
countries in extra-euro area trade. The specification of the PCP invoicing equation is as 
follows: 
homexBitB = β B1 B + β B2 Bmp BitB + β B3 BeurinstBi B + β B4 BeurointBitB + β B5 BrauexBi B +β B6 BusinfBitB +β B7 BfmdumBitB + uBit,B
           (2.3) 
where homex is the share of exports invoiced in the exporter’s home currency (PCP) and 
mp is the country’s export share in world exports, taken to be an indicator for market power.T51T 
Table 2.4 shows that being part of or candidate for the European Union significantly 
increases the share of PCP in exports by around 15 percentage points. The market power of 
the exporting economy also plays a significant role. The higher the share of a country’s 
exports in world exports, the more likely it is to invoice in its own currency. This could of 
course also indicate that a country pertaining to a monetary union is more likely to invoice its 
(extra-union) exports in home currency already due to the fact that the common market power 
is higher.T52T The introduction of the euro currency does have a separate significantly positive 
impact on home invoicing. This is because out of the 19 countries for which data is available 
9 countries are part of the euro area.  
__________
T
51
T For the euro area countries mp is the share of extra euro area exports to world exports 
T
52
T This effect does, however, not seem to be very high, yet. In an alternative specification I tested for the 
influence of the individual countries’ market shares. They are also found to be significant and deliver 
comparable results. 
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Table 2.4:     
Home Currency Export Invoicing     
Dependent variable: share of exports invoiced in producer currency (in percentage points) 
Regression random fixed PWa weightedb
Constant -22.79** 26.77*** -50.10*** -34.34*** 
 (-2.00) (12.64) (-6.32) (-4.80) 
Share of exports in world exports  0.49*** 0.41** 0.22 0.36*** 
 (2.60) (2.12) (1.45) (5.66) 
EU-25 and candidates 14.58**  14.53*** 14.63*** 
 (2.42)  (2.99) (18.98) 
Introduction of the euro (2002) 4.66*** 4.75*** 4.76*** 2.41*** 
 (4.57) (4.71) (3.61) (5.65) 
Share of differentiated exports 0.25  0.50*** 0.28*** 
 (1.22)  (4.66) (3.16) 
Exchange rate volatility to U.S. 17.67 21.44 10.73 -31.12 
 (0.44) (0.54) (0.28) (-1.44) 
Inflation differential to U.S.  -0.11 -0.06 -0.11 0.00 
 (-0.94) (-0.49) (-1.05) (0.04) 
Forward market 30.66***  48.56*** 47.85*** 
  (4.00)   (12.25) (21.18) 
Number of observations 92 92 92 92 
Number of countries 19 19 19 19 
Wald chi2 98.2  1251.1 49591.3 
R squared overall 0.76 0.54 0.95 0.97 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
a Prais-Winston regression with heteroscedastic panel corrected standard errors and panel specific AR1. 
b Prais-Winston regression with het. panel corrected standard errors. Importance weighted with GDP. 
 
The share of differentiated products has a positive sign as expected and is significant in 
most of the specifications. The inflation differential on the other hand is always insignificant, 
albeit mostly with the expected sign. The reason why the results are not so significant can 
partly be attributed to the fact that for the home specification there are much fewer 
observations and the cross section is much smaller. Another reason could be that the euro area 
countries don’t exhibit strong divergence in terms of inflation differentials with the U.S. If a 
country has a developed financial system as modelled with the forward market dummy it is 
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more likely to invoice its exports in the own currency.T53T The volatility of the exchange rate 
towards the U.S. dollar does not have any significant impact.  
2.3.7 The Empirical Model for Home Currency Import Invoicing (LCP) 
In the most general specification I expect the market power of the importing country, i.e. the 
share of a country’s exports in total world exports, the share of differentiated products 
imported and the monetary stability of the importing country to be significant.T54T The most 
general specification has the following structure:  
 
homeimBitB = β B1B+ β B2 Bmp BitB + β B3 BeurinstBi B + β B4 BeurointBitB + β B5 BrauimBi B +β B6 BusinfBitB +β B7 BfmdumBitB + uBitB,
           (2.4) 
where homeim stands for imports invoiced in the importer’s home currency (LCP).  
As can be seen from Table 2.5, the market power of the importer has a significantly 
positive influence on home currency invoicing in all regressions. Thus, the higher the market 
power of an economy, the more likely it is that this country’s imports are invoiced in the 
home currency.T55T In the alternative specification, where only the market share of the 
individual country is included, this variable is not always significant. There is, therefore, a 
weak indication that the monetary union does increase the likelihood of imports being 
invoiced in the union’s currency as herding in euro becomes more likely. 
 
  
__________
T
53
T I also experimented with including the private credit to GDP ratio as a measure of financial development. For 
the home export invoicing estimations this variable is insignificant as was the case for vehicle currency invoicing 
in U.S. dollar and euro. Only for the home import invoicing estimation does the coefficient become significantly 
positive (as expected) when the forward market dummy is excluded due to possible collinearity. This does not 
change the other results.  
T
54
T Ideally, the characteristics of the exporting country would also be included. Due to the lack of bilateral 
invoicing data, this is difficult to determine. Alternatively one could include a trade weighted average of the 
exporting countries’ market power (to one importing country) and monetary stability. Goldberg and Tille (2005) 
experiment with this and do not get satisfactory results.  
T
55
T Alternatively, the size of the country could also be included. I chose the share of exports in relation to world 
exports as a proxy, however, as Rey (2001) states that the use of vehicle currencies cannot be explained by a 
large GDP but by high trade flows.  
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Table 2.5:     
Home Currency Import Invoicing     
Dependent variable: share of imports invoiced in local currency (in percentage points) 
 
Regression random fixed PWa weightedb
Constant -31.52*** 18.47*** -47.85*** -33.02*** 
 (-2.68) (11.76) (-10.43) (-5.44) 
Share of exports in world exports  0.83*** 0.62*** 0.98*** 0.75*** 
 (5.37) (3.81) (4.74) (7.36) 
EU-25 and candidates 7.8  9.02*** 9.71*** 
 (1.46)  (2.73) (6.14) 
Introduction of the euro (2002) 3.84*** 4.00*** 2.03** 3.72*** 
 (4.73) (5.15) (2.00) (6.94) 
Share of differentiated imports 0.51*  0.80*** 0.53*** 
 (1.94)  (8.64) (10.32) 
Exchange rate volatility to U.S. 16.6 21.14 12.53 98.45*** 
 (0.52) (0.69) (0.63) (4.32) 
Inflation differential to U.S.  -0.01 0.01 -0.06 -0.39** 
 (-0.15) (0.13) (-1.32) (-2.34) 
Forward market 19.72***  20.05*** 20.74*** 
  (3.26)   (5.39) (3.18) 
Number of observations 103 103 103 103 
Number of countries 19 19 19 19 
Wald chi2 136.1  1290.1 2654.4 
R squared overall 0.83 0.69 0.96 0.96 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
a Prais-Winston regression with heteroscedastic panel corrected standard errors and panel specific AR1. 
b Prais-Winston regression with het. panel corrected standard errors. Importance weighted with GDP. 
 
Being part of or a candidate of the EU again increases the share of home currency 
invoicing. This result is, however, not significant for all specifications. The results for the 
introduction of the euro are significantly positive. Around 4 percentage points more imports 
have been invoiced in home currency since 2002. The inflation differential variable is 
inconclusive and the effects of the exchange rate volatility are again insignificant. Although 
the coefficients are positive, there is, thus, no evidence that high exchange rate volatility 
increases local currency pricing.  
The share of differentiated products is significant for the home import invoicing estimation. 
From a theoretical perspective we expect that if a product is highly differentiated the exporter 
is more likely to choose PCP as he does not care so much about relative prices. I would 
therefore expect rauim to have a negative impact on LCP. It has a significantly positive 
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impact, however. How can this phenomenon be explained? The share of differentiated goods 
was found to significantly reduce invoicing in U.S. dollar as vehicle currency. Apparently, 
this reflects only the choice of a vehicle currency, though, whereas the theory also makes a 
strong argument for its role in the choice between PCP and LCP. In the estimation of the 
share of imports invoiced in the importer’s home currency (LCP), I find that the more 
differentiated the products the more likely it is that they are invoiced in the local – i.e., 
importer’s – currency, while we would have expected them to be invoiced in the exporter’s 
currency instead. As the dataset mainly refers to euro area countries, this unexpected result 
may simply reflect that the lower the share of organized traded and referenced goods, the 
lower the invoicing in U.S. dollar. Thus, the higher the share of differentiated products, the 
more likely the product is invoiced in euro – which in this specification is the home currency 
for half the countries. While the home export invoicing estimations suggest a positive impact 
of the degree of product differentiation on the use of the own currency, there is, thus, no clear 
support for the theory of the importance of differentiated products with respect to PCP and 
LCP. The only conclusion that can be drawn is that the level of product differentiation plays a 
role for the decision on vehicle currency invoicing and that apparently the role of the euro in 
this respect is still fairly limited.  
2.3.8 Robustness and Goodness-of-Fit of the Model 
In addition to the inclusion of a wide range of specifications to show that the significance 
level and the coefficients are quite stable over different specifications, I also perform 
Hausman tests to compare the coefficients of the random effects and the fixed effects model 
and find that they are not systematically different.56 As the time invariant variables drop out 
for the fixed effects estimations the Hausman test may not be proof enough for the validity of 
the random effects estimations. I therefore also report the fixed effects specifications. They 
deliver the same qualitative results for the time varying variables. To control for 
heteroscedasticity across the cross section and for autocorrelation I also present estimation 
__________
56 Only for euro import invoicing can the null hypothesis of no systematic difference be rejected. This does not 
change the qualitative results of the estimation, however.   
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results for a Prais-Winston regression with panel corrected standard errors.57 Almost all 
variables which are found to be significant in the random effects model are also significant for 
this specification and insignificant results stay insignificant. Only for the exchange rate 
volatility variables and the forward market dummy is there some change in the significance 
pattern as compared to the reference estimations. The estimation method for which results 
diverge the most is the importance weighted Prais-Winston regression. In this case it is not 
surprising that the results vary a bit as the GDP weights of the countries do differ 
considerably. On the contrary, it is very reassuring to see that this regression also confirms the 
general findings of the other regressions.  
As another test for robustness I ran regressions including a dummy for every year to control 
for omitted variable bias. This does not change the results significantly, either. Furthermore, I 
experimented with including different sets of variables as mentioned in the above analysis. 
Not all variables which were found to be insignificant are reported as they did not change the 
main results. As an indicator of the explanatory power of my model I include the pseudo R 
squared adjusted for the overall estimation as reported by stata. Although one has to interpret 
this R squared with caution, it indicates, that the model does have quite good explanatory 
power. The main contribution of the explanatory power stems from the variables reflecting 
the prospective future adoption of the euro. In particular, whether a country belongs to or is a 
candidate for the EU –, the introduction of the common currency and the share of trade with 
the euro area (for the euro invoicing estimations). However, even when leaving out these 
variables, the remaining parameters still have a significant and quite high overall explanatory 
power.  
__________
57 I also estimated an alternative feasible GLS estimation with heteroscedasticity robust errors. Likewise, I 
estimate a random effects model with serial correlation robust standard errors especially constructed for 
unbalanced data by Baltagi and Wu (1999). Again, this does not qualitatively change the estimation results. The 
results for these estimations are not included in the paper as they are both qualitatively and quantitatively almost 
identical. 
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2.4 Conclusion 
This paper provides empirical evidence on the determinants of currency invoicing in 
international trade, a topic which has received little attention so far due to data limitations. 
This study presents a newly constructed dataset on currency invoicing in trade for 42 
countries. The paper contributes to the literature by exploring the use of the euro in invoicing 
of international trade. It provides a comparison of the role of the euro and the role of the U.S. 
dollar as world vehicle currencies.  
The main findings of this analysis are that the membership or prospective membership of a 
country in the EU plays a decisive role in the choice of the euro as invoicing currency in its 
trade. At the same time, the introduction of the common currency in the euro area increased 
the invoicing in euro at the expense of the U.S. dollar. This effect goes hand in hand with the 
finding that higher market power defined as a country’s total exports in relation to world 
exports leads to increased invoicing in home currency for the countries of the euro area. The 
paper finds ambiguous evidence for the importance of exchange rate risk as a determinant of 
currency invoicing. Neither for the estimations of home currency invoicing nor for U.S. dollar 
invoicing is there increased invoicing in the vehicle currency and less home currency 
invoicing with higher exchange rate risk. Only for the euro invoicing estimations, there is a 
higher incidence of euro vehicle currency invoicing when a country’s currency is volatile. 
There is, thus, some evidence for an increased role of the euro as a vehicle currency. The role 
of the euro as vehicle currency in trade seems to be limited, however, when compared to the 
U.S. dollar. The estimation results support the hypothesis that monetary instability reflected in 
high inflation differentials increases the invoicing in vehicle currency. But this relationship is 
only found for vehicle currency invoicing in U.S. dollar in the case when monetary unstable 
countries are involved. At the same time, while a low level of product differentiation 
increases vehicle currency pricing in U.S. dollar, this mainly seems to reflect the trade in 
organized and referenced priced goods. The data only provides partial support for the 
theoretical hypothesis that producer currency invoicing is likely if exports are highly 
differentiated, however. Summing up, it can be said that the U.S. dollar is still the dominant 
vehicle currency as compared to the euro. There are, however, some indications that the role 
of the euro as invoicing currency increased as the euro replaced the legacy currencies.  
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The use of this new and extensive dataset made a thorough econometric analysis of the 
determinants of currency invoicing possible. Data limitations, nevertheless, have to be borne 
in mind when interpreting the results. Industry specific country data and data on bilateral 
trade, if available for each of the countries in the data set, would help to refine the analysis. 
Also, once the time horizon of available data will be longer, research could focus on the 
dynamics of the invoicing process, including the question of inertia of invoicing strategies. 
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2.6 Appendix 
Invoicing (Database see Appendix Table A2.1) 
eurex    share of exports invoiced in euro (in %)   
eurim   share of imports invoiced in euro (in %)    
homex   share of exports invoiced in home currency (in %) 
homeim   share of imports invoiced in home currency (in %) 
usdex   share of exports invoiced in U.S. dollar (in %) 
usdim   share of imports invoiced in U.S. dollar (in %) 
 
Trade Share (IMF Direction of Trade Statistics) 
mp market power, measured as country’s export share in total world exports 
shexeur country’s share of exports to the euro area as share of total country exports (in %) 
shexus country’s share of exports to the U.S. as share of total country exports (in %) 
shimeur country’s share of imports from the euro area as share of total country imports (in %) 
shimus country’s share of imports from the U.S. as share of total country imports (in %) 
shimdum 0/1 dummy, taking on the value of 1 if share of imports from the euro area is higher 
than 50 percent  
 
Rauch Index (UN Comtrade Statistics) 
rauex share of country’s differentiated exports in country’s total exports (measured with 
SITC rev. 2 four digits codes) 
rauim share of country’s differentiated imports in country’s total imports (measured with 
SITC rev. 2 four digits codes) 
 
Membership of the EU and euro currency introduction 
 
eurinst 0/1 dummy, taking on the value of 1 when a country is a member of the EU-25 or an 
official candidate country (Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania). 
euroint 0/1 dummy, taking on the value of 1 for the year 2002 and thereafter. Introduction of 
the euro currency and discontinuation of the legacy currencies.  
 
 
Financial Stability (IMF International Financial Statistics) 
credit private credit to GDP ratio 
eurexvol volatility of country’s exchange rate vis-à-vis the euro (four month moving average of 
standard deviation) 
eurinf country’s inflation differential with the euro area (before 1999 with Germany) 
eurpeg 0/1 dummy, taking on the value of 1 when a country has a hard peg vis-à-vis the euro 
fmdum dummy taking on the value of 1 all those countries with a forward market for their 
exchange rate in 1999 (Bloomberg statistics) 
usdpeg 0/1 dummy, taking on the value of 1 when a country has a hard peg vis-à-vis the U.S. 
dollar 
usexvol volatility of country’s exchange rate vis-à-vis the euro (four month moving average of 
standard deviation) 
usinf country’s inflation differential with the U.S. 
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Table A2.1:  
U.S. Dollar, Euro and Home Currency Invoicing in the Exports and Imports of 42 Countries 
  Exports in Goods Imports in Goods 
  EUR USD home EUR USD home 
EUROPE        
Euro Area        
Belgiuma 2000 42  42 43.6  43.6 
 2001 46.7  46.7 47.2  47.2 
 2002 53.5 32.5 53.5 53.6 34.6 53.6 
 2003 56.6 30.8 56.6 57.7 32.9 57.7 
 2004 57.7 29.6 57.7 55.5 35.1 55.5 
France 1999 52.2 35.5 52.2 40.6 48.4 40.6 
 2000 44.6 42.6 44.6 32.9 57.2 32.9 
 2001 47.1 41.0 47.1 44.4 45.7 44.4 
 2002 51.0 37.0 51.0 46.9 45.2 46.8 
 2003 52.7 33.6 52.7 45.3 46.9 45.3 
Germanyb 2002 49.0 31.6 49.0 48.0 34.5 48.0 
 2003 63.0 24.1 63.0 55.2 33.9 55.2 
 2004 61.1 24.1 61.1 52.8 35.9 52.8 
Greece 2001 23.5 67.7 23.5 29.3 61.5 29.3 
 2002 39.3 52.6 39.3 35.8 57.1 35.8 
 2003 47.3 45.9 47.3 39.6 54.7 39.6 
 2004 44.3 51.2 44.3 40.6 55.3 40.6 
Italy 2001 52.7  52.7 40.8  40.8 
 2002 54.1  54.1 44.2  44.2 
 2003 58.2  58.5 44.5  44.5 
 2004 59.7  59.7 44.5  44.5 
Luxembourga 2000 42.0  42 43.6  43.6 
 2001 46.7  46.7 47.2  47.2 
 2002 46.0 38.3 46.0 31.6 47.5 31.6 
 2003 51.2 26.6 51.2 41.6 36.9 41.6 
 2004 62.7 22.1 62.7 49.4 36.3 49.4 
Netherlands 1998 51.5 32 51.5 41.9 44.3 41.9 
 1999 51.8 32 51.8 41.5 45.6 41.5 
 2000 44.7 41.3 44.7 37 52.8 37 
 2001 47.8 39.2 47.8 41.1 48.5 41.1 
 2002 52.0 35.2 52.0 48.0 43.8 48.0 
Portugal 2000 40.1  40.1 47  47 
 2001 43.5  43.5 53.6  53.6 
 2002 48.4 33.0 48.4 57.5 35.2 57.5 
 2003 53.6 27.6 53.6 59.2 31.1 59.2 
 2004 57.6 27.4 57.6 58.8 32.6 58.8 
Spain 1998 48.9 40.1 48.9 42.1 46.4 42.1 
 1999 50.2 39.1 50.2 45.3 44.4 45.3 
 2000 49.0 40.9 49.0 44.0 48.2 44.0 
 2001 52.0 38.4 52.0 49.7 43.7 49.7 
 2002 57.5 32.4 57.5 55.9 38.9 55.9 
 2003 61.7 29.3 61.7 61.1 34.9 61.1 
 2004 62.6 29.1 62.6 61.1 35.5 61.1 
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Table 2.1 continued 
  Exports in Goods Imports in Goods 
  EUR USD home EUR USD home 
Other EU 
25        
Cyprus 2003 30.2 34.1  44.9 33.4  
 2004 32.0 28.6  52.9 30.2  
Czech Rep.c 1999 71.2 13.1  67.3 18.8  
 2000 69.2 14.4  66.9 20.5  
 2001 68.7 14.1 10.3 66.6 19.7 7.7 
 2002 68.2 14.7 10.2 66.7 19.5 8.7 
 2003 70.3 13.5 9.6 67.6 18.3 9.3 
 2004 72.4 12.0  68.8 18.5  
Denmark 1999 30.0 19.7  32.6 20.6  
 2000 29.3 25.4  32.6 24.1  
 2001 32.6 25.6  35.3 24.3  
 2002 35.9 22.0  37.4 19.3  
 2003 35.2 19.5  32.4 17.4  
 2004 34.3 19.5  33.1 17.0  
Estoniad 2002 65.1   59.0   
 2003 70.3 9.0  61.5 22.0  
 2004 72.2 9.4  62.5 21.9  
Hungarye 1992 52.4 37.5  53.3 33.8  
 1993 50.6 40.3  48.3 40.1  
 1994 55.2 34.3  53.5 34.3  
 1995 59.6 31  55.2 33.1  
 1996 62.6 27.4  55.8 32.9  
 1997 60.5 28.7  57 29.4  
 1998 65.1 28.5  61.6 27  
 1999 74.4 21.2 0.4 70.6 22.5 2.1 
 2000 78.6 17.5 0.3 69.8 23.2 2.6 
 2001 79.4 15.7 1.0 70.5 21.7 3.4 
 2002 83.2 12.2 1.4 73.3 18.5 4.0 
 2003 85.0 10.1 1.8 72.4 17.7 5.4 
 2004 84.8 9.6 2.3 70.8 18.8 6.3 
Latvia 2000 28.5 46.9  40.2 42.4  
 2001 34.1 41.4  44.5 37.3  
 2002 40.4 36.2  51.9 29.7  
 2003 41.6 38.3  49.6 34.0  
 2004 47.9 35.2  52.7 34.9  
Lithuania 1996    25 62.2 2.0 
 1997    28 60.3 1.3 
 1998    33 55.9 0.7 
 1999 28.5 62.5 1.4 34.3 58.8 1.4 
 2000 32.3  60.7 1.2 38.3 57.5 1.5 
 2001 40.1 54.3 1.3 42.9 52.9 1.2 
 2002 48.2 46.3 1.4 46.0 49.2 1.3 
 2003 51.7 43.6 1.4 53.0 42.0 1.5 
 2004 53.0 42.0 1.6 54.7 39.3 2.4 
 2005 54.8 40.8 1.4 61.0 34.2 1.3 
 
 54
Table 2.1 continued 
  Exports in Goods Imports in Goods 
  EUR USD home EUR USD home 
Poland 1994 48.1 41.2  48.1 41.2  
 1995 44.2 49.1  49.3 41.0  
 1996 43.6 49.4  51.5 39.5  
 1997 44.0 48.5  53.3 38.0  
 1998 51.2 40.0 2.7 58.3 32.3 1.5 
 1999 53.7 36.3 4.1 57.2 32.1 3.4 
 2000 54.8 36.2 3.5 54.9 34.8 3.9 
 2001 57.2 33.8 4.1 57.7 32.9 4.6 
 2002 60.1 29.9 4.9 59.6 28.6 6.5 
 2003 64.9 25.2 5.1 60.2 27.2 8.3 
 2004 69.3 21.4 5.1 61.7 26.1 8.5 
Slovakia 1999 58.3 28.4     
 2000 58.5 30.0     
 2001 61.3 26.4     
 2002 63.7 23.2     
 2003 69.8 19.0     
Slovenia 2000 85.0 10.4  77.0 17.9  
 2001 85.0 10.3  79.0 15.7  
 2002 87.0   83.0   
 2003 87.2 9.5  82.4 14.2  
 2004 88.1 8.1  83.3 13.2  
UK 1999 19 27 53 23 30 40 
 2000 21 29 46 19 34 42 
 2001 23 29 46 19 38 40 
 2002 21 26 51 27 37 33 
EU candidates        
Bulgaria 1998 31.5 65.9  42.1 53.5  
 1999 36.7 60.4  46.8 48.9  
 2000 37.5 60  46.9 50.1  
 2001 48.1 49  55.5 41.8  
 2002 52.4 44.4  60.1 37.1  
 2003 60.7 36.4  62.7 34.7  
 2004 62.2 35.2  63.6 34.1  
        
Croatia 1998 61 36  72 24  
 1999 62 33  72 24  
 2000 60 36  70 26  
 2001 63.0 32.9  72.7 24.4  
 2002 69.4 27.6  77.1 20.2  
 2003 72.0 24.2  78.0 18.6  
 2004 68.5 27.7  78.0 18.3  
        
Romania 1999 50.5 45.2  57.1 37.7  
 2000 51 42.8  60.4 33.7  
 2001 55.7 39.5  60.6 35.1  
 2002 58.6 36.4  65.6 30.3  
 2003 63.8 30.6  67.9 28.3  
 2004 66.3 28.5  70.8 25.6  
 2005 64.3 31.5  71.1 25.7  
Turkey 2002 46.7 44.9 0.9 37.0 56.7 0.3 
 2003 49.3 42.6 1.1 39.7 55.1 0.2 
 2004 49.3 42.9 1.0 40.3 55.0 0.2 
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Table 2.1 continued 
  Exports in Goods Imports in Goods 
  EUR USD home EUR USD home 
Other European Countries        
1998 54.7 43.8  58.4 39.9  
1999 59.4 39.1  62.0 36.3  
2000 54.7 43.8  54.6 43.7  
The former 
Yugoslav 
Republic of 
Macedonia 2001 61.0 37.6  63.7 34.6  
 2002 66.4 32.2  67.6 30.4  
 2003 67.4 31.2  70.6 27.9  
 2004 75.5 22.9  75.3 23.2  
2002  20.0   30.0  Serbia and 
Montenegro 2003  15.0   27.0  
Ukraine 2001 2.6 76.0     
 2002 4.7 75.7  10.8 73.3  
 2003 5.7 75.4 0.4 14.6 74.1 0.4 
 2004 7.6 78.0 0.4 14.1 76.9 0.4 
AFRICA        
Algeria 2003 0.48 99.0  50.8   
 2004 0.58 99.0  48.0   
        
Morocco 2003    55.0   
South Africa 2003 17.0 52.0 25.0    
        
Tunisia 1995 45.4   46.6   
 1996 45.5   49.1   
 1997 49.1   45.9   
 1998 56.9   48.5   
 1999 47.7   65.6   
 2000 46.2   50.4   
 2001 52.3   55.6   
ASIA 
PAZIFIC        
Australia 1997 0.8 63.0 33.8 7.8 51.7 24.9 
 1998 0.9 66 30.8 7.8 52.5 24.3 
 1999 0.7 64.2 32.1 8.3 49.7 28.6 
 2000 0.5 68.4 28.6 7.1 51.4 28.3 
 2001 0.7 68.8 27.7 9.2 49.5 30.7 
 2002 1.4 67.9 27.6 8.7 50.1 30.6 
 2003 1.4 67.5 27.8 9.4 47.9 32.6 
India 1998 7.1   8.1   
Indonesia 1991 4.5 89.7 0.0 10.8 70.6 0.0 
 1992    11.1 72.1 0.0 
 1993    9.0 73.3 0.0 
 1994 0.7 95.7 0.1 8.9 74.7 0.1 
 1995 0.5 83.5 0.0 6.6 77.7 0.2 
 1996 0.5 90.4  6.6 81.5 0.2 
 1997 1.2 91.9 1.7 6.6 78.7 0.5 
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Table 2.1 continued 
  Exports in Goods Imports in Goods 
  EUR USD home EUR USD home 
Indonesia 1998 0.8 93.7 0.2 8.4 77.4 0.3 
 1999 1.2 92.9 0.0 4.1 83.3 0.6 
 2000 1.5 92.7 0.0 4.5 79.9 1.0 
 2001 2.2 91.0 0.0 5.8 80.0 0.6 
 2002 2.1 91.4 0.1 5.8 79.6 0.4 
 2003 1.5 92.8 0.0 5.8 80.3 0.4 
 2004 1.2 93.6 0.0 5.7 82.5 0.4 
Israel 2000 24.6 62.6     
 2004 23.9 64.7     
Japan 1992  46.6 40.1  74.5 17 
 1993  48.4 39.9  72.4 20.9 
 1994  48.3 39.7  73.9 19.2 
 1995  52.0 36.8  69.6 23.5 
 1996  53.2 35.6  72.3 20.6 
 1997  52.5 35.8  72.4 20.8 
 1998  51.2 36.0  71.5 21.8 
 2000 7.6 52.4 36.1 2.3 70.7 23.5 
 2001 8 52.8 34.9 3 70 23.4 
 2002 8.6 51.7 35.8 4.4 68.3 24.9 
 2003 9.6 48.0 38.4 4.5 68.7 24.6 
South Koreaf 1990 2.1 88  4.1 79.1  
 1995 2.4 88.1  3.8 79.4  
 1996 2.2 89.1  3.6 81.0  
 2000 1.8 84.8  1.9 80.4  
 2001 4.5 87.4  4.0 82.2  
 2002 5.8 86.8  5.4 80.6  
 2003 7.6 84.6  6.1 78.3  
Malaysia 1995 3.2 61.7 18.7 8.2 1.2  
 1996 2.8 66 17.8 6.8 1  
 2000  90     
Pakistan 2001 1.6 92.6  3.5 84.2  
 2002 3.5 92.3  7.0 84.6  
 2003 6.9 89.4  9.0 82.8  
Thailand 1993 1 91.8 0.9 5.1 74.3 0.6 
 1994 0.8 90.5 1.6 4.6 77.1 0.7 
 1995 0.5 91.0 2.4 3.6 80.7 0.5 
 1996 0.5 91.7 1.3 3.5 80.1 0.8 
 1997 0.4 92.0 2.1 3.5 80.4 1.7 
 1998 0.7 90.6 2.6 2.9 80.7 1.7 
 1999 1.7 87.6 3.7 3.0 79.2 2.2 
 2000 1.8 87.0 3.9 3.0 79.0 2.4 
 2001 2.8 85.7 4.0 5.1 77.9 3.5 
 2002 3.2 84.7 4.3 5.3 77.2 4.4 
 2003 2.7 84.4 5.0 4.3 76.0 5.6 
NORTH 
AMERICA        
Canada 2001  70 23    
US 2003    2.0 90.3 90.3 
See below for sources and notes. 
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Table 2.1 continued: Sources and Notes 
Country Type of Data  Source and Notes 
EUROPE   
Euro Area   
  
Belgium Exports and imports, 
goods and services 
ECB data request to National Central Banks. a Data before 2002 refers to Belgo-Luxembourg economic union. 
France Exports and imports, 
goods and services 
ECB data request to National Central Banks. 
Germany Exports and imports,  
only goods 
ECB data request to National Central Banks. b Data for Germany reflect the average value of data collected in surveys 
carried out in the first and third quarters of 2002, 2003 and 2004  on behalf of the Deutsche Bundesbank. 
Greece Exports and imports,  
goods and services 
ECB data request to National Central Banks.  
Italy Exports and imports,  
goods and services 
ECB data request to National Central Banks.  
Luxembourg Exports and imports, 
goods and services 
ECB data request to National Central Banks. a Data before 2002 refers to Belgo-Luxembourg economic union. 
Netherlands Exports and imports, 
goods and services 
Dutch National Bank, Data Request. Currency practices in Dutch exports and imports (1975-2002), DNB Quarterly March 
2004. 
Portugal  Exports and imports, 
goods and services 
ECB data request to National Central Banks. 
Spain Exports and imports, 
goods and services 
ECB data request to National Central Banks. 
Other EU-25 
Cyprus Exports and imports,  
only goods 
ECB data request to National Central Banks. 
Czech Republic Exports and imports,  
only goods 
ECB data request to National Central Banks. c Goods data for 2004 refer to the first quarter of 2004 as a result in changes 
in the way data are collected from May 2004 onwards. 
Denmark Exports and imports, 
goods and services 
ECB data request to National Central Banks 
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Estonia Exports and imports, 
goods and services 
ECB data request to National Central Banks. d Goods data for 2004 refer to the first quarter of 2004 as a result in changes 
in the way data are collected from May 2004 onwards. 
Hungary Exports and imports, 
goods and services 
ECB data request to National Central Banks. e Please note break in the series, data for 1992 to 1999: Ibolya Mile: Exchange 
rate policy of Hungary on the way to European Union membership.  
Latvia Exports and imports, 
goods and services 
ECB data request to National Central Banks.  
Lithuania Exports and imports, 
goods and services 
ECB data request to National Central Banks. Before 2000: Data only available for imports of goods from Igor Vetlov: The 
Monetary Transmission Mechanism in Lithuania, Eesti Pank publication (approximation for euro share as he quotes EU 
currencies): http://www.bankofestonia.info/pub/en/dokumendid/publikatsioonid/seeriad/muud_uuringud/_2004/_3.pdf
Poland Exports and imports,  
only goods 
ECB data request to National Central Banks. Data before 2002: Only data on goods. Bank of Poland, various issues of 
Annual Reports. http://www.nbp.pl/en/publikacje/r_roczny/rocznik2001_en.pdf 
Slovakia   
  
Overall Trade Bank of Slovakia, Report on Monetary Developments in the SR in 2003. Currency structure of foreign exchange receipts 
and payments.  
Slovenia Exports and imports, 
goods and services 
ECB data request to National Central Banks. Data before 2002: Banka Slovenije, Annual Report 2001.  
UK Exports and imports,  
only goods 
HM Revenue & Customs [formerly H M Customs and Excise]. Bilateral trade data available. Warning issued that data may 
not be reliable.  
EU candidates 
Bulgaria Exports and imports,  
only goods 
ECB special data request. Bulgarian National Bank, Customs declarations data, supplemented with NSI data and processed 
by the BNB. Data are coordinated with the National Statistical Institute of Bulgaria. 
Croatia Exports and imports,  
only goods 
Bank of Croatia, various issues of Annual Reports. Data before 2001 refers to overall trade only.  
Romania Exports and imports, 
goods; services (only 
starting with 2005 data) 
National Authority for Customs, National Bank of Romania.  
Turkey Exports and imports Turkish undersecretariat of the Prime Ministry for Foreign Trade 
Other European Countries  
F.Y.R.of Macedonia Exports and imports State Statistical Office of the Republic of Macedonia 
Serbia & Montenegro  Exports and imports Bank of Serbia and Montenegro, Annual Report 2003 and 2002. Data only for USD invoicing.  
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Ukraine Exports and imports Bank of Ukraine. Balance of Payments Report. Data for 2002 on bilateral basis.  
AFRICA
Algeria Exports and imports ECB special data request. Bank of Algeria. Only euro no USD invoicing for imports.  
Morocco Only imports Article in “Al Bayane”: Les scénarii d’impact du renchérissement de l’euro sur l’économie marocaine. 
http://www.albayane.ma/Detail.asp?article_id=41798. Article from 3/28/2004.  
South Africa Only exports Budget Review. http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/budget/2004/review/Chapter%202.pdf
Tunisia Exports and imports ECB special data request. Banque Centrale de Tunisie. Data on services available for imports.  
ASIA PACIFIC   
Australia Exports and Imports Bank of Australia. Data available on industry level. Australian Bureau of Statistics. Australia Now. International 
Merchandise Trade, Australia 1998 and 2003.  
India  Exports and imports Bank of India. Annual Report 1998/99. Bank of India Story. Box VI.4: Euro and India. Only euro data.  
Indonesia Exports and imports Bank of Indonesia, Balance of Payments Statistics; data transformed to represent overall trade (not only non-oil trade). 
http://www.bi.go.id/web/en/Data+Statistik/ 
Israel Overall trade Bank of Israel, Press Release April 23 2000.  
Japan Exports and imports Japan Customs, http://www.mof.go.jp/english/if/if043f.htm, and McKinnon and Schnabl (2004).  
South Korea Exports and imports Monthly Statistics of Korea and McKinnon and Schnabl (2004) and Yun (2005). f Data for 2001 approximation.  
Malaysia Exports and imports Ngiam Kee Jin: Financial and Monetary Cooperation in East Asia: The Singapore Perspective.  
Data for 2000: Treasury Malaysia: The Performance of the Malaysian Economy.  
Pakistan Exports and imports Bank of Pakistan, Annual report 2003. http://www.sbp.org.pk/reports/annual/index.htm 
Thailand Exports and imports Bank of Thailand, bilateral data. http://www.bot.or.th/BOThomepage/databank/EconData/EconData_e.htm 
NORTH AMERICA  
Canada Only exports Murray and Powell (2002), Dollarization in Canada. Bank of Canada Technical Report No. 90.  
United States Only imports Bureau of Labor Statistics. Special data request.  
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Table A2.2:  
Share of Differentiated Goods in Exports and Imports 
  Year Exports Imports 
EUROPE     
Euro Area     
 Belgium 2004 55.0 64.9 
 Germany 2004 72.9 69.5 
 Spain 2003 67.0 64.0 
 France 2004 66.1 67.5 
 Greece 2004 49.6 61.9 
 Italy 2004 73.9 62.7 
 Luxemburg 2004 56.7 62.3 
 Netherlands 2004 51.3 62.6 
 Portugal 2004 66.2 65.3 
Other EU 25     
 Cyprus 2004 64.4 69.8 
 Czech Republic 2004 72.6 70.8 
 Denmark 2004 64.9 71.4 
 Estonia 2004 70.6 67.0 
 Hungary 2003 73.6 76.3 
 Latvia 2004 63.6 66.0 
 Lithuania 2003 46.2 63.2 
 Poland 2004 66.9 67.5 
 Slovenia 2004 69.4 65.8 
 Slovakia 2004 63.0 66.5 
 United Kingdom 2004 66.7 76.5 
EU candidates     
 Bulgaria 2004 49.9 75.9 
 Croatia 2004 59.8 66.7 
 Romania 2004 64.1 66.6 
 Turkey 2004 68.0 46.8 
Other European Countries    
 Macedonia 2004 52.6 53.8 
 Serbia Montenegro 2004 47.8 55.2 
 Ukraine 2003 31.0 40.5 
AFRICA     
 Algeria 2004 0.3 58.8 
 Morocco 2004 44.8 28.7 
 Tunisia 2004 59.1 64.6 
 South Africa 2004 30.4 68.4 
ASIA PAZIFIC     
 Australia 2004 38.1 75.9 
 Indonesia 2004 37.6 39.8 
 India 2003 47.0 39.5 
 Israel 2004 47.0 72.0 
 Japan 2004 72.8 56.2 
 Korea 2004 62.8 52.2 
 Malaysia 2004 46.0 74.4 
 Pakistan 2004 69.5 35.6 
 Thailand 2003 55.0 62.3 
NORTH AMERICA     
 Canada 2004 54.9 77.5 
  United States 2004 64.1 75.3 
Source: UN Comtrade database; own calculations based on Rauch (1999) index.  
 61
Table A2.3:     
U.S. Dollar Import Invoicing     
Dependent variable: share of imports invoiced in U.S. Dollar (in percentage points) 
 
Regression random fixed PWa weightedb
Constant 108.21*** 48.27*** 99.99*** 106.78*** 
 (8.82) (25.82) (15.66) (40.34) 
Share of imports from U.S  0.08 -0.01 0.21 0.05 
 (0.40) (-0.06) (1.21) (0.53) 
EU-25 and candidates -16.31***  -14.62*** -16.48*** 
 (-2.68)  (-2.72) (-13.43) 
Introduction of the euro (2002) -3.63*** -3.91*** -2.04*** -2.41*** 
 (-5.01) (-5.29) (-2.59) (-3.72) 
Share of differentiated imports -0.97***  -0.73*** -0.80*** 
 (-3.66)  (-4.07) (-19.08) 
Exchange rate volatility to U.S. 0.96 2.36 8.70 3.52 
 (0.04) (0.11) (0.45) (0.18) 
Inflation differential to U.S.  0.22*** 0.21*** 0.16*** 0.17** 
 (4.76) (4.67) (3.58) (2.45) 
Forward market 4.18  -4.11* -0.3 
 (1.03)  (-1.76) (-0.27) 
Peg to USD 12.19*** 11.86*** 10.58*** 10.16 
  (5.59) (5.40) (4.33) (1.49) 
Number of observations 160 160 160 160 
Number of countries 31 31 31 31 
Wald chi2 232.7  531.9 2860.8 
R squared overall 0.77 0.02 0.97 0.99 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
a Prais-Winston regression with heteroscedastic panel corrected standard errors and panel specific AR1. 
b Prais-Winston regression with het. panel corrected standard errors. Importance weighted with GDP. 
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Table A2.4:     
Euro Import Invoicing     
Dependent variable: share of imports invoiced in euro (in percentage points) 
 
Regression random fixed PWa weightedb
Constant -1.16 25.53*** -1.00 5.37 
 (-0.10) (4.84) (-0.26) (1.32) 
Share of imports from euro area  0.60*** 0.27* 0.95*** 0.92*** 
 (5.44) (1.96) (11.98) (4.91) 
EU-25 and candidates 13.99**  12.84*** 0.21 
 (2.45)  (3.40) (0.03) 
Introduction of the euro (2002) 5.24*** 5.28*** 2.17** 2.56*** 
 (6.19) (6.40) (2.37) (4.12) 
Share of differentiated imports 0.20  -0.09 -0.29*** 
 (0.80)  (-1.21) (-9.67) 
Exchange rate volatility to euro 42.42 50.46 -26.69 44.71 
 (1.21) (1.48) (-0.89) (1.50) 
Inflation differential to euro area  -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.16*** -0.18 
 (-4.67) (-4.87) (-3.28) (-1.49) 
Forward market -12.95***  -1.09 -1.32 
 (-2.78)  (-0.48) (-0.34) 
Peg to euro 12.83*** 13.95*** 8.43*** 26.09** 
  (4.52) (4.83) (3.05) (2.23) 
Number of observations 154 154 154 154 
Number of countries 30 30 30 30 
Wald chi2 254.7  918.7 630.0 
R squared overall 0.77 0.48 0.87 0.90 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
a Prais-Winston regression with heteroscedastic panel corrected standard errors and panel specific AR1. 
b Prais-Winston regression with het. panel corrected standard errors. Importance weighted with GDP. 
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3 Petrodollars and Imports of Oil Exporting Countries 
Oil prices have risen sharply since 1999. This seems to have exacerbated global 
imbalances. High oil prices have worsened the current account deficit in the United States 
through higher oil import bills. At the same time, oil exporting countries benefited from the 
higher oil prices and used their export revenue windfalls among others to buy foreign 
products. However, additional import spending seems to fall short of the export revenue 
windfall. Thus, while the current account deficit in the United States widens, oil exporting 
countries are running record current account surpluses. This has led to increased interest in 
the effect of higher oil prices on global imbalances.1 There were voices to be heard in the 
international community that oil exporting countries should be made to participate in reducing 
global imbalances by increasing their import demand. First and foremost it was stated that oil 
exporting countries should let their exchange rates float which would lead to real 
appreciations and help reduce global imbalances by stimulating demand for foreign products 
in oil exporting countries. There are several questions arising from this statement. First of all, 
the direct impact of oil prices on import demand should be analyzed. How much do imports in 
oil exporting countries increase due to the higher oil revenues and the increased wealth? A 
further question is whether and to which extent a real appreciation stimulates imports in these 
countries. Third, it is important to look at other factors influencing import behaviour in oil 
exporting countries. In particular what distinguishes oil exporting countries’ import behaviour 
from that of industrial countries? Finally, the possible import increase should be put into the 
perspective of global imbalances. How much can oil exporting countries contribute at all to 
reducing global imbalances? 
The aim of this paper is to focus on the trade channel of petrodollar recycling.2 Especially 
in times of high oil prices the use or “recycling” of these petrodollars attracts interest. Table 
3.1 gives an overview of petrodollar recycling for the period from 2002 to 2005. Oil exporting 
countries can also spend their oil revenues in the domestic economy. However, as most of the 
oil exporting countries focus on the production of oil, the domestic economy cannot absorb all 
oil revenues. This is particularly true in times of high oil price increases when the domestic 
economy is unable to adjust to the higher demand in the short run. 
                                                 
1 See for example IMF World Economic Outlook (2006), Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco (2006), U.S. 
Department of the Treasury (2006).  
2 The export revenues oil exporting countries gain with their oil exports are often referred to as petrodollars. It 
should be noted that throughout this study the word petrodollars is used in a neutral way to describe revenues 
earned by oil exports.  
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Table 3.1: Petrodollar Recycling, 2002 - 2005 
(mn bbl)
2005 2002 2005 ∆ 2002 2005d ∆ 2002 2005 ∆ 2002 2005 ∆
Algeria 1.8 18.1 45.6 27 23.5 54.6 31.1 12.01 19.50 7.5 53.5 28.53 -24.9
Angola 1.2 7.2 21.6 14 0.8 2.6 1.8 3.61 8.28 4.7 79.1 37.65 -41.5
Bahrain na 2.5 3.6 1 1.4 1.7 0.3 3.01 3.44 0.4 41.6 53.21 11.6
Congo, Rep. of 0.3 1.9 4.1 2 0.03 0.78 0.8 1.04 2.08 1.0 200.9 98.73 -102.2
Ecuador 0.4 1.8 4.2 2 1.0 2.1 1.1 5.94 8.10 2.2 65.2 44.33 -20.9
Equatorial Guinea 0.4 2.0 7.0 5 0.6 2.9 2.4 0.48 1.81 1.3 10.2 3.59 -6.6
Gabon 0.2 1.8 4.2 2 0.1 0.7 0.6 0.70 1.01 0.3 66.0 47.27 -18.7
Iran, I.R. of 2.4 23.0 48.8 26 21.6 33.8 12.2 22.04 40.97 18.9 7.9 8.77 0.8
Kazakhstan 1.2 4.9 17.0 12 5.0 18.4 13.4 7.86 17.60 9.7 20.1 14.25 -5.8
Kuwait 2.4 14.0 42.1 28 9.3 9.5 0.2 8.11 13.52 5.4 32.4 16.93 -15.5
Libya 1.7 8.9 27.4 18 14.5 31.9 17.4 6.78 9.50 2.7 33.7 1.22 -32.5
Nigeria 2.6 14.8 41.6 27 7.4 24.0 16.6 12.56 20.48 7.9 67.2 20.65 -46.6
Norway 2.8 24.8 45.9 21 32.1 42.5 10.4 35.71 56.82 21.1 36.1 46.44 10.3
Oman 0.8 7.4 13.2 6 3.2 3.6 0.4 5.64 8.83 3.2 17.4 10.84 -6.6
Qatar 1.0 4.6 10.7 6 1.6 4.5 2.9 3.65 9.89 6.2 47.1 25.03 -22.0
Russia 6.8 40.3 117.2 77 44.7 162.3 117.6 60.97 125.30 64.3 44.1 33.85 -10.2
Saudi Arabia 9.1 63.7 162.2 98 20.8 23.5 2.7 29.66 54.58 24.9 96.9 39.59 -57.3
Sudan 0.4 1.7 3.9 2 0.1 1.9 1.8 2.02 5.62 3.6 161.2 106.81 -54.4
Syrian Arab Rep. 0.5 3.8 1.8 -2 9.9 11.3 1.4 4.27 5.71 1.4 60.1 60.20 0.1
Turkmenistan 0.1 0.8 2.0 1 na na na 1.83 2.95 1.1 19.1 6.07 -13.0
Trinidad and Tobago 0.2 1.2 4.8 4 1.9 4.8 2.9 2.66 3.71 1.1 33.9 20.90 -13.0
United Arab Emirates 2.4 16.6 43.5 27 15.2 19.9 4.7 37.53 80.80 43.3 22.4 28.14 5.8
Venezuela 2.5 21.5 48.1 27 na na na 13.36 23.95 10.6 44.9 36.39 -8.6
Yemen 0.4 2.9 5.4 2 4.4 5.8 1.4 2.87 4.08 1.2 11.6 14.50 2.9
Total 41.3 290.3 725.9 435.6 219.1 463.1 244.04 284.3 528.5 244.2 na na na
Sources: BP (2006), Department of the Treasury (2006), IMF (2006). 
Notes:  a Approximation of export volumes given as oil production minus oil consumption. b nominal import value.  c Gross Central Government Debt. For 
Angola, Congo, Ecuador, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Nigeria, Russia, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates and Venezuela numbers are for Total Debt 
Outstanding at Year End (IMF WEO). d Includes IMF staff estimates and projections for Angola, Bahrain, Congo, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Oman, 
Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Trinidad and Tobago and Yemen. Data for Oman and Syrian Arab Republic is 2004 data.  ∆ stands for the change in absolute 
numbers. na stands for not available. 
Country                    Exportsa
(bn U.S. dollar) (bn U.S. dollar) (percent)(bn U.S. dollar)
Foreign reserves Importsb Government debt to GDPcOil export revenues 
 
Therefore a large share of the petrodollars is recycled abroad. Apart from the trade channel 
there are two financial channels of petrodollar recycling. The first is the asset accumulation 
channel. Oil exporting countries use part of their oil revenues to accumulate foreign reserves. 
In 2005 portfolio investment seems to have replaced reserve accumulation as most important 
source of capital outflow. The majority of the capital outflows are going to the United States. 
The second financial channel is the debt reduction channel. Many oil exporting countries 
accumulated a stock of debt in the past part of which is international debt. Lately, especially 
Russia used a large share of its petrodollars to repay outstanding international debt liabilities.3 
These two financial channels are often linked to the question of who is financing the U.S. 
current account deficit.  
This paper, however, focuses on the trade channel of petrodollar recycling. Foreign asset 
accumulation only serves to finance global imbalances, while increased trade could serve to 
correct global imbalances. How much of petrodollars are recycled in increased demand for 
                                                 
3 Only in the year 2005 Russia spent the equivalent of 3.33 billion U.S. dollar on early debt repayment to the 
IMF and the equivalent of 15.1 billion U.S. dollar for first debt repayments to the Paris Club countries.. 
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foreign products? In the following, I briefly discuss the literature on import demand equations 
in general and on import behaviour of oil exporting countries in particular. In a next step I set 
up an empirical model of the import demand of oil exporting countries. The analysis is based 
on a panel cointegration model including 24 oil exporting countries for the period from 1980 
to 2005. The results are extensively tested for their robustness before drawing conclusions on 
the impact of oil exporters’ import demand on global imbalances. Estimation results show that 
import demand of oil exporting countries depends positively on domestic demand and 
exports, the real exchange rate and the price of oil. Fiscal balances reduce the demand for 
imports. With higher oil prices and a real appreciation imports in these countries are 
significantly expanded. The impact on global imbalances is, however, limited. Due to the 
structure of trade the euro area rather than the United States benefits from the increased 
demand in the region. 
3.1 The Literature 
How do the real exchange rate and the oil price affect the import behaviour of oil exporting 
countries? Import demand is driven by real demand and the relative price of domestic versus 
foreign goods (and services). Every import demand equation therefore contains an activity 
variable and a relative price variable. Most of the early studies on import equations were 
performed for industrial countries. 4 In a comparison of import demand estimations for seven 
industrial countries Thursby and Thursby (1984) found that only models including lagged 
dependent variables show a good performance. Using cointegration methods taking into 
account long-run relationships Clarida (1994) sets a benchmark model for import equations. 
The general findings of the empirical import demand literature is that the import demand 
elasticity with respect to the income or activity variable is higher than unity. This is contrary 
to predictions of the theory. In particular, an income elasticity of higher than unity would 
imply a gradually increasing share of imports in GDP. Ultimately this would mean that all 
income would be spent on imports. In an attempt to explain the puzzle of higher than unity 
income elasticities of imports, Barrell and Dées (2005) included a measure of foreign direct 
investment as an additional indicator of openness and globalization. This measure proves to 
have a significantly positive impact on import demand. In addition, it helps reduce income 
                                                 
4 For an overview of the early literature see Goldstein and Kahn (1985).  
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elasticities to 1.2 and brings them, thus, closer to unity.5 Their sample comprises the 22 
countries with the highest share in merchandise imports in the world.6 
In her analysis on 12 developing countries Reinhart (1995) finds results similar to Clarida 
(1994) concerning the long run elasticity of imports with respect to the income variable. 
When comparing the elasticity for industrial countries which is estimated at around 2 and the 
elasticity for developing countries estimated at 1.2 she comes to the conclusion that in the 
long-run this constellation would lead to deteriorating trade balances in industrial countries 
and would work for the benefit of developing countries. Her elasticities with respect to the 
relative prices of imports are in most cases significant and lower than Clarida’s estimates and 
well below unity, which means that large swings in the real exchange rates are necessary to 
bring about changes in the trade pattern.  
Many studies have followed this example and have estimated import equations for different 
countries. Senhadji (1998) presents a study on the import demand function of 77 countries.7 
He finds that most of the coefficients have the expected sign and are significant. He uses as 
the activity variable GDP minus exports. The elasticity with respect to this measure of income 
is relatively small for the oil exporting countries. It is below unity for all exporting countries 
and even below 0.1 for the case of Norway.8 Maybe the elasticity is so low because for theses 
countries the main source of income is export revenues. 
With a longer time dimension Harb (2005) presents a study of 40 countries. He finds that 
for most countries, income and price variables have a significant effect on import demand and 
that the elasticities are higher in developing countries than in industrial countries.9 The only 
oil exporting countries included in his sample are Norway, Syria and Venezuela, however. 
And for these countries the estimation results for the impact of the relative prices on import 
demand are inconclusive.  
For the impact of oil prices on imports one has to look at the literature on oil exporting 
countries. In 2006 the IMF (2006) conducted an analysis on the import behaviour of oil 
exporting countries. This study asks the question whether the observation that the simple 
                                                 
5 Although it is still significantly different from unity.  
6 This sample does not include any of the oil exporting countries as none of these countries have such high 
import shares.  
7 His sample includes some oil exporting countries; in particular, Algeria, Congo, Gabon, Nigeria, Norway, 
Sudan, and Trinidad and Tobago.  
8 When comparing his two estimation methods, he comes to the conclusion that Fully Modified Ordinary Least 
Squares (FMOLS) outperforms simple ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations. 
9 This finding is contrary to Reinhart’s finding of lower income elasticities for developing countries.  
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marginal propensity to import out of oil revenues10 seems to have decreased since the 1970s 
mirrors the behaviour of oil exporting countries to spend oil revenues more cautiously. To test 
whether the simple propensity to import of around 24 percent for the OPEC countries, 15 
percent for the Golf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and 31 percent for the non-OPEC 
oil exporting countries are similar to the past they estimate an error correction import function 
for several oil exporting countries. In an out of sample forecasting exercise it is found that the 
spending on imports in OPEC countries is only slightly lower than implied by past behaviour 
and that only the spending of the GCC countries seems to be significantly more conservative.  
In a next step the IMF (2006) study also sets up a global, multiregion VAR model to 
estimate the impact of higher oil prices on the current account balances of several countries. 
As a reaction to a permanent 10 US dollar increase in oil prices the analysis finds a significant 
but short lived deterioration of the current account for oil importing countries and an increase 
in fuel exporters’ current account by around 2 percent (of own GDP). It is stated that higher 
oil prices slow down growth and lead to real depreciations in oil importing countries while 
output growth is enhanced and oil price hikes lead to real appreciations in oil exporting 
countries. The impulse response functions of these reactions are, however, highly 
insignificant. The significant reaction of the current account might therefore only mirror price 
effects resulting from the oil price changes. It depends on volume effects and the Marshall-
Lerner condition whether current accounts deteriorate in oil importing countries and whether 
the current account of oil exporting countries improves with increasing oil prices. In this case 
the reaction of the current accounts seems to be quite unambiguous because the demand for 
oil is in general very price inelastic and there are therefore almost no quantity adjustments to 
higher oil prices.  
In the import demand literature no study focuses on the specific characteristics of oil 
exporting countries. In country by country studies, only very few oil exporting countries are 
included. In the literature on oil exporting countries many studies analyse the reactions of the 
current account to changes in the oil price or in the terms of trade. This way it is impossible to 
tell whether reactions of the current account are only driven by price effects due to higher 
export prices. I disentangle the price effects and the wealth effects by estimating the reaction 
of real imports to the exchange rate and to the price of oil. In particular, I estimated separate 
effects for the oil price and a measure of the real exchange rate which takes into account the 
                                                 
10 Defined as the change in the current account (change in imports net of non-oil exports, investment income, 
and transfers) over the change in oil revenues (oil exports).  
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fact that exports and imports of oil exporting countries are no substitutes. At the same time I 
control for the specific characteristics of the oil exporting countries by including a measure of 
the fiscal balance as oil exporting countries are forced to use fiscal policies to guard against 
the high volatility of their export revenues.  
3.2 Empirical Findings 
This section presents empirical evidence on the import demand of oil exporting countries 
for a panel of 24 oil exporting countries based on a panel cointegration model. The challenge 
of estimating import demand functions for oil exporting countries is twofold. First of all, data 
is not as readily available as for industrial countries. On a quarterly basis there is no data for a 
large cross section of oil exporting countries available. The next problem is to find a 
specification suitable for the specific characteristics of oil exporting countries. Oil exporting 
countries are likely to differ from industrial countries because their economies are in general 
not well diversified and highly dependent on the oil sector. At the same time, these countries 
know that their most important source of revenue is finite, so that they have to put aside 
revenues for future generations. In addition, most of the oil industry in oil exporting countries 
is state owned or at least partially state own. This gives the state a central role in influencing 
import demand in oil exporting countries. In particular, the government balance is likely to 
play a role in determining import demand. The following estimation tries to make the best of 
the data available by using panel estimation methods. Also, the estimations control for the 
role of government by including a measure of government balances.  
3.2.1 The Data 
The estimations are based on annual data for a balanced panel of 24 oil exporting countries 
for the period from 1980 to 2005. The sample of countries consists of Algeria, Angola, 
Bahrain, Republic of Congo, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Islamic Republic of Iran, 
Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, 
Syrian Arab Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela 
and Yemen. The sample includes all countries listed as “Fuel Exporters” in the September 
2006 edition of the IMF World Economic Outlook with the addition of Norway and 
Kazakhstan and without Azerbaijan. The definition is based on the criteria that the main 
 69
source of exports consists of fuel, i.e. over the past five years the average share of fuel exports 
in total exports exceeds 40 percent and that the average value of exports exceeds 500 million 
U.S. dollar. Kazakhstan is included even though it is not possible to verify whether it meets 
these criteria. Azerbaijan which would also qualify is excluded from the sample because of 
the unavailability of data on fiscal balances. Note that this panel does not include all members 
of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). For Iraq11 the data quality is 
not sufficiently high and Indonesia’s oil trade balance turned negative in 2004. Other large oil 
exporters such as Canada, Mexico, and the United Kingdom are not part of the sample 
because oil is not their main source of export revenues.  
Table A3.1 in the appendix gives an overview of source and the availability of data. The 
variable to be explained is real imports. Other studies such as the IMF (2006) have analysed 
the behaviour of the current account of oil exporting countries. Because the price of oil and 
the exchange rate create price effects in the current account from which I want to abstract my 
main focus will be on the reaction of real imports. For this purpose real imports (in 2000 
constant prices) are taken from the IMF World Economic Outlook database. National 
Accounts data is taken as opposed to Balance of Payments data due to better comparability 
with the explanatory variables.12  
The first explanatory variable is a variable capturing real demand. It includes real domestic 
demand (including private consumption, investment, government consumption and 
investment, and changes in inventories) and real exports. Therefore a variable including 
domestic demand and exports is created. Goldstein and Kahn (1985) label the use of domestic 
demand as explanatory variable for imports the real expenditure approach. More recently and 
in the theoretical literature the approach is referred to as the absorption approach.13 In addition 
to domestic demand real exports are included. Especially for oil exporting countries, the 
inclusion of exports as explanatory variable can be justified because their oil export revenues 
make up a big part of their income. While the price effect of export revenues will be estimated 
separately with the inclusion of the oil price, the volume of exports could also play a role. The 
data for the domestic demand and exports is taken from the national accounts and it is 
                                                 
11 Iraq would also qualify as fuel exporter according to the above definition.  
12 It should be noted that imports from the balance of payments statistics are the basis for the statistics on imports 
in the national accounts. These concepts can different because they take different concepts as basis. National 
accounts data is based on the time it arises (accrual principle) and the Balance of Payments statistics are based on 
the transactions when payment is effected. In general, the two concepts differ only marginally.  
13 Theoretical models using this approach are among others Backus, Kehoe, Kydland (1994); Chari, Kehoe and 
McGrattan (2002) 
 70
therefore appropriate to estimate real imports taken from the national accounts. As can be 
seen in Table A3.1 in the appendix for some countries national accounts data for components 
of GDP is not available over the whole period. For these countries real imports are 
approximated by the volume of imports taken from the BoP.14 For Sudan and Kazakhstan no 
real data on components of GDP is available. For these countries the nominal national 
accounts data for imports is deflated with import prices from the balance of payments.15  
An alternative approach is to use gross domestic product (GDP) as the activity variable in 
the estimation of import demand. This approach is labelled income approach by Goldstein and 
Kahn (1985). This variable is often more readily available and it measures the total income of 
an economy. Some authors, e.g. Senhadji (1998), also use GDP excluding exports as an 
activity variable. For this large variety in the possibilities to specify the activity variable for 
import demand there seems to be no theoretical guidance on what variable is most appropriate 
to use as activity variable. The focus of this study will be on domestic demand and exports. 
Because of the different possibilities in specifying this variable, estimations with all of the 
concepts are performed and it is shown that the use of a different activity measure does not 
change the results. The activity variable is expected to have a positive impact on real import 
demand. With higher domestic demand the demand for imports will also rise. With higher real 
exports the oil exporting countries have more revenues to spend on foreign products. 
The second explanatory variable is a measure of the real exchange rate. This study builds 
on the real effective exchange rate as a measure of the real exchange rate. This exchange rate 
which takes into account the relative trading shares is not available for all the countries in the 
sample.16 Therefore, I calculated an approximation of the real effective exchange rate. This 
approximation is based on the bilateral nominal exchange rates of each country with the 
United States and the Euro Area deflated with the relative consumer price indices weighted 
with the relative import shares from these regions. In this specification all fluctuation in the 
real exchange rate is assumed to come from fluctuations in the real exchange rates with 
respect to the United States and the Euro Area. This approximation captures on average 
around half of the countries’ import flows. It should be a very good approximation of the real 
effective exchange rate because many countries have a fixed exchange rate vis-à-vis the U.S. 
                                                 
14 For Turkmenistan only the value of non-oil imports is available.  
15 Where the base year of the price index between BoP and national accounts GDP differs the data is transformed 
to have the same base year.   
16 The real effective exchange rate from the IMF WEO data source is only available for the following countries: 
Algeria, Bahrain, Republic of Congo, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Iran, Nigeria, Norway, Russia, Saudi 
Arabia, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela. See Table A3.1 of data availability in appendix. 
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dollar (e.g. Asia) and the euro (e.g. Eastern Europe). Also, a comparison of this 
approximation and the real effective exchange rate of the IMF for those countries where data 
is available proved that the approximation performs well.17 The share of imports is chosen as 
this is believed to be the relevant trade share as compared to the share of overall trade as the 
focus of the analysis is on imports. Another consideration is that the exports of oil exporting 
countries are almost exclusively invoiced in U.S. dollar so that nominal exchange rate 
fluctuations vis-à-vis the United States do not play a role for the demand of exports (besides 
the fact that the demand for oil is very price inelastic in any case).18 Thus, exports of oil 
exporting countries are likely not to depend on the real exchange rate. This should not be the 
case for imports. Even though there is almost no data available, it is likely that imports to oil 
exporting countries are invoiced in the currency of the producer (trading partner of oil 
exporters’ imports). The case of Algeria where data on the structure of currency invoicing in 
trade is available supports this claim.19 Thus, fluctuations in the real effective exchange rate 
of imports should lead to a direct expenditure switching effect; in the case of an appreciation 
away from domestic products towards foreign products. As reported below in the section on 
robustness, I also experimented with including an approximation of the real effective 
exchange rate where the assumption is that the real exchange rate with all trading partners 
outside the US and the Euro Area stays constant and therefore the fluctuations of the real 
effective exchange rate are less pronounced.20 The results indicate that using different real 
exchange rate approximations yields very similar results.  
One problem when estimating an import demand function for oil exporting countries is how 
to take into account the special role of oil on import demand. It is therefore interesting to see 
whether standard measures of the real exchange rate can perform equally well when put into 
the context of oil exporting countries. Many studies including the IMF (2006) study on import 
behaviour of oil exporting countries use the terms of trade as a measure of the real exchange 
rate. However, for our purpose it is crucial to distinguish between relative price effects and 
wealth effects. Price effects are exchange rate effects that make the import good cheaper (or 
more expensive) relative to the domestic good. In this sense, movements of the exchange rate 
lead to expenditure switching effects towards the relatively cheaper good. Using the terms of 
                                                 
17 The correlation between the approximation and the IMF real effective exchange rate is 92 percent on average.  
18 Iran has proposed to introduce an Iranian Oil Burse where contracts are invoiced in euro rather than U.S. 
dollar. So far, the project has been postponed several times, however.  
19 For exports almost all trade is invoiced in U.S. dollar (as very high share of oil). For imports around 50 are 
invoiced in euro which is not much lower than the relative import share with the euro area. 
20 In the comparison with the real effective exchange rate available from the IMF this exchange rate 
approximation showed less correlation than the base approximation described above.  
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trade as a real exchange rate measure, the relative price is based on import and export prices, 
i.e. imports and exports are assumed to be substitutes. While the terms of trade are in general 
quite a good approximation of this price effect it does not make sense to set import prices 
relative to export prices for oil exporting countries as imports and exports are no substitutes. 
Thus, the terms of trade would not be a good measure of the relative price effect but rather 
show the wealth effect of the very volatile price of their main export good oil.21  
The third explanatory variable is the price of oil in U.S. dollar. Data is taken from the IMF 
WEO series. This oil price is an average of three sorts of oil, namely Brent, West Texas 
Intermediate, and the Dubai Fateh. The basic specification with the nominal U.S. dollar oil 
price is chosen because it is the main point of reference when talking about oil price 
fluctuations. As discussed below in the section on robustness, I also performed estimations 
with two different concepts of real oil prices. The first one is the real U.S. dollar price of oil, 
where the nominal price of oil is deflated with the U.S. CPI. The second concept is a real oil 
price for which the nominal oil price is converted to local currency using the nominal 
exchange rate towards the U.S. dollar and then deflated with each country’s CPI. The oil price 
is expected to have a positive impact on real imports. For oil exporting countries higher oil 
prices translate into higher export revenues so that more resources can be spent on imports. In 
addition, all existing oil resources can be evaluated at higher prices. The resulting higher 
wealth should also stimulate import demand.  
The fourth explanatory variable is the share of government balances in nominal GDP. 
Where available the general government balance is used, otherwise the central government 
balance is used.22 As this variable is reported as share of GDP and not in logarithmic terms 
like all other variables the coefficient of this variable cannot directly be interpreted as 
elasticity. This variable is expected to have a negative effect on import demand. As suggested 
above, oil revenues can be used either for import demand, for demand of financial assets or 
for the reduction of debt. The latter would mean that the countries run a fiscal surplus. 23 
                                                 
21 This is not to say that in the long run oil prices could not have an impact on the real exchange rate. For the link 
between oil prices and the real exchange rate see the discussion and analysis in the section on Russia’s oil 
dependency. On the link between terms of trade and the real exchange rate see for example Cashin, Cespedes 
and Sahay (2004). They find that for a third of the 58 commodity exporting countries they analyse the 
commodity price has a significant long run effect on the real exchange rate. However, only Ecuador, Norway, 
Sudan and the Syrian Arab Republic from our sample are considered.  
22 This is the case for Algeria, Congo and Gabon, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. For Nigeria, Trinidad and Tobago 
and Venezuela some periods in the early 80s are approximated with the central government balances.  
23 The variable could therefore be endogenous and linked to the oil price. Possible problems with 
multicollinearity might arise in the estimation. The coefficients should therefore be interpreted with caution. 
There are two reasons why the specification is still chosen in this way. First of all, the correlation between the 
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Indeed many countries such as Norway and Russia even have an own stabilisation fund to 
channel excess liquidity from increasing oil revenues in this fund. Therefore, if funds are 
spent on increasing the fiscal surplus, fewer resources are used to demand imports.  
3.2.2 Estimation Methodology 
In the following analysis I will show that it is appropriate to conduct a panel cointegration 
analysis for our model. First, panel unit root tests are conducted to test for the stationarity of 
the variables. In a second step, panel cointegration tests are performed. The test results 
suggest that there are long run cointegration relationships between the variables of the model. 
The main focus of this study will, thus, be on the long run determinants of oil exporters’ 
import demand.  
Panel Unit Root Tests 
This section analyses the property of the variables over time. First of all, the question 
whether the variables in the panel are stationary or exhibit a high degree of time persistence 
will be explored. When finding nonstationary variables in the panel it is analysed whether 
there are variables with a similar stochastic trend so that a long run cointegration relationship 
can be established. To this end some of the standard panel unit root and cointegration tests are 
discussed and results presented.  
The first question when discussing unit root and cointegration tests for this panel is whether 
the assumption of asymptotic behaviour will hold at all due to the relatively short time and 
cross section dimension of the panel. Hlouskova and Wagner (2006) discuss the performance 
of several panel unit root and stationarity tests.24 In their discussion on the different unit root 
tests Hlouskova and Wagner (2006) distinguish between two groups of tests, namely those 
which assume homogenous behaviour, i.e. the first order serial correlation coefficient is 
required to be identical in all units and those based on the heterogeneous alternative where 
tests are based on individual time series unit root tests which are combined in an appropriate 
way to form group-mean computations. For the assumption of homogeneity, the Levin, Lin 
                                                                                                                                                        
fiscal variable and the oil price is only around 45 percent. Second, both variables prove to be significant which 
would not be the case if multicollinearity was a serious problem.  
24 Their main finding is that the stationarity tests proposed by Hadri (2000) and Hadri and Larsson (2005) do not 
exhibit a good performance. According to their analysis, the null hypothesis of stationarity is almost always 
(wrongly) rejected. Own estimation results for this panel not reported confirm this behaviour. The Hadri test 
would also reject stationarity for all variables in differences, thus, suggesting that the variables are integrated of 
order two. 
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and Chu (2002) and the Breitung (2000) test show the best performances. Problems arise for 
short samples when the time dimension is not sufficiently large. They come to the conclusion, 
however, that the estimation results exhibit satisfactory behaviour when T is larger than 25 
and at the same time larger than the cross section dimension. As this is the case for the present 
panel, results of the unit root tests should be reliable and give a good impression of the 
characteristics of the variables. The tests for heterogeneous unit root tests based on group-
mean estimates perform equally well. For our purpose the Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) test 
can be used as our panel is balanced.  
Table 3.2: Panel Unit Root Tests 
t-stat p-value t-stat p-value t-stat p-value t-stat p-value
Variables in levels
imports 0.2 0.58 1.9 0.97 2.8 1.00 34.5 0.93
exdd 1.1 0.87 1.5 0.94 2.1 0.98 25.6 0.99
reer -0.8 0.20 1.9 0.97 1.1 0.85 44.5 0.62
oil 9.1 1.00 2.4 0.99 12.7 1.00 0.5 1.00
fiscal -1.1 0.14 0.5 0.71 0.2 0.58 96.4 0.00
Variables in differences
imports -4.9 0.00 -0.7 0.24 -6.2 0.00 444.1 0.00
exdd -3.7 0.00 -1.2 0.11 -4.7 0.00 260.2 0.00
reer -5.5 0.00 -4.7 0.00 -6.3 0.00 215.9 0.00
oil -9.4 0.00 -4.3 0.00 -17.1 0.00 949.3 0.00
fiscal -9.6 0.00 -3.6 0.00 -10.6 0.00 972.8 0.00
Source: Author's estimations.
     BreitungLevin-Lin-Chu Fisher PP   Im, Pesaran, and Shin
 
Table 3.2 reports the results of the unit root tests. All tests cannot reject the null hypothesis 
of a unit root for the variables in levels, while they do reject the null of a unit root for the 
variables in differences.25 Our variables should, thus, all be integrated of order 1.   
Panel Cointegration Tests 
To find out whether theses I (1) variables possess a common stochastic trend the tests 
suggested by Pedroni (1999) are performed. These are cointegration tests for which 
information is pooled in such a way that the short run dynamics and the fixed effects are 
allowed to be heterogeneous over countries while common long-run relationships are 
assumed in the panel. The null hypothesis is that for each member of the panel the variables 
of interest are not cointegrated. As can be seen from Table 3.3 five out of seven cointegration 
tests can reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 1 percent significance level while 
the panel v and panel rho statistic fail to reject it.   
                                                 
25 Only the Levin-Lin-Chu test cannot reject the null of unit roots for the differences of imports and of domestic 
demand and exports.  
 75
                        Table 3.3: Pedroni cointegration tests 
t-statistic
Panel v-stat 0.75934
Panel rho-stat 0.7178
Panel pp-stat -2.61762***
Panel adf-stat -3.14538***
Group rho-stat 2.38183***
Group pp-stat -2.54379***
Group adf-stat -3.79910***
 
The tests are divided into two subgroups. The panel statistics are based on tests where the 
residuals of the regression are pooled along the within dimension of the panel. The second 
type group statistics is based on pooling along the between dimension and are thus simply the 
group mean statistics of the individual time-series statistics. Pedroni (2004) finds that for 
small time and cross section dimensions, the panel ADF and the group ADF tests perform 
best.26 There is therefore sufficiently strong evidence for cointegration in the panel.  
Panel Cointegration Models 
After showing that the variables in the panel exhibit unit roots and that there are long run 
relationships between the variables we can proceed in estimating a panel long run 
relationship. Given the data restrictions the choice of the methodology crucially depends on 
the assumption of slope homogeneity of the coefficients. Estimating the panel with fixed 
effects assumes slope homogeneity and puts a restriction not only on the long run coefficient 
but also the short run dynamics and the adjustment processes are restricted to be the same 
across countries. For a panel of oil exporting countries this assumption seems to be too strong 
as the panel includes economies as different as Norway, Oman and Venezuela. The alternative 
would be to run separate regressions for each country. The shortcoming of this estimation 
methodology is that it requires sufficient data on the time dimension. For most of the 
countries included in this panel it is, however, impossible to increase the time frequency from 
annual data to quarterly data and no data prior to 1980 exists. The time dimension is, thus, not 
long enough to perform country by country estimations. An alternative suggested by Pesaran 
et al. (1999) is the estimation of the Pooled Mean Group Estimator (PMGE). This maximum 
likelihood estimator allows the short run dynamics and the speed of adjustment to differ 
                                                 
26 The power of the unit root tests sharply increases with a larger T dimension. For samples of this size the 
empirical power of the test is just below 50 percent.  
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across countries and only restricts the long-run coefficients to be the same across countries. It 
seems reasonable to assume that oil exporting countries have the same economic behaviour 
concerning their import behaviour in the long run and to leave the short run dynamics and the 
adjustment process to equilibrium unrestricted. An alternative, simpler estimation method also 
proposed by Pesaran et al. is the Mean Group Estimator (MGE) where the estimates are not 
pooled but only averages of the country by country estimations are calculated. While this 
estimator is always consistent it does not take advantage of the possible poolability of the data 
and is therefore inefficient. The PMGE is efficient when compared to the MGE. To test 
whether the PMGE is also consistent a Hausman (1987) test comparing MGE and PMGE and 
testing for slope homogeneity has to be performed.  
An alternative for the PMG estimation is the estimation with fully-modified ordinary least 
squares (FMOLS) as proposed by Pedroni (2004). This estimator provides superconsistent 
estimates for the long-run parameters. In general it is found that the FMOLS needs less 
restrictive assumptions and performs well even for small panels. Pedroni (2004) shows that 
the group mean FMOLS estimation method performs well even for small T and small N. For 
our panel which has a time dimension (T) of 26 years and a cross section dimension (N) of 24 
countries the above mentioned estimation methods should be appropriate. Indeed, both 
Pedroni (2004) and Pesaran et al. (1999) use panels with similar dimensions for their 
estimations.27  
3.2.3 Estimation Results 
The long-run import function for oil exporting countries is assumed to be given by: 
imit = θ0i + θ1i exddit + θ2ireerit + θ3itoilit + θ4it fiscit + uit              (3.1) 
i = 1,2,…..,24 and t = 1,2,…..26, 
where im is the logarithm of real imports, exdd is the logarithm of the sum of real domestic 
demand and real exports, reer is the logarithm of the real effective exchange rate, oil is the 
logarithm of the US dollar price of oil and fisc is the government balance in percent of 
nominal GDP as described in the data section. As discussed above we would expect θ1i and θ2i 
to be close to unity from a theoretical point of view while previous empirical studies point to 
                                                 
27 Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999) use a panel with N=24 and T=32 and Pedroni simulates panel results with at 
the lowest N=10 and T=10. For the PMGE it is also important that the condition holds that the time dimension is 
larger than the cross section dimension. This is the case for this panel. 
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θ1i higher than 1 and θ2i lower than 1. The coefficient for oil θ3it is expected to be positive and 
the coefficient of government balances θ4it is expected to have a negative sign. From the 
previous tests on unit roots we conclude that our variables are I(1) and cointegrated.  
The import equation can be written as an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) equation in 
general terms (with one lag short run dynamics as an example): 
imit = µi + δ10i exddit + δ11i exddi,t-1 + δ 20ireerit + δ 21ireeri,t-1 + δ 30ioilit +  
δ 31ioili,t-11 + δ 40i fiscit + δ 41i fisci,t-1 + λi imi,t-1 + εit                                (2)
The error correction form of the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) equation is given as 
∆imit = Φi (imit-1 - θ0i - θ1i exddit - θ2ireerit - θ3ioilit - θ4i fiscit ) –  
δ11i ∆exddit+ δ21i ∆reerit – δ31i ∆oilit – δ41i ∆fiscit - εit                           (3) 
where θ0i=µi/(1- λi), θ1i=(δ10i + δ11i)/(1- λi), θ2i=(δ20i + δ21i)/(1- λi), θ3i=(δ30i + δ31i)/(1- λi), θ4i=(δ40i 
+ δ41i)/(1- λi) and Φi = - (1- λi).  
The lag structure is determined by the Akaike selection criterion. The maximum lag length 
is chosen to be two and then the optimum lag length for each variable for each country is 
chosen individually by the Akaike criterion. Table 3.4 shows the estimation results.  
                   Table 3.4: Estimation of Import Demand in Oil Exporting Countries 
Regression FMOLS PMGE
EXDD 1.28*** 1.65***
(56.41) (28.68)
REER 0.18*** 0.18***
(10.8) (7.98)
OIL 0.09*** 0.25***
(5.94) (6.76)
FISC -0.00*** -0.01***
(-3.30) (-7.22)
Phi -0.21***
(-4.33)
Hausman-test 3.28
(0.51)
Number of observations 624 624
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses (p-value for Hausman test)
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
 
All coefficients are significant at the 1 percent significance level and have the predicted 
sign. At the same time, the Hausman test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the PMG 
estimator is significantly different from the consistent MG estimator. The main focus of our 
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analysis will, thus, be on the PMGE estimation results. In addition, FMOLS results are 
reported as robustness because they are superconsistent and therefore a good robustness 
check. As can be seen in Table 3.4, the coefficient for the variable exdd which includes real 
domestic demand and real exports is 1.28 for the FMOLS and 1.65 for the PMGE. This 
coefficient is comparable with findings for the real activity coefficient in many other studies 
for industrial countries. The coefficient for real demand including real exports is higher than 
the coefficient only including domestic demand (1.2).28 However, for oil exporting countries, 
the volume of exports needs to be included as an explanatory variable as much of their 
purchasing power comes from export revenues.29 It is reassuring to see that this real activity 
variable has a highly significant and positive effect on real import demand.  
The main focus of this study is, however, on the price effects both of the real exchange rate 
and of the oil price. As can be seen in Table 3.4, the real effective exchange rate (reer) has a 
significantly positive impact on imports. A 10 percent appreciation of the real exchange rate 
for imports leads to a 1.8 percent increase in imports in the long run. This elasticity is rather 
on the lower side. Theory predicts an elasticity of unity in the long run. One reason for this 
low elasticity might be the relatively low substitutability of imports and domestically-
produced goods. Especially for oil exporting countries, a large share of imports are luxury 
goods produced only abroad, e.g. luxury cars. Some import goods seem to be substitutes of 
domestically-produced goods, however, because in the extreme case of no substitutability no 
expenditure switching would take place and the coefficient of the real exchange rate measure 
would be zero. Table A3.2 in the appendix summarizes the growth rates of the main variables 
in oil exporting countries. It can be seen that real exchange rate fluctuations have been rather 
small in the past. Only for the CIS countries sizeable fluctuations can be observed. The main 
reason for this phenomenon is that most of the oil exporting countries do not only have a 
fixed exchange rate regime so that nominal exchange rate fluctuations are kept small, but they 
also do not allow local prices to adjust freely. The latter restrictions most likely prevent more 
pronounced real appreciations that the Balassa-Samuelson effect would predict.30  
The coefficient for oil has a significantly positive impact on import demand. Through 
higher export revenues import demand is stimulated. In addition there can be a significant 
                                                 
28 This specification was estimated as an additional robustness check.  
29 It is, however, important to distinguish between quantity and price effects of export revenues. The volume of 
exports only reflects the quantity of oil exports. This is likely to be relatively stable comparable to domestic 
demand. In contrast to prices which are likely to be highly volatile and which are the source of fluctuations in 
export revenues in the short and medium run.  
30 The Balassa Samuelson effect states that countries in a catching up process (like countries in transition) exhibit 
higher inflation rates than industrial countries.  
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wealth effect through the higher value of existing oil reserves if the oil price change is 
perceived as permanent. The overall wealth effect is quite large even though the coefficient 
looks rather small with 0.25. In the long run a 10 percent increase in the oil price leads to 2.5 
percent more imports. In the past years the oil price more than doubled. Only from 2004 to 
2005 the oil price increased by more than 40 percent. This shows the dimension of the impact 
the oil price can have on imports.  
The size of the effect of the fiscal variable on imports in the long run cannot directly be 
read from the coefficient as this is not reported in logarithms but as share of nominal GDP. 
The qualitative estimation results show, however, that the fiscal balance has a significant 
negative effect on import demand. This shows that some of the revenue increases due to 
higher oil prices are kept as a reserve for times of lower oil prices so that fiscal policy can be 
countercyclical to movements in the oil price. Many countries such as Russia or Norway have 
oil stabilization funds. These funds can indeed have a negative effect on import demand as 
our results show. To claim that oil exporting countries should not keep their petrodollars in 
funds but to use them to minimize global imbalances is, however, unjustified. This study 
shows that the oil price does have a significant positive effect on import demand. The nature 
of the oil price which is highly volatile as well as the nature of petroleum as an export product 
which is scarce, make it necessary for oil exporting countries to build up some reserves for 
times of low oil prices and for future generations.  
The main focus of the analysis is on the estimation results of the PMGE estimations. For 
this long run cointegration estimation the adjustment coefficient Φ is crucial because it 
describes the speed of adjustment with which the system reacts to shocks to come back to the 
steady state relationship between the variables. This coefficient is significant and negative as 
it should be for the overall panel. It is estimated for each country individually. For the 
majority of countries this adjustment coefficient is significantly negative.31 It is not surprising 
that there are some insignificant adjustment coefficients given the small sample size. The size 
of the average coefficient of adjustment can be interpreted in such a way that the estimated 
speed of convergence is about 20 percent per year and that the system is close to equilibrium 
in around five years. Most of the countries have an adjustment coefficient close to 0.2. The 
highest speed of adjustment to equilibrium can be found for Russia. The coefficient of 0.78 is 
                                                 
31 For Saudi Arabia the optimum lag length criterion selects a lag length of 0 so that a static model is estimated. 
In 19 countries the coefficient is negative, only in 4 countries is the coefficient positive (and not significant). In 
10 countries the coefficient is highly significant. 8 countries show t-statistics between 1 and 2.  
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similar to the error correction coefficient in the country analysis of Russia (0.65).32 Russian 
imports seem to adjust quickly to shocks. The contrary is true for imports of Iran and Oman. 
Here, adjustment takes around 10 years. Reasons for these different speeds in adjustment 
could be found in the respective trade openness of the countries.  
Table A3.4 shows some tests on the functional form of the group specific estimates. It is 
important to see how well specified the model is on a country-by-country basis before the 
more efficient PMGE procedure should be implemented. The results presented are reassuring. 
Only three countries exhibit signs of serial correlation, three countries show signs of 
functional form misspecification, in one country signs of non-normality and in one country 
signs of heteroscedasticity of the residuals can be found. On average almost 90 percent of the 
change in the logarithm of imports is explained. Some long run elasticities estimated on this 
country-by-country basis are found to be insignificant. When judging these diagnostic results 
it should, however, always be kept in mind that the estimation over such a short horizon is 
likely to render some estimates insignificant or unstable. This is precisely, why the analysis is 
not based on a country-by-country study but on the PMG estimation. In addition, when 
comparing these results with an analysis of OECD countries it should be noted that it is not 
unsurprising that the data quality and diversity of oil exporting countries does not allow for 
even more robust results. On the contrary, as the next section will show, the estimation results 
are surprisingly robust over different specifications.  
3.2.4 Robustness of the Estimation Results 
The panel of oil exporting countries is extremely diverse; therefore it is important to check 
the estimation results for robustness. The first check of robustness was the estimation of 
FMOLS parallel to the estimation of PMGE. As a next step I check whether the stepwise 
exclusion of a country (group) has a significant effect on the size and significance of the 
coefficient. Figure A3.1 in the appendix shows the coefficients of exdd, reer and the price of 
oil respectively. On the x axis the country groups which are excluded are listed.  
The coefficient for domestic demand and exports is very robust. It is almost the same for all 
the specifications. Only for the specification without the Middle East the coefficient is a little 
bit lower. This has to be read in such a way that the coefficient for the countries of the Middle 
                                                 
32 See chapter 4 for details. Even though this coefficient is estimated for quarterly data, the slightly lower 
coefficient for the quarterly estimation leads to a similar adjustment process within one year.  
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East is higher than for the overall panel. 33 The intuition behind this result is straightforward. 
These economies are highly dependent on oil and often hardly have any domestic industry 
outside the oil production process. With increased domestic demand most of the demand is 
therefore channelled to foreign products because the domestic industry is slow to adjust to the 
additional demand.  
The coefficient of the real exchange rate seems to be less robust when compared to the 
coefficient of exdd. It should be kept in mind, however, that the reaction to the real exchange 
rate is more likely to differ across countries already because of the different exchange rate 
regimes which have been in place over the sample period. Yet, it is reassuring to note that 
even with reduced degrees of freedom due to the smaller sample when excluding country 
regions the coefficient is highly significant for all specifications. It also hardly fluctuates with 
all the country regions. Only when excluding the countries of the CIS the coefficient increases 
somewhat. It is important to keep in mind that for the countries of the CIS the data quality 
before 1995 is very poor. Especially the approximation of the real exchange rate is extremely 
poor for the beginning of the sample period.34 The reason to include the countries of the CIS 
nevertheless is not only that Russia is one of the major economies in the sample, but also that 
the CIS countries are almost the only countries with a relatively flexible exchange rate 
regime.35 Fluctuations of the real exchange rate in the other economies have been more 
subdued in the past due to nominal exchange rate restrictions. Especially when discussing a 
possible step to let the currencies of the oil exporting countries float freely it is crucial to 
compare the effect this could have on their import demand to the countries that have had 
flexible exchange rate regimes already over the current sample period.  
The coefficient for the panel without the CIS countries is higher, i.e. the coefficient for the 
CIS countries would be lower if it could be estimated individually.36 The CIS countries have 
such a large effect on the size of the coefficient because their real exchange rates are the main 
ones to fluctuate. The discussion on the real exchange rate coefficient can show two things. 
First, there is an even higher potential for the impact of the real exchange rate on oil exporting 
countries for all the countries that are currently in a fixed peg. Second, this effect should not 
                                                 
33 It would not be efficient to estimate the panel for each country group individually because of the limited time 
dimension and degrees of freedom of the panel. 
34 It can be argued indeed that there should be no approximation of the real exchange rate for these countries 
during this time period as they were extremely closed economies and capital was not allowed to fluctuate freely.  
35 For a list of exchange rate regimes in oil exporting countries see Table A3.3 of the appendix.  
36When comparing the coefficient for the overall panel with the coefficient for the long run elasticity of the real 
exchange rate for Russia in the section on Russia’s dependence on oil, it can be seen that the two do not differ 
considerably. This is an additional proof of robustness.  
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be overestimated, however, as the experience of the CIS countries shows that the effect might 
become smaller when exchange rate fluctuations become larger. The next section will show 
that neither interpretation of the coefficient leads to fundamentally different interpretations of 
the impact of the real exchange rate of oil exporting countries for global imbalances in the 
long run.  
The coefficient of the oil price is robust over countries. The relatively higher impact of the 
oil price in the Middle East can be explained by the big share of oil exports in overall GDP. 
These countries are therefore especially dependent on their oil revenues and more likely to 
show more pronounced reactions to the oil price. Also, as argued above, the domestic industry 
mostly cannot absorb additional demand created by the increased wealth due to higher oil 
prices so that the additional demand is channelled to foreign products. The contrary is true for 
a country like Russia which is such a big economy that even though it is highly dependent on 
the price of oil, it still has a sizeable industry outside the oil sector which can also absorb 
additional demand created by higher oil revenues.  
The next robustness check is to see whether the estimation results are robust to changes in 
the lag length. The lag length is chosen with the optimum lag selection criterion of the 
Augmented Dickey Fuller test. The results do not change when instead of the ADF test, the 
Schwartz or the Hannan Quinn lag selection criterion is chosen. The maximum lag length is 
chosen to be two for the standard specification. Figure A3.2 of the appendix shows that the 
estimation results are robust to different maximum lag lengths. A maximum lag length higher 
than 3 is not chosen because of the reduced degrees of freedom and also because a higher lag 
length seems rather implausible economically as the data is on an annual basis.  
As another robustness test different versions of the explanatory variables are included. 
Different concepts of the activity variable as explained above, as well as different concepts of 
the real exchange rate are included and estimations where also performed with a real oil price. 
For an overview of the results of the different estimation specifications see Table 3.5. 
Estimations for both the real oil price deflated with the U.S CPI and the real oil price 
converted to local currency using the nominal exchange rate and deflated with each country’s 
CPI are shown. The reason to include the nominal oil price in the main specification is simply 
a matter of better interpretability as stated above. Including the real oil price does not change 
the estimation results. The coefficient of the oil price is 0.18 for the U.S. real oil price and 
0.20 for the country specific real oil price. The coefficient is, thus, only marginally smaller 
than in the estimation with nominal oil prices.  
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  Table 3.5: Overview of different estimation specifications 
Dependent variable: Imports
Regression basis 1a 1b 1c 2a 2b 3a 3b
Activity variable Domestic Demand plus Exports 1.65*** 1.41*** 1.68*** 1.60*** 1.44***
(28.69) (26.18) (36.24) (34.48) (34.22)
GDP 1.10***
(22.18)
Domestic Demand 1.22***
(44.9)
only exports 0.72***
(26.91)
Real exchange rate reera (all US Euro Area) 0.18*** 0.32*** 0.22*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.33***
(7.98) (11.29) (10.83) (5.81) (6.82) (13.34)
reer (incl. WEO) 0.30***
(11.33)
reera (no other fluct.) 0.23***
(7.76)
Oil price nominal 0.25*** 0.24*** 0.14*** 0.38*** 0.21*** 0.21***
(6.76) (6.16) (5.57) (8.67) (6.13) (6.84)
real US 0.18***
(7.68)
real country specific 0.20***
(9.32)
Government balance -0.01*** 0.00 0.00*** -0.01** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01***
(-7.22) (1.61) (3.87) (-2.19) (-4.45) (-8.33) (-5.59) (-0.74)
Phi -0.23*** -0.42*** -0.36*** -0.44*** -0.23*** -0.28*** -0.27*** -0.25***
(-4.33) (-5.32) (-4.62) (-5.14) (-4.55) (-4.63) (-5.27) (-3.75)
Hausman-test 3.28 3.00 4.07 4.69 3.18 14.35 5.82 5.84
(0.51) (0.56) 0.40 (0.32) (0.53) (0.01) (0.21) (0.21)
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses (p-value for Hausman test)
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Including different approximations of the real exchange rate does not change the results 
either. One concept includes the IMF WEO real effective exchange rate where available (reer 
(incl. WEO)) and only fills the non available data with the approximation of the real exchange 
rate for imports. The other specification is the approximation of the real exchange rate which 
assumes that all exchange rates other than the bilateral real exchange rates vis-à-vis the U.S. 
dollar and the euro stay constant (reera (no other fluct)). This way the real exchange rate 
fluctuates much less on average than with the assumption used for the standard estimation that 
all fluctuation comes from the real exchange rate vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar and the euro, i.e. 
that all other bilateral exchange rates fluctuate in the same way on average (reera (all US 
Euro Area)). From a theoretical point of view it is not clear which approximation is more 
appropriate. When comparing the two different concepts of approximation with the IMF 
WEO real effective exchange rate for those countries where data exists led me to choose the 
second concept over the first as it follows the data from the IMF more closely. However, even 
the estimation with other approximations of the real exchange rate led to almost identical 
results.  
Another robustness test is to extend the dataset which is in full only available until 2005 with 
preliminary and forecasted data of the WEO database for the year 2006.37 Estimations with 
this extended dataset also provide almost identical coefficients.38 This exercise was performed 
to judge whether recent developments would change the estimation results. This is not the 
case. Another issue is whether the estimation suffers from an omitted variable bias. The 
overall power of the estimation equation and the good fit and good robustness of the model do 
not point to such a bias. It is not possible to include all variables that come to mind into the 
estimation because this would reduce the degrees of freedom in such a way that the estimation 
is no longer possible. One channel for petrodollar recycling should, however, not be left 
unmentioned. While the focus of this study is the recycling of petrodollars through trade other 
studies focus on the financial channel. It is very difficult to measure the financial flows and 
the foreign assets of oil exporting countries as many of these are acquired through financial 
centres in London or similar. One specification to check the robustness of our results was to 
include the net foreign asset position as an explanatory variable.39 Net foreign assets have a 
significantly negative effect on imports. All resources taken for financial assets are not free 
                                                 
37 IMF World Economic Outlook, September 2006.  
38 Detailed results are available on request. 
39 The data is taken from the dataset by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006). The variable was included as share of 
nominal GDP. In this specification the fiscal balance could not be included at the same time due to reduced 
number of degrees of freedom.  
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for use to buy imports. This coefficient should, however, be interpreted with caution due to 
the data problems mentioned above. The main reason why this estimation was performed was 
to show that the results for the other coefficients do not change. This is the case as the 
coefficients are almost the same as with the specification without the financial variable. 
3.3 Impact on Global Imbalances 
The group of oil exporting countries considered in this panel makes up only 5.6 percent of 
world GDP.40 Nevertheless, theses countries are increasingly given a role as players in the 
global imbalances debate. In April 2006 at the G8 meeting in St. Petersburg it was argued that 
oil exporting countries should let their exchange rates float so as to appreciate and have 
increased demand for foreign products help reduce global imbalances.41 The idea behind this 
is that with increasing oil prices and increasing oil revenues in theses countries some of the 
extra gain should be spent abroad especially as higher oil prices increase the current account 
deficit of oil importing countries already through the price effect.42 It is often argued that oil 
exporting countries have replaced other advanced countries excluding the United States as 
countries with the highest current account surplus. In the following exercise I want to show 
that even though both oil prices and the real exchange rate have a considerable effect on 
imports of oil exporting countries, the overall effect on global imbalances is bound to be 
almost negligible. To get an intuition on the exact amount of trade flows the next section 
performs a simulation exercise on the impact of a 10 US dollar increase in the oil price and a 
10 percent appreciation of the real effective exchange rate.  
A 10 dollar increase in the price of oil is often discussed as a benchmark scenario. From the 
approximate level of 50 US dollars in 2005, a 10 dollar increase is a 20 percent increase in the 
price of oil. According to our long run elasticity of 0.25 a 20 percent increase in the price of 
oil would lead to a 5 percent increase in real imports. A 10 percent appreciation of the real 
exchange rate given the long run elasticity of approximately 0.2 would result in a 2 percent 
increase in real imports. While this has a considerable impact for each oil exporting country, 
                                                 
40 In nominal GDP numbers for the year 2005.  
41 For example Krueger (2006): “The oil exporters' large surpluses—and their increase in wealth—provide a rare 
opportunity to tackle some long-standing domestic problems, and at the same time—as an important by-
product—make a major contribution to the reduction of global imbalances. […] Oil-importers, too, need 
flexibility both in their exchange rate regimes and elsewhere in the economy if they are to minimize the impact 
of oil price rises on their economies.” 
42 Nsouli, Saleh M., Director Offices in Europe, IMF (2006): “Indeed, oil exporters' imports may come partly to 
offset the initial oil price-driven revenue inflow in their current account. If those imports come from oil-
importing countries, they also help reduce the pressure on oil importers' current accounts.” 
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to find out how this increase in real imports affects global imbalances a number of 
assumptions have to be set.  
As discussed in the introduction the focus of this study is on real effects rather than on price 
effects. This is why the impact of the real exchange rate and the oil price on real imports has 
been analysed. In the worldwide discussion on global imbalances, the current account 
balances, in particular the current account deficit of the United States is the main focus of 
attention, however. Therefore I will transform the effect on real imports into changes in the 
current account balances of the trading partners. For this exercise a set of simplifying 
assumptions can transform real import changes into value changes in the trade balance. First 
of all, it is assumed that oil demand is completely inelastic.43 Second, there are no changes in 
the nominal exchange rate.44 That is, the real appreciation comes only through relative price 
differences or higher price increases in the oil exporting countries than in their trading 
partners. This assumption is not binding for the analysis of the US current account deficit as 
the US dollar value of exports of the US to oil exporting countries shows only volume effects 
and not value effects (as their exports are priced in US dollar). The same is true when the 
assumption holds that all exporters to the oil exporting countries invoice in producer currency, 
i.e. no nominal exchange rate movements influence the value of the exports going to the 
region of oil exporting countries. Another assumption is that export prices of the trading 
partners are not subject to inflation, i.e. real changes equal nominal changes. These 
assumptions might seem very restrictive but they are not at all crucial for the overall 
qualitative result of the analysis, rather they serve to make the analysis as simple and 
straightforward - leaving out all effects outside the direct transmission mechanism - as 
possible.  
3.3.1 Simulation of a 10 U.S. dollar increase in the price of oil 
First of all, the impact of a 10 US dollar increase in the oil price is analysed. A simple oil 
bill calculation is based on the assumption of an oil price increase from 50 US dollar to 60 US 
dollar (20 percent increase). Current account and trade balance data are taken from the World 
Economic Outlook of the IMF for the year 2005.  
                                                 
43 This assumption is quite plausible as the demand for oil is very price inelastic. 
44 The assumptions should hold both for the oil price increase and the real exchange rate increase simulation.  
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Table 3.6 shows the implications of a 10 US dollar increase in the price of oil for the 
United States. First of all, it should be noted that the increase in the oil price has a direct (and 
considerable) negative impact on the U.S. current account balance through the higher oil 
bill.45 
Table 3.6: The impact of a 10 dollar rise in the oil price on the United States 
Hypothetical    
Oil Price       
(in $ per barrel)
Oil Bill     
(in billion $)
Exports to Oil 
Exporting Countries 
(in billion $)
% point 
compensation in 
Current Account
Share of Bill Increase 
compensated for by 
export increase
Starting point 50.0 224.1 62.6
Increase 60.0 268.9 65.8
in dollar 10.0 44.8 3.1
in percent 20 20 5.0 0.03 7.0
Source: IMF WEO, IMF DTS, BP (2006), own calculations.  
Assuming that the geographic import structure of the oil exporting countries does not 
change, the 20 percent increase in the oil price translates into a 5 percent increase of oil 
exporting countries’ imports from the U.S. or a 5 percent increase of U.S. exports to the oil 
exporting countries. Calculated as a percentage point change from the 2005 level of the 
current account deficit, this translates into a 0.03 percentage point compensation for the 
otherwise worsening current account balance. Or transformed into a the share of the bill 
increase due to the oil price increase that is compensated for by the higher exports to oil 
exporting countries, this is a 7 percent compensation. This calculation illustrates that higher 
oil prices cannot be compensated for by higher exports to the region benefiting from the oil 
price increase, at least not for the United States.  
Figure 3.1 shows the geographical distribution of exports of the United States and the euro 
area.46 The figure shows that not only is the share of euro area exports almost three times as 
high in 2005 as the share of U.S. exports to the region of oil exporting countries, but the euro 
area gradually increased their trade share with the region while the United States does not 
seem to participate in this increased demand from the region of oil exporting countries. This is 
the case even though the oil exporting countries depreciated on average in real terms by 
                                                 
45 It is assumed that there is no quantity adjustment in the demand of oil. This assumption is quite plausible as 
the demand for oil is very price inelastic.  
46 For the euro area the share is the share of exports relative to extra euro area trade. All euro area data is for the 
composition of the European Monetary Union as of 2006, i.e. excluding Slovenia.  
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around 7 percent against the euro while they appreciated against the U.S. dollar by around 23 
percent.47 
Figure 3.1: Share of exports to oil exporting countries 
0
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euro area US  
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DTS). Author’s 
Calculations. 
How does the oil bill calculation of the euro area compare to that of the United States? 
When comparing the euro area oil bill to the oil bill of the United States it should first of all 
be noted that – although the United States is an oil producer – the oil bill of the U.S. is still 
slightly higher than for the euro area, i.e. the U.S. is likely to suffer more from increasing oil 
prices. It can also be seen that the euro area exports almost five times more in absolute terms 
to the region of oil exporting countries. With similar oil bill increases due to a 10 U.S. dollar 
increase of the oil price, the compensation of higher exports to the region is, thus, five times 
as high as for the United States. As can be seen from Table 3.7, for the euro area almost 40 
percent of the oil bill increase is compensated for by higher exports to the region of oil 
exporting countries.  
Table 3.7: The impact of a 10 dollar rise in the oil price on the euro area 
Hypothetical    
Oil Price       
(in $ per barrel)
Oil Bill     
(in billion 
$)
Exports to Oil 
Exporting Countries 
(in billion $)
% point 
compensation in 
Current Account
Share of Bill Increase 
compensated for by 
export increase
Starting point 50.0 202.8 294.6
Increase 60.0 243.4 309.3
in dollar 10.0 40.6 14.7
in percent 20 20 5.0 0.15 36.32
Source: IMF WEO, IMF DTS, BP (2006), own calculations.  
                                                 
47 These numbers are calculated for the period from 2000 to 2005 from a weighted average of oil exporting 
countries. In nominal terms oil exporting countries depreciated by around 30 percent against the euro and by 
around 8 percent against the USD. 
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3.3.2 Simulation of a 10 percent real appreciation 
A 10 percent real appreciation leads to a 2 percent increase in real imports in the long run. 
As discussed above, this effect could also be slightly higher when abstracting from the CIS 
countries or when using different estimation specifications. This exercise shows that the 
overall impact on global imbalances would be almost negligible. The improvement of the U.S 
current account deficit would amount to 0.01 percentage points48 while the improvement of 
the euro area current account would amount to 0.06 percentage points. Even if the elasticity 
was four times as large the improvement in the current account balances would still be 
minimal, especially for the United States.  
Figure 3.2: Oil Exporters’ Share in the U.S. Trade Deficit and U.S. Exports 2006 
US Trade Deficit 2006
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     Note: Oil Exporter includes OPEC countries without Indonesia and in addition of Russia and Algeria. North 
America consists of Canada and Mexico; NICS are the Newly Industrialised Countries (Hong Kong, Korea, 
Singapore, and Taiwan). The data includes data up to November 2006.  
     Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (2007), own calculations.  
In Figure 3.2 it can be seen that the bilateral U.S. trade deficit with the oil exporting 
countries is approximately of the same size than the bilateral trade deficit with North 
America49 and the EU. However, the share of exports going to the oil exporting countries is 
not very high when compared to other regions. Given that imports form the region consist 
almost exclusively of oil which is invoiced in U.S. dollar, the adjustment mechanism of the 
exchange rate and the expenditure switching mechanism can work only for exports going to 
oil exporting countries. The effect is, thus, bound to be very low.  
Therefore, the role of the oil exporting countries in global imbalances seems to be rather 
limited so far. This is not to say that the impact of considerable real appreciations that could 
well be higher than 10 percent per year would not be felt in the world economy. But given the 
geographical trade structure of the United States and the euro area, considerable real 
                                                 
48 Using a current account deficit of -6.35 of GDP as a starting point.  
49 In the definition of the Bureau of Economic Analysis, North America includes Canada and Mexico.  
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appreciations of oil exporting countries are more likely to benefit the euro area rather than the 
U.S leaving global imbalances unresolved.  
3.4 Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to analyse the determinants of oil exporting countries’ import 
behaviour and to put the results of the analysis into a global perspective. The estimation 
results show that real imports are driven by real domestic demand and real exports, by the real 
effective exchange rate, by the oil price and by fiscal balances in the long run. Higher 
domestic demands and higher real exports lead to additional demand for foreign products. The 
elasticity for oil exporting countries is higher than for industrialised countries as most of the 
oil exporting countries heavily rely on the oil industry in all production fields and can 
therefore not satisfy increased demand with domestic products. The fiscal balances have a 
negative effect on imports in the long run. This is the case because most of the oil exporting 
countries have oil stabilisation funds to safeguard against too high volatility in the oil price 
and to accumulate some funds for future generations which cannot profit from the oil 
revenues to such an extent as resources are limited.  
Real appreciations also lead to an increase in imports in the long run. The elasticity of 0.2 
seems to be on the lower side when compared to estimates for other countries. When 
excluding the countries of the CIS from the panel or using alternative approximations of the 
real exchange rate this elasticity could also be somewhat higher. Most of the oil exporting 
countries have fixed exchange rate arrangements so that the fluctuations of the real exchange 
rate have been subdued in the past years. However, even the considerable real appreciations 
that could be expected if all currencies in oil exporting countries were free to float and if 
prices were no longer regulated in these economies are not likely to trigger an improvement 
of global imbalances. Also, the impact of the increased import demand would on the contrary 
rather benefit the euro area and not the United States due to their respective geographical 
structure of trade.  
An increase in the oil price is accompanied by increased demand for foreign products in oil 
exporting countries in the long run. This direct wealth effect through higher oil export 
revenues increases imports of oil exporting countries considerably following oil price 
increases. However, the negative effect the higher oil price has on the current account 
balances of oil importing countries like the United States and the euro area cannot be 
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compensated. For the United States only 7 percent of the higher oil bill is compensated by 
increased exports to oil exporting countries while almost 40 percent of the increase is 
compensated for the euro area.  
Overall this study sheds some light on the import behaviour of oil exporting countries. 
Even though these countries are quite heterogeneous in their economies they still seem to 
exhibit some common behaviour in the long run adjustments to movements of the real 
exchange rate and the oil price. Their reaction to domestic demand and real export increases 
and to fluctuations in the exchange rate are even comparable to those of industrialised 
countries. The overall impact of oil exporting countries import demand on global imbalances 
is almost negligible, however. Even though their imports are likely to stay very dynamic in 
the medium term future, the size of their economies is just too small for them to play a 
leading role in the resolution of global imbalances. In addition, increases in demand for 
foreign products mainly benefit the euro area rather than the United States due to the 
geographical structure of trade. Future research could benefit from better data quality and 
longer time series.  
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3.6 Appendix 
Table A3.1: Data Availability 
Variable Source Type Start date End date Countries Notes
imports IMF WEO national accounts data 1980 2005 All countries except listed below real imports in constant 2000 prices.
1990 2005 Congo, Ecuador, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Yemen.
approximation for missing national accounts data with 
BoP data
1997 2005 Turkmenistan approximation for missing data with BoP data
BoP imports IMF WEO BoP data 1980 2005 Kazakhstan and Sudan
domestic demand and 
exports
IMF WEO national accounts/ BoP data 1980 2005 All countries except listed above approximation for missing data with BoP data
reer IMF WEO real effective exchange rate 1980 2005
Algeria, Bahrain, Congo, Ecuador, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Iran, Nigeria, 
Russia, Saudi Arabia, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Venezuela and Norway
Data for Equatorial Guinea only available from 1985, 
for Russia only from 1994
reer approximation author's calculation with IMF WEO and DTS data
CPI, nominal exchange 
rates and Direction of 
Trade (DTS)
1980 2005 All countries
approximation with relative exchange rates to USD 
and euro deflated with relative prices and weighted by 
import trade shares
oil IMF WEO average of three sorts (in USD) 1980 2005 All countries
real U.S. oil IMF WEO author's calculations 1980 2005 All countries nominal oil price deflated with U.S. CPI
real country spedific oil IMF WEO author's calculations 1980 2005 All countries nominal oil price deflated with each country's CPI and nominal exchange rate towards the USD
fiscal IMF WEO general government balances 1980 2005 All countries except listed below
As share of nominal GDP. For Nigeria, Trinidad and 
Tobago and Venezuela approximation with central 
government balances for early 1980s.
IMF WEO central government 
balances
Algeria, Bahrain, Gabon,Saudi Arabia
national accounts/ BoP 
dataIMF WEO
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Table A3.2: Development of major economic variables 
gdp im exdd reera oil fisc
All countries
(1980 - 2006) 3.8 7.1 4.0 2.9 5.4 -1.9
(1980 - 1995) 2.0 4.2 1.8 3.8 -2.8 -4.4
(1996 - 2006) 6.3 11.0 7.1 1.5 16.5 1.7
(1980 - 2006)
African Countries 4.5 8.2 4.9 1.0 5.4 -2.7
Middle East 4.2 5.8 4.3 1.6 5.4 -1.9
CIS 2.4 4.2 2.3 15.5 5.4 -2.6
Latin America/Caribean 2.6 11.8 3.0 0.0 5.4 -1.8
Europe (Norway) 2.9 3.9 3.1 0.2 5.4 6.2
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook (2006) and IFS (2006), authour's calculations. 
Note: All variables except for fisc are averages of growth rates. Fisc is the average share of the general government 
balance to nominal GDP. 
 
 
Table A3.3: De facto exchange rate arrangements 
Country Exchange rate arrangement Reference Currency/Anchor
Algeria managed float no explicitly stated nominal anchor
Angola managed float no explicitly stated nominal anchor
Bahrain conventional fixed peg U.S. dollar
Congo, Rep. of exchange rate with no separate legal tender Franc zone CAEMCa
Ecuador exchange rate with no separate legal tender U.S. dollar
Equatorial Guinea exchange rate with no separate legal tender Franc zone CAEMCa
Gabon exchange rate with no separate legal tender Franc zone CAEMCa
Iran, I.R. of managed float monetary aggregate target
Kazakhstan managed float no explicitly stated nominal anchor
Kuwait conventional fixed peg U.S. dollarb
Libya conventional fixed peg SDR basket
Nigeria managed float no explicitly stated nominal anchor
Norway independently floating inflation targeting
Oman conventional fixed peg U.S. dollar
Qatar conventional fixed peg U.S. dollar
Russia managed float no explicitly stated nominal anchor
Saudi Arabia conventional fixed peg U.S. dollar
Sudan managed float monetary aggregate target
Syrian Arab Rep. conventional fixed peg U.S. dollar
Turkmenistan conventional fixed peg U.S. dollar
Trinidad and Tobago managed float no explicitly stated nominal anchor
United Arab Emirates conventional fixed peg U.S. dollar
Venezuela conventional fixed peg U.S. dollarc
Yemen independently floating monetary aggregate target
Source: IMF (2004) De facto classification of Exchange Rate Regimes. 
 Notes: a African Economic and Monetary Community b Peg with a 3.5 percent margin. Before 2003 the Kuwaiti Dinar was 
pegged against a basket of currencies. c bevor 2004 crawling peg, since 2005 the euro is also included in foreign exchange 
interventions.
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Table A3.4: Country Specific Diagnostic Results 
Country Ch-SC1 CH-FF2 CH-NO3 CH-HE4 RBARSQ5
Algeria 0.01 0.00 0.92 0.30 0.87
Angola 0.31 2.78 0.04 0.17 0.85
Bahrain 7.37 1.28 0.69 0.80 0.91
Congo, Rep. of 0.11 4.85 1.18 0.32 0.74
Ecuador 0.91 2.13 1.03 0.44 0.91
Equatorial Guinea 0.22 0.48 0.71 0.09 0.92
Gabon 5.80 0.01 0.64 0.92 0.89
Iran, I.R. of 0.98 0.12 1.70 0.84 0.91
Kazakhstan 0.31 8.53 1.31 0.02 0.97
Kuwait 1.65 0.96 1.03 0.81 0.97
Libya 2.14 3.26 3.28 0.00 0.87
Nigeria 0.00 6.26 0.19 0.13 0.94
Norway 2.38 0.80 0.21 2.00 0.78
Oman 1.96 2.88 0.12 1.02 0.98
Qatar 0.06 2.07 1.48 0.01 0.84
Russia 0.17 0.30 4.26 0.07 0.89
Saudi Arabia 1.81 0.20 2.51 0.35 0.97
Sudan 1.50 2.64 1.26 0.00 0.74
Syrian Arab Rep. 9.53 0.03 0.53 0.95 0.82
Turkmenistan 3.22 19.76 4.24 8.11 0.90
Trinidad and Tobago 0.00 3.27 5.57 0.00 0.88
United Arab Emirates 0.44 0.07 0.36 1.05 0.88
Venezuela 0.85 2.45 0.58 2.21 0.91
Yemen 0.43 4.20 0.75 0.05 0.95
Note: 1. Godfrey's test of residual correlation
2. Ramsey's RESET test of functional form
3. Jarque-Bera test of normality of residuals. 
4. Lagrange multiplier test of homoscedasticity. 
5. Adjusted R2.  
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Figure A3.1: Robustness over Countries 
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Figure A3.2: Robustness over Maximum Lag Length 
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4 Has Russian GDP growth become less dependent on oil? 
A Cointegration VAR Approach 
In the group of oil exporting countries, Russia is by far the largest economy.1 The previous 
section focused on the effect of the import behaviour of oil exporting countries on global 
imbalances. Almost all of the economies exporting oil are highly dependent on the price of 
their main export good – oil. In the panel of oil exporting countries, Russia seems to be 
among the countries with the highest diversification of the economy.2 The question then is, 
whether Russia has achieved higher independence from oil prices in recent years. There are 
several reasons why this could be the case. First of all, the experience of high volatilities in 
the price of oil might have led to a more prudent fiscal policy. In particular, starting in 2004 
an oil stabilization fund similar to the one in Norway was established for the Russian 
economy to smooth out the effects of the volatility in oil prices on the Russian economy. 
Second, Russia’s economy could have become less dependent on oil due to increased 
diversification of the economy. Sometimes it is also argued that oil prices have increased so 
sharply that the Russian economy just cannot absorb all the additional revenues due to 
capacity constraints so that a large part of the additional revenues is spent on foreign products 
(imports). This would limit the positive effect high oil prices can have on Russian GDP (at 
least in the short run). Another question is, whether high oil prices lead to a real appreciation 
in the long-run dampening the positive effect of oil on the economy.  
Against the backdrop of the prominent role of the oil and gas sector in the country’s exports 
and, to a lesser extent, in GDP one would expect a close relationship between Russia’s GDP 
growth and oil prices. Indeed, empirical studies have found a significant impact of changes in 
the price of oil on Russian GDP growth with long-run elasticities ranging from 0.15 to 0.2.3 
When looking at the simple correlations between GDP growth and the oil price since 2002, 
the continued steep increase of oil prices does not appear to have translated into even higher 
GDP growth in Russia. The simple correlation suggests that Russia’s GDP growth de-coupled 
from oil prices since early 2002 and, even more pronounced, since 2004 (see Figure 4.1).  
 
                                                 
1 With a share of 1.7 percent in world GDP in nominal USD dollars for the year 2005, Russia’s economy is more than twice 
as large as the second and third largest oil exporting economies Saudi Arabia and Norway.  
2 According to official numbers, the share of mining (petroleum and gas production) in GDP was only 10.4 percent in 2005. 
According to the World Bank (2004) these numbers underestimate the true share of oil in Russia’s production process. The 
true share is rather somewhere between 20 and 30 percent (according to the World Bank the true share according to input 
output calculations amounted to 20 percent in 2000). 
3 See for example IMF (2002) in which the magnitude of this effect depends on policy reactions, and Rautava (2004). 
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Figure 4.1: Real GDP growth and oil prices 
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One might expect that this de-coupling may be due to strong import growth which may have 
been stimulated by the real appreciation of the rouble as argued above. However, the simple 
correlation between real import growth and the real effective exchange rate also appears to 
have weakened (Figure 4.2). 
Figure 4.2: The real effective exchange rate and real import growth 
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Since simple correlations do not capture the impact of other variables, the decline of the 
simple correlation between real GDP growth and the oil price on the one hand, and between 
real import growth and the real effective exchange rate on the other hand does neither imply 
that the oil price has no longer an impact on Russia’s GDP growth nor that Russian imports 
are no longer stimulated by real appreciation. Only an econometric analysis that 1) controls 
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for other relevant variables and 2) allows also for feed back between the variables and their 
lagged values can shed light on these issues. For example, as stated above, rising oil prices 
may not only stimulate GDP growth in Russia but may lead at the same time to an 
appreciation of the real exchange rate offsetting the oil stimulus to some extent. Likewise, real 
import growth may depend not only on the real exchange rate, but also on oil prices through 
wealth effects. 
To shed some light on the question of Russia’s dependency on oil a Vector Error Correction 
Model (VECM) is estimated. In particular, I set up a model including GDP, the real exchange 
rate, the price of oil and real government revenues. The analysis of the cointegration 
coefficients suggests that Russia’s dependency on oil has not become smaller but has stayed 
more or less constant over time. However, when comparing the long run effects the overall 
reaction of the model including the reaction of all endogenous variables has to be taken into 
account. When considering the long-run impulse response functions of a permanent increase 
in the oil price an elasticity of 0.24 is found. This figure compares with other estimates for 
Russia’s long-run elasticity with respect to oil even though most of these studies use different 
and sometimes less sophisticated estimation methods. Rising oil prices stimulate Russian 
GDP growth while an endogenous real appreciation resulting from the higher oil prices in the 
long run seems to offset the positive effect on GDP to some extent.  
The study most closely related to this analysis is Rautava (2004). He finds a significant 
cointegration long-run relationship between Russian GDP growth and oil prices and the real 
exchange rate. His analysis suggests that Russia reacts to a 1 percent increase in the oil price 
with a 0.22 percent increase in GDP and to a 1 percent real appreciation with a 0.24 percent 
decrease in GDP. These numbers represent the long-run ceteris paribus reactions of GDP, 
however. As suggested above, the endogenous reaction of other variables e.g. of the real 
exchange rate to changes in the price of oil might, however, offset some of the effect. The 
analysis of Rautava (2004) is, thus, a very good study of the ceteris paribus effects of oil 
prices and the real exchange rate on Russian GDP. The present study provides more refined 
estimations in several ways. First of all, the estimation in Rautava (2004) is based only on a 
very short time series (1995:1 until 2002:4). Yet most of his results have only asymptotic 
validity. This seems to be very short when setting up a long-run cointegration relationship. 
The present study uses a longer time-horizon (1995:1 until 2006:1) and because this can still 
be considered a relatively short sample, this study controls for this fact by simulating the 
small-sample rank test statistics instead of relying on the asymptotic behaviour of the test 
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results. The next important contribution of this paper is that while Rautava presents only long-
run coefficients, this study presents simulations of shocks to the price in oil. In particular, 
impulse response functions are presented including error bands that are calculated with a 
bootstrap routine. This way, the long run reaction of GDP taking into account the endogenous 
reaction of all other variables in the system can be shown.  
An analysis of Russia’s import behaviour shows results comparable to those in the section on 
oil exporting countries’ import behaviour. Imports are significantly stimulated by higher oil 
prices and an appreciation of the real exchange rate.4 This estimate shows that imports which 
are predominantly priced in the currency of the producer are indeed subject to expenditure 
switching. The channel through which the real exchange rate has a negative effect on GDP is 
therefore the demand for imports. 
The study is ordered in the following way. First, I give a short review of the literature. Both 
the literature relating to the particular characteristics of Russia and the possible link between 
the oil price and the real exchange rate in oil exporting countries is briefly discussed. In a next 
step the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) is set up and estimated in a recursive way to 
analyse the development of the coefficients over time. Then, the behaviour of the overall 
model is analysed with impulse response functions including bootstrap error bands. To shed 
some more light on the reason why the real exchange rate has a negative effect on GDP, the 
reaction of imports to a change in the oil price and the real exchange rate is estimated in an 
Error Correction Model (ECM) for Russian real imports. 
4.1 The Literature 
In this section a short review of the issues concerning Russia’s dependence on oil are given. 
In particular, first other studies on the impact of oil prices on the economy of OECD 
economies and of Russia are presented. Then, the impact of fiscal policy on the Russian 
economy is shortly discussed. In a next step a short summary on the link between the oil price 
and the real exchange rates in oil exporting countries is presented. This is linked to the 
presentation of some ideas regarding possible Dutch Disease phenomena and the question of 
the competitiveness of the Russian economy. Finally, some thoughts about the pass-through 
of the exchange rate to domestic prices are presented with a discussion on the invoicing 
                                                 
4 In particular, the elasticity of imports with respect to the oil price is 0.1 percent. The elasticity of imports with respect to the 
real exchange rate is 0.7. 
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pattern of Russian Trade and how this affects the overall impact of the exchange rate on 
Russian GDP. 
Most of the studies on the macroeconomic effects of oil shocks focus on the reaction of 
GDP and inflation in OECD countries. Evidence suggests that for OECD countries the 
relationship between oil prices and macroeconomic development has become weaker over 
time. Hutchison (1993) finds that the effect of an oil price hike on GDP in the USA and Japan 
after 1980 is only one quarter of the effect of the late 1970s. He concludes, thus, that the USA 
and Japan have become better insulated from oil price disturbances. Similarly, Hamilton 
(1996) comes to the conclusion that oil price increases have smaller macroeconomic effects 
on the United States after 1973 than before 1973. Bjørnland (2000) finds that for the USA, 
Germany and the UK, oil price shocks have a significant negative effect on output, while they 
have a positive (albeit insignificant) effect on Norway. In 2003 Hamilton (2003) confirms his 
earlier findings that the effect of oil prices on GDP in the Unites States has declined over 
time.  
Aivazian et al. (2003) analyse the short-term dynamics of the Russian economy. They find 
a significant positive effect of oil prices on Russian GDP in the magnitude of 0.26 percent and 
a significant negative effect of the nominal exchange rate on Russian GDP in the magnitude 
of 0.29. Their focus is, however, on the short-term and they do not show the behaviour of 
these coefficients over time. The study most related to this paper is given by an analysis on 
the impact of oil prices and the real exchange rate on the Russian economy by Rautava 
(2004). In his VAR cointegration analysis with data covering the period from 1995 to 2002, 
Rautava finds a positive long-run relationship between oil prices and GDP and oil prices and 
real revenues. At the same time the exchange rate has a significant negative impact on GDP 
both in the long run and in the short run. He finds that the coefficients for the long-run 
cointegration relationship are stable over time. The coefficient of oil is around 0.2, while the 
coefficient of the real exchange rate is around - 0.27. The author does not provide any impulse 
responses for this analysis. In a next step Rautava estimates an Error Correction Model to 
look at the short run dynamics and finds that a 10 percent increase in the oil price contributes 
directly to 0.5 percent GDP growth, while fiscal revenues are increased by 3.9 percent. Most 
studies preceding Rautava (2004) analysed the effect of oil prices without taking into account 
a dynamic reaction of GDP (IMF 2001).  
The role of fiscal policy increased with the introduction of the oil stabilization fund in 
January 2004. The fund was established to absorb excessive liquidity, reduce inflationary 
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pressure and insulate the economy from volatility of raw material export earnings (Ministry of 
Finance 2006). Originally, the Fund was supposed to accumulates revenues from all tax 
revenues for Ural oil prices exceeding 20 US dollar per barrel. The cut-off price was revised 
upwards to $27 per barrel in April 2006. If the balance of the fund exceeds 500 billion 
roubles, the Fund may be used “to cover the federal budget deficit and for other purposes” 
(Ministry of Finance 2006). As capital of the Fund exceeded 500 billion roubles in 2005, the 
following transactions took place: The equivalent of 3.33 billion U.S. dollar was spent on 
early debt repayment to the IMF and the equivalent of 15.1 billion U.S. dollar for first debt 
repayments to the Paris Club countries.5 The Fund’s objective is to invest in foreign sovereign 
debt securities.6 In the beginning of 2007 the fund reached a volume of 2346 billion roubles 
an equivalent of 88.7 billion U.S. dollar at the exchange rate of January 2007 (RIAN (2007)). 
According to the IMF (2005), there are three ways in which the fiscal authorities can react 
to increases in oil revenues. 1) Decrease non-oil revenues for example with a tax rate cut.7 2) 
Increase government expenditure 3) Decrease the public deficit or run a surplus. According to 
the IMF in 2003 large windfall revenues led to decreases in non-oil taxation. Reducing the 
non-oil tax rate could have stimulating effects for the economy. From 2004 on most increases 
were saved in the oil stabilization fund, resulting in large fiscal surpluses. Thus, not all 
revenues were fuelled into the economy and the oil stimulus accordingly could have become 
smaller. However, it is stated that fiscal policy has “taken away steam” only in a limited way. 
Similarly, Spilimbergo (2005)8 finds that the fiscal balance assuming constant oil prices 
worsened since 2001. Accordingly, although fiscal policy was countercyclical, it was not 
countercyclical enough and a large oil stimulus reached the economy. One reason could be 
that the oil windfalls rose to levels well above the 500 billion rouble cap below which all 
revenues are earmarked for the stabilization fund.  
Regarding the relationship between oil prices and the real exchange rate, there seems to be 
increasing evidence that oil prices play a significant role for real exchange rates of oil 
exporting countries. Most studies follow the approach by Cashin et al. (2002, 2004) who find 
evidence for a long-run relationship between real exchange rates and commodity prices for 
one third of their panel of 58 commodity exporting countries. Koranchelian (2005) finds a 
                                                 
5 Furthermore, an equivalent of 4.3 billion U.S. dollar was paid to Vnesheconombank for loans provided to the Ministry of 
Finance in 1998-1999 for servicing the state debt of Russian Federation; an equivalent of 1 billion U.S. dollar was 
transferred to the Russian Pension Fund.  
6 The share of currencies is 45 percent U.S. dollar, 45 percent euro and 10 percent GBP.  
7 We abstract from possible revenue increases due to a potentially increasing tax base.  
8 The IMF country report is partly based on Spilimbergo (2005), however the country report provides less details. 
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long run elasticity of the real exchange rate with respect to the oil price of 0.24 for Algeria. 
Other studies like Habib and Kalamova (2006) find a positive effect of the oil price on the 
real exchange rate also for oil exporting countries with fixed exchange rate arrangements. 
Sosunov and Zamulin (2006) show in a theoretical model that oil prices can help explain the 
real appreciation of the rouble from 1998 to 2005 when the oil price increase is perceived to 
be permanent. From a theoretical point of view it should not matter whether real appreciations 
are brought about by nominal appreciations or by relatively higher prices in the domestic 
economy as compared to the world economy (or relatively higher prices of nontradable goods 
as compared to the non-oil tradable goods). When this leads to resources being shifted away 
from the non-oil tradable sector the phenomenon is called Dutch Disease in the context of 
natural resource windfalls.9 Another way to check for possible signs of Dutch Disease is to 
look at the diversification of the economy. According to Gianella and Chanteloup (2005) the 
Russian economy shows no signs of diversification. They claim that the export composition in 
value terms is increasingly dominated by commodities. This dominance is, however, likely 
due to price effects. Beck et al. (2007) find that in volume terms the share of oil production in 
output increased only marginally. Another way of judging whether the economy shows signs 
of Dutch Disease is to look at the competitiveness of the tradable sector and the equilibrium 
exchange rate. While Égert (2005) finds that the real exchange rate started to become 
overvalued and the Russian economy therefore less competitive, the IMF (2006) and Beck et 
al. (2007) consider the Russian economy still to be competitive. In particular, the market 
share of Russian non-oil exports in world exports did not decrease with the recent 
appreciation. Also, the real exchange rate appreciation seems to be justified by Russia’s 
productivity gains relative to the U.S. and the euro area. This short summary of the evidence 
on Dutch Disease serves to put the discussion on the possible negative impact of the exchange 
rate on the Russian economy in context. Given the above evidence it is relatively save to say 
that so far, Russia does not seem to suffer from symptoms of Dutch Disease but rather that the 
appreciation of the real exchange rate is a natural process accompanying the transition process 
and the high oil price increases. 
In what way does the exchange rate dampen the positive effect of the oil price on the 
economy? The IMF (2005) claims that with oil revenues at these high levels, the Russian 
economy faces capacity constraints in form of transportation bottlenecks. Additional revenue 
                                                 
9 There are many studies which discuss the phenomenon of Dutch Disease in oil exporting countries. Lately for example 
Égert and Leonard (2006) find no evidence of Dutch Disease in Kazakhstan. They find that all real appreciation comes 
about by nominal exchange rate adjustments and not by higher prices in the nontradable sector. 
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cannot be absorbed in the domestic economy and is spent on imports instead. In this way, the 
import leakages, i.e. real imports in percent of real domestic demand, increased from 17 
percent in 2000 to 27 percent in 2005 (see Figure 4.3).  
Figure 4.3: Import Leakage 
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Note: Import leakage is defined as share of real imports in real 
domestic demand. Source: Rosstat (2006), own calculations 
Gianella and Chanteloup (2006) analyse Russia’s trade elasticities. They ask the question 
whether the Russian economy reacts “normally” to exchange rate movements. Often, the 
“normal” reaction is based on the assumption of producer currency pricing. However, this 
assumption is not likely to hold for Russia. Although there is no data available for the Russian 
Federation, the assumption is that Russian exports are predominantly invoiced in U.S. dollar 
while Russian imports are invoiced in U.S. dollar but also the currency of the producer, i.e. in 
euro for imports coming from the euro area.10 The currency in which trade is invoiced has 
significant implications for the transmission of exchange rate movements into the economy, 
in particular, the expenditure switching effect. The pass- through of the exchange rate to 
import prices can give an impression on the invoicing structure of Russian trade. Gianella and 
Chanteloup (2006) find that the pass-through of the nominal exchange rate into export and 
import prices is not complete. For exports which are very unlikely to be invoiced in Russian 
rouble, the pass through is particularly low. They argue consequently that exchange rate pass-
through takes place predominantly through imports. Thus, imports are also more likely to be 
subject to expenditure switching effects with movements in the exchange rate. This means 
that if oil price increases are accompanied by a real appreciation imports might increase by 
more than might be expected from increased oil revenues because they get relatively cheaper. 
                                                 
10 Butorina (1999) claims that 80 percent of Russian trade is invoiced in U.S. Dollar. The source of the data is, however, not 
clear. In the foreign currency securities invested in the oil stabilization fund the decided allocation is USD 45%, EUR 45% 
and GBP 10%. 
 107 
As a consequence this might dampen the transmission from higher oil prices into higher GDP 
growth in Russia. How much the oil price increase stimulates import demand and whether the 
introduction of the oil stabilization fund changed the impact the oil price has on the Russian 
economy will be discussed in the following.  
4.2 Empirical Findings 
For the estimation of Russia’s dependence on the price of oil two models are set up. A first 
model incorporates the feedback between all endogenous variables included into a Vector 
Error Correction Model. The second model estimates a long run relationship between imports 
and the price of oil and the real exchange rate.  
4.2.1 The Data 
The estimations are based on quarterly national accounts data published by Russia’s State 
Statistics Committee (Rosstat) both for real GDP and for real import demand. These variables 
are seasonally adjusted. Data for federal government revenues is taken from the IMF 
International Financial Statistics (IFS). The consumer price index is used as a deflator to 
compute real revenue figures. Data for the real effective exchange rate is also taken from the 
IMF IFS. It is calculated as the nominal exchange rate adjusted for relative consumer price 
changes and weighted by the relative trade weights. The price for North Sea Brent oil in 
dollars per barrel is also taken from the IFS. The oil price is considered as exogenously 
given.11 The use of Ural prices which are more representative for Russian oil exports instead 
of North Sea Brent does not change the results.12 All variables are in logarithmic terms.  
4.2.2 Unit Root and Cointegration Tests 
The first question to answer as was the case in the section of oil exporters’ import demand 
is whether the variables are stationary or whether they are integrated of some order. To test 
for stationarity several unit root tests are performed. For an overview see Table 4.1.  
                                                 
11 In contrast to the study by Rautava the oil price is not included as a moving average. Including the oil price as a moving 
average could distort the results as lags are already included in the dynamic structure of the VAR.  
12 The correlation between the two is close to unity.  
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Table 4.1: Unit Root Tests 
 
Levels
First 
differences Levels
First 
differences Levels
First 
differences Levels
First 
differences Levels
First 
differences
GDP 0.45 -3.129** -1.51 -5.478*** 0.772*** 0.431* 1.19 -19.188*** 129.07 1.407*** I(1)
Real Revenues -1.79 -4.233*** -2.65 -10.276*** 0.81*** 0.15 0.94 -17.001** 235.49 6.043 I(1)
REER -1.64 -3.708*** -1.73 -4.112*** 0.162 0.136 -9.429** -18.548** 4.63 1.265*** I(1)
Oil -0.54 -2.693* -2.01 -5.158*** 0.672** 0.141 0.92 -20.12*** 25.93 1.215*** I(1)
Imports 0.14 -3.719*** 0.48 -5.296*** 0.608** 0.29 1.62 -19.894*** 38.68 1.384*** I(1)
Domestic Demand 
and Exports 1.81 -2.35 1.80 -7.73*** 0.772** 0.431* -63.162*** -0.01 247.45 3.09* I(1)/I(2)
Degree of 
integration
Note: ***,**,* denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. The null hypothesis is "no unit root"except for KPSS. Here, the null hypothesis is stationarity. 
Unit Root Tests 
ADF PP KPSS NP ERS
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The unit root tests show that for almost all tests the null hypothesis of a unit root can be 
rejected. When looking at the unit root tests for the differenced variables, the results are a bit 
more mixed. For most of the tests the hypothesis of a unit root in the differences cannot be 
rejected. Only for some tests there is indication of a further unit root. It is, thus, reasonable to 
assume that the variables are integrated of order one.13 To find out whether these I(1) 
variables are cointegrated and exhibit a common long run relationship, several methods are 
applied to check for the rank of the cointegration matrix. In a first step the Johansen (1988, 
1991) trace test is performed in the following way: 
H0(r0): rank(Π)=r0 versus H1(r0): rank(Π)=k, r0=0,1,2.    (4.1) 
Where Π denotes the (k x k) matrix of the coefficients for the lagged dependent variable, and 
k denotes the number of equations in the system. First, the null hypothesis of a zero 
cointegration rank is tested. If this null hypothesis cannot be rejected, a VAR in differences 
should be estimated as the variables exhibit unit roots without being cointegrated. At the other 
extreme, the rejection of the rank of 2 would imply that the variables are (trend-) stationary in 
levels and the estimation of a VAR in levels would be appropriate.  
Table 4.2: Rank determination with simulated asymptotic trace test distributions 
p-r r Eig.Value Trace Trace* Frac95 P-Value P-Value*
3 0 0.694 93.116 70.613 41.752 0.00 0.00
2 1 0.609 43.412 30.868 25.253 0.00 0.008
1 2 0.091 4.013 3.077 12.478 0.689 0.815
 
Note: p-r is the number of unit roots, r is the rank, and star denotes the simulated trace test statistics. 
As simulation studies have shown that for small samples the asymptotic distribution of the 
rank test may not be a good approximation, the small sample correction of the trace test 
derived in Johansen (2002) is implemented. As can be seen in Table 4.2, taking into account 
the small sample property of the model does not change the implications for the rank 
determination. The rank of the cointegration matrix is set at two. Both trace tests reject 3 and 
2 unit roots, but not 1 unit root. There should therefore be two long-run cointegration 
relationships and it is appropriate to estimate a restricted VAR, i.e. a Vector Error Correction 
Model.14  
A number of other specification tests are performed to test for the appropriateness of the 
model. Tests for variable exclusion show that at the chosen rank of 2, the exclusion of every 
                                                 
13 Unit root tests only give an econometric description of the data. Especially for this relatively short sample, there should be 
strong economic intuition behind the choice of the order of integration. Thus, I will not consider the possibility of order 2 
integration.  
14 Recursive estimations of the trace test support the view that the number of cointegration relations is constant over time.  
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single variable can be rejected at the five percent level (see Table A4.1 of the appendix). Tests 
for weak exogeneity show that for all variables excluding the oil price weak exogeneity can 
be excluded at the 1 percent significance level (see Table A4.2 of the appendix). To determine 
the lag length several lag length criteria are consulted. The simple log likelihood ratio test 
suggests the inclusion of as many lags as possible. Given the short nature of the sample, the 
lag length criteria correcting for the loss of degrees of freedom, i.e. Schwarz and Hannan-
Quinn, suggest a lag length of 3 (see Table A4.3 of the appendix).  
The first cointegration relationship describes the fiscal revenues. For the sake of brevity, this 
cointegration relationship of the government real revenue equation is not discussed in detail. 
In this equation the long-run effect of the real exchange rate is restricted to be zero while both 
real GDP and the oil price have a positive long-run effect on real revenues (this effect is not 
significant for oil, however). Although the first cointegration relationship is part of the model, 
the main interest of the analysis is on the reaction of GDP. The second cointegration 
relationship describes the long run GDP equation. We expect oil prices to have a positive 
impact on real GDP in the long run; the real exchange rate is expected to have a negative 
impact on GDP in the long run. Fiscal revenues are considered to have no impact on GDP in 
the long run.15 As will be shown in the following, the choice of these just identifying 
restrictions in the cointegration relationship has no implications on the long-run impulse 
response functions.  
4.2.3 Estimation Results 
Focusing on the first cointegration equation for real GDP, a significant positive relationship 
between the oil price and real GDP as well as a significant negative relationship between the 
real effective exchange rate and real GDP is found. The estimation equation can be described 
in the following way:  
∆Yt = ΠyYt-1 + Γy1∆Yt-1 + Γy2∆Yt-1 + ΠxXt-1 + Γx1∆Xt-1 + Γx2∆Xt-2 + Φ Dt + εt    (4.2) 
where ∆ is the difference operator and the vector of endogenous variables Y can be expressed 
as Y=[gdpt,reert,realrevt]’. The vector of exogenous Variables X includes the price of oil and a 
constant restricted to the cointegration relationship. The vector of dummies D includes two 
dummies for the periods 1998:3 and 1998:4 capturing the effects of the 1998 crisis. Tests for 
                                                 
15 The determination of the set of restrictions on the model is taken from economic intuition following the approach by 
Rautava (2004). This restriction of the impact of the fiscal variable on GDP to be zero does not seem to be too restrictive. 
There can still be a role for fiscal stabilization through anti-cyclical policy in the short run. Over the long run, the effect 
should, however, not be felt assuming non-distortionary taxation. 
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misspecification show that the model should have a good fit (see Table A4.4 of the appendix). 
The autocorrelation tests show that for the Ljung Box test, autocorrelation could only be 
rejected at the 1 percent significance level. However, The Lagrange Multiplier tests for first 
and fourth order autocorrelation show no sign of autocorrelation. Furthermore, the residuals 
are free of heteroscedasticity and seem to be normally distributed.16  
Table 4.3: Estimation Results 
BETA(transposed)
REER Revenues GDP Brent const
Beta(1) 0.00 1.000 -4.051 -1.070 30.664
(na) (na) (-2.473) (-1.713) (2.72)
Beta(2) 1.159 0.00 1.000 -0.686 -1.175
(5.25) (na) (na) (-6.40) (-12.52)
ALPHA
Alpha(1) Alpha(2)
DREER -0.003 -0.058
(-0.609) (-3.022)
DReven -0.201 0.105
(-4.348) (0.64)
DGDP 0.007 -0.046
(3.39) (-6.644)
 
Table 4.3 shows the estimation results for the matrices based on 2 cointegrating vectors. Beta 
1 shows the cointegration relationship of real revenues. Both GDP and oil (brent) have a 
positive effect on revenues.17 The effect of the oil price is, however, not significant at standard 
significance levels. As mentioned above, the main focus will be on the cointegration 
relationship of GDP. In this cointegration relationship oil has a significant positive effect on 
GDP with a coefficient of 0.69 while the real exchange rate has a significant negative impact 
on GDP with a coefficient of 1.16. In the table the zero restrictions on the coefficients can be 
seen. As these restrictions are just identifying, there are no t-statistics for these zero 
coefficients and the normalizations. Alpha shows the speed of adjustment back to the steady 
state. It can be seen that for shocks to the GDP equation, the real exchange rate and GDP 
adjust to move back to equilibrium.18 The speed of adjustment seems to be rather slow.  
Recursive Estimations 
Recursive estimation of the model as introduced by Hansen and Johansen (1999) is performed 
to analyse the development of the coefficients over time. When estimating a model it has to be 
kept in mind that the estimated parameters measure average effects. Given the strong 
                                                 
16 Although the residuals are normally distributed, the model can deal with non-normality of the residuals. In particular, the 
error bands for the impulse response functions are bootstrapped and are therefore not subject to any non-normality bias. 
17 It should be noted that the coefficient as depicted in the table has the opposite sign. Bringing the coefficient to the other 
side of the equation to find out the impact on the normalized variable would change the sign.   
18 I.e. they have a significant negative coefficient.  
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movements in the oil price in recent years, as well as potential structural changes e.g. due to 
the establishment of an oil stabilization fund, it is therefore necessary to check for parameter 
nonconstancy. At the same time, identifying structural breaks would be interesting to see 
whether Russia’s dependency on oil has become weaker. Starting from a base sample,19 the 
estimations are preformed recursively for increasing samples. There are two different ways of 
doing this. In one all the parameters are reestimated in each step, in the other only the long-
run parameters are reestimated. The recursive estimations are, thus, performed for the full and 
the concentrated model, where adjustment exclusively takes place towards the long run 
equilibrium relations. The full model, including all the short run adjustment, provides very 
similar results but is more unstable in the beginning of the estimation period due to the 
relatively short baseline sample and reduced degrees of freedom as compared to the 
concentrated model. This can be seen for example in the recursive test of the likelihood 
function. This test is similar to a Chow structural break test for single equation models. As 
can be seen in Figure A4.1 of the appendix, the full (X) model shows some signs of instability 
in the very beginning of the estimation period. This is not unusual due to the short structure of 
the model. The likelihood function of the concentrated (R1) model on the other hand clearly 
cannot reject the null hypothesis of no structural break at the five percent level (the 1 line 
represents the 95 confidence interval).  
Figure 4.4: Recursive Estimation of the Coefficient of oil      
for the GDP equation 
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The recursive estimations in Figures 4.4 and 4.5 depict the concentrated model.20 As can be 
seen in Figure 4.4 the coefficient of the oil price stays more or less the same over time. The 
                                                 
19 In the current model the base sample runs from 1995:1 to 2000:4. 
20 The recursive estimations of the two models provide very similar results. For the recursive estimations of the full model 
see Figure A4.2 of the appendix. For the full model, the coefficient of oil in the GDP equation seems to have become even 
larger over time.  
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resulting recursive coefficient of oil confirms that the relationship between GDP and oil prices 
does not seem to have become weaker in recent years. On the other hand, the coefficient for 
the real exchange rate seems to have an increasingly negative effect on Russian GDP growth. 
Running the model over the whole sample period still seems to be appropriate, however, as 
the tests for constancy of the β coefficients cannot be rejected.21
Figure 4.5: Recursive Estimation of the Coefficient of 
REER for the GDP equation 
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The above finding is compatible with flat GDP growth since 2001 as the real exchange rate – 
endogenously responding to the rise in oil prices - appreciated during that period and the 
negative impact of the real exchange rate on GDP growth seems to have become stronger (see 
Figure 4.5). This shows that looking at partial correlations without accounting for the effect of 
third variables can be misleading. 
The Impulse Response Analysis 
To find out more about the reaction of GDP to oil prices in the long run and to see to what 
extent the real exchange rate reacts to the oil price, the following section analyzes the 
dynamic properties of the estimated VECM. For this purpose the reaction of each variable to a 
1 percent shock in the price of oil is simulated. There are several ways of calculating the error 
bands for the impulse responses. The construction can be based on analytical derivatives, on 
Monte Carlo simulations or on the bootstrap methodology. The error bands for this exercise 
are created with a bootstrap procedure, where the errors of the estimated model are randomly 
reshuffled and used to construct new bootstrap endogenous variables. The parameters are then 
re-estimated from the generated data and impulse response functions are calculated. This 
                                                 
21 Figure A4.3 of the appendix displays the test for Beta constancy. Note that the fluctuations in the test statistics do not 
necessarily signify non-constancy. The test has to be read in such a way that all test statistics below 1 (the 95 confidence 
interval) can reject the null hypothesis of no constancy in the parameter.  
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procedure is repeated a large number of times (500 times in this application) and the resulting 
distribution is taken to calculate the appropriate error bands. Error bands calculated with this 
bootstrap routine are robust against non-normality of the residuals.22 In this study the 
confidence interval is chosen at the 95 percent confidence interval.23  
As shown in the Figure 4.6, the output response to a permanent shock in the oil price is 
positive and statistically significant. The cumulative effect of a one percent increase in oil 
prices on GDP, which takes into account the endogenous reaction of all the other variables, is 
estimated to be around 0.24 percent (as compared to the 0.7 ceteris paribus effect of the oil 
price on GDP). This number is comparable with the long run impact of oil prices on Russian 
GDP found in other studies.24 The impulse response of the real exchange rate suggests that - 
in the long run - the real exchange rate reacts with an appreciation to a positive shock in the 
oil price. This finding confirms that the overall impact of a positive oil price shock on GDP is 
dampened by an intrinsic real appreciation. The significant real depreciation in the short run 
(3 quarters) could be explained by the fact that rising oil prices directly lead to higher 
inflation in the economy of Russia’s trading partners through higher import prices, while the 
domestic energy prices in Russia are still kept at below-market prices. In the longer run, the 
second round effects of higher inflation in Russia due to rising wages and increased wealth 
appear to prevail and lead to a real appreciation of the rouble.25 The impulse response of real 
revenues shows that a permanent positive shock to the oil price increases real revenues in the 
long run. The long-run elasticity is above unity implying that besides the direct positive effect 
due to increased revenues through taxation on oil, revenues also increases due to the overall 
improvement of the economic situation. As a robustness check Figure A4.4 of the appendix 
shows the impulse responses of the unrestricted model. Although the elasticities for all 
variables seem to be lower for the unrestricted VAR model, the overall significant positive 
impact of oil on GDP, the real exchange rate and real revenues is confirmed.26  
                                                 
22 Note that the point estimate of the impulse response does not necessary have to be at the centre of the error bands due to 
possible non-normality of the residuals. In this study the residuals seem to be normally distributed as confirmed by the test 
for normality described above. 
23 In the empirical VAR literature typically either 95 percent or 68 percent confidence intervals are reported. While for this 
analysis the more precise 95 percent confidence interval is reported, Sims and Zha (1999) argue that the use of 68 percent 
confidence intervals can also be justified.  
24 For example, the IMF (2002) finds an elasticity of similar magnitude. 
25 Habib and Kalamova (2006) find similar results for Russia. 
26 Note that the results of the unrestricted VAR analysis are only discussed as a robustness test. Given the results of the rank 
tests which are adjusted for short samples, there is very strong evidence of two cointegration relationships.   
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Figure 4.6: Permanent oil price shock 
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Note: Point estimates with bootstrapped error bands.  
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Figure 4.7: Temporary oil price shock 
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
GDP 95% confidence interval
 
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
REER 95% confidence interval
 
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Revenues 95% confidence interval
 
Note: Point estimates with bootstrapped error bands.  
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Figure 4.7 presents the impulse responses of the variables to a temporary shock to the oil 
price. While the responses are relatively more volatile and the amount of the response is as 
expected much lower, the impulse responses of the temporary shock show rather persistent 
effects of an oil price shock of around 4 years on GDP and the real exchange rate. This strong 
persistence is not surprising given the low speed of adjustment as described above. 
As robustness test the model was also estimated using different specifications. Using Russian 
Ural oil prices instead of North Sea Brent does not change the estimates qualitatively. The 
model is robust regarding the choice of cointegration relationships. The impulse responses 
and long-run elasticities of GDP and the real exchange rate are almost identical regardless of 
the number of cointegration relations. Likewise, the choice of the identifying restrictions does 
not affect the impulse responses either. 
4.3 An Error Correction Model for Russian Imports 
To find out more about the reasons for the negative reaction of GDP with respect to the real 
exchange rate I take a closer look at the import behaviour of the Russian economy. The 
expenditure switching effect of the exchange rate is likely to be felt predominantly for imports 
as Russian exports are mainly invoiced in vehicle or in local currency and thus not subject to 
fluctuations in the exchange rate as described above.27 I would expect imports to increase 
following a real appreciation.  
The following error correction model (ECM) for real imports is estimated for quarterly data 
from 1995 Q1 to 2006 Q1: 
∆imt = -4.97  -  0.65[imt-1 – (1.28 exddt-1 + 0.70 reert-1 + 0.11 oilt-1)] + short-run dynamics + dummies           (4.3) 
             (-4.07)    (-4.50)            (4.13)                (4.28)            (2.57) 
 
R2 adj = 0.92; DW = 2.06; AR(1) = 0.84; AR(4) =  0.68; AR(8) = 0.53 
where im stands for real imports of goods and services, exdd stands for real exports plus real 
domestic demand, oil is the US dollar price of oil and short-run dynamics includes the 
differences of the explanatory variables at the lag level chosen by the optimum lag length 
selection criteria of Akaike, Schwarz and Hannan Quinn up to a maximum lag length of 6.28 
                                                 
27 At the same time, the demand for oil as a major export good is likely to be highly price inelastic. For more details 
concerning Russia’s non-oil export trade elasticities see Gianella and Chanteloup (2005) and Algieri (2004).  
28 As the data for Russia is available on a quarterly basis, the maximum lag length of 6 in this dataset is comparable to the 
maximum lag length of 2 for the annual dataset of the oil exporter panel.  
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Dummies includes two dummies for the periods of 1998:3 and 1998:4 capturing the effect of 
the 1998 crisis. The short-run dynamics are not listed in details.29  
In this specification the long-run elasticity of imports with respect to exports and domestic 
demand is 1.3 which is comparable with estimates for other countries.30 The long-run 
elasticity with respect to the real exchange rate is 0.7 suggesting that Russian imports which 
are almost exclusively invoiced in foreign currency such as the euro indeed respond 
considerably to changes of the real effective exchange rate.31 The long-run elasticity with 
respect to the oil price is 0.1. Thus, some of the increase in oil revenues due to higher oil 
prices seems to be spent on imports. The elasticities for the activity variable and for the oil 
price compare with the long-run elasticities found in the panel of all oil exporting countries. 
The elasticity with respect to the exchange rate is higher than for the panel estimations. One 
reason could be that for this analysis the real effective exchange rate of overall trade and not 
only of imports is used. This overall exchange rate is likely to show less fluctuation (precisely 
because pass through into export prices would be small), so that the same appreciation in this 
version of the exchange rate provokes more pronounced reactions of imports. It should also be 
mentioned that for this specification of Russia’s import demand the fiscal variable proved to 
be insignificant for the long-run relationship.32 This might be a sign that the stabilisation fund 
so far has not changed the behaviour of the Russian economy in a significant way. Already in 
the analysis of Russia’s GDP dependence on oil over time, no structural break could be found 
for the introduction of the oil stabilization fund. This can be interpreted in a positive way that 
the introduction of the stabilization fund did not reduce the positive impact high oil prices had 
on the Russian economy. At the same time, international worries that the establishment of 
such a fund would significantly reduce Russia’s willingness to import also prove to be 
ungrounded. The oil stabilization fund, thus, seems to be an efficient tool in saving for future 
generations without harming current economic development.  
4.4 Conclusion 
Summing up the presented econometric findings, it appears that GDP growth in Russia is still 
benefiting from high oil prices. Indeed, Russia’s GDP growth appears to be still as dependent 
on the oil price as it used to be while real appreciation - endogenously triggered by rising oil 
                                                 
29 Details are available from the author on request. 
30 See discussion in chapter 3. 
31 These estimates compares with the 1.6 demand elasticity and the 0.5 price elasticity of Russian imports in Gianella and 
Chanteloup (2005).  
32 The inclusion of the fiscal variable did not lead to significant changes of the long-run elasticities of the other variables.  
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prices - is increasingly acting as a “buffer” by stimulating imports. The introduction of the oil 
stabilization fund in 2004 does not seem to have taken away the positive impulses of the oil 
price on GDP. On the other hand, GDP growth did not follow the explosive development of 
oil prices one to one as the economy has increasingly been affected by the appreciating real 
exchange rate. This appreciation significantly stimulates imports and, thus, puts some restraint 
on GDP growth. The appreciation of the real exchange rate seems to be brought about among 
others by rising oil prices. So far, this development is, however, a natural process following a 
positive terms of trade shock and accompanying the transition of the economy to a full market 
economy. Further research on the welfare implications of the oil price and the real exchange 
rate on the Russian economy could be interesting.  
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4.6 Appendix 
Table A4.1: Test for variable exclusion 
r DGF 5% C.V. REER Revenues GDP Brent constant
1 1 3.841 1.719 10.304 4.952 0.002 5.226
[0.190] [0.001] [0.026] [0.964] [0.022]
2 2 5.991 18.466 30.045 7.808 7.580 13.181
[0.000] [0.000] [0.020] [0.023] [0.001]
Note : LR-test, Chi-Square (r), P-values in brackets.  
 
 
Table A4.2: Test for weak exogeneity 
r DGF 5% C.V. REER Revenues GDP
1 1 3.841 0.172 8.436 1.965
[0.678] [0.004] [0.161]
2 2 5.991 11.037 15.999 27.746
[0.004] [0.000] [0.000]
Note : LR-test, Chi-Square (r), P-values in brackets.  
 
 
Table A4.3: Lag Length Determination 
lags Log-like Schwarz Hannan-Quinn
5 452.976 -16.009 -17.950
4 439.201 -16.427 -18.044
3 428.321 -16.989 -18.283
2 395.420 -16.451 -17.421
1 378.641 -16.719 -17.366
Note: Effective Sample: 1996:2 to 2006:1  
 
 
Table A4.4: Tests for misspecification 
Tests for Autocorrelation
Ljung-Box(10): ChiSqr(66) = 91.802 [0.020]
LM(1): ChiSqr(9) = 8.363 [0.498]
LM(2): ChiSqr(9) = 7.941 [0.540]
Test for Normality:   ChiSqr(6)  =           3.671 [0.721]
Test for ARCH:
LM(1): ChiSqr(36) = 22.439 [0.962]
LM(2): ChiSqr(72) = 78.637 [0.277]
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Figure A4.1: Test for structural breaks 
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Figure A4.2: The full model recursive estimations 
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Figure A4.3: Test of Beta Constancy 
Test of Beta Constancy
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Figure A4.4: Impulse Responses of the unrestricted VAR model 
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5 The International Transmission of Monetary Shocks: 
Evidence for Selected OECD Countries∗
This paper examines the international transmission of monetary policy shocks both in the 
context of flexible exchange-rate regimes and in the case where one country adopts 
unilaterally fixed exchange rates. Do other OECD countries undergo a recession because there 
is an unanticipated interest rate increase in the United States or do they profit from the 
increased competitiveness through the appreciation of the dollar? Are countries with a flexible 
exchange rate able to isolate from international monetary policy shocks and do they conduct 
independent monetary policies or is there a positive correlation between interest rates? Even 
though these questions have long been discussed theoretically, they still remain controversial.  
The traditional Mundell-Fleming model established a framework for a straightforward 
analysis of macro policy transmission. It does not provide unambiguous results, however. In 
the Mundell-Fleming framework this ambiguity is mostly explained by differences in capital 
mobility - high capital mobility making a positive foreign output reaction to an increase of 
home interest rates more likely. While capital markets have become almost perfectly 
integrated, empirical results show that production in most countries seems to be correlated 
positively even though the standard Mundell-Fleming would suggest an asymmetric 
transmission of monetary policy shocks under flexible exchange rates and high capital 
mobility.  
This paper investigates whether there is a mismatch between traditional theory and 
empirical evidence and whether more elaborate models of the New Open Economies 
Macroeconomics (NOEM) provide an alternative framework that better fits the empirical 
findings. In the second section the paper gives a short summary of the most important 
theoretical models used for analyzing international monetary transmission. In the third 
section, I estimate a Vector Autoregression (VAR) model to provide empirical evidence on 
the direction of output movements following an international monetary policy shock. To find 
out whether the exchange-rate regime affects the direction of business cycle transmission, I 
analyze two sets of countries. The first group of countries, which include the United States, 
Germany and Japan, follow a flexible exchange-rate regime. In the second set, which 
comprises Germany, the Netherlands and Austria, exchange rates are unilaterally fixed over 
the period analyzed. The fourth section concludes by summarizing the main findings.  
                                                 
∗ This chapter previously appeared in Applied Economics Quarterly Supplement, Issue 54, 2003, pp. 125-42 
(under my maiden name Kuhn). Reprint permission kindly granted by Duncker & Humblot, Berlin. 
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5.1 Theoretical Background 
When analyzing the international transmission of monetary shocks in an open economy 
the Mundell-Fleming model is the standard theoretical framework. In the early 1960s, 
Mundell (1962) and Fleming (1962) independently developed a model to describe the 
international transmission of national macro policies. At that time, when exchange rates were 
still fixed under the Bretton Woods system, their major concern was to determine whether 
countries were able to use their national monetary policies to bolster shocks to the economy. 
They found that, if exchange rates are fixed and capital mobility is high, central banks of 
small countries cannot conduct independent monetary policies. Instead, the interest rates are 
bound by the world interest rate. 
After the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, the standard Mundell-Fleming model 
had to be adjusted to take into account movements of the exchange rates. Dornbusch (1976) 
introduced rational expectations of the exchange rate into the model and thus provided the 
basis for a large body of research on exchange rates. In this Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch 
(MFD) framework economies are linked via the exchange rate. An unexpected increase in the 
interest rate of one country in this model, say the United States, leads to capital inflows into 
the US resulting in an appreciation of the dollar. As a consequence for uncovered interest rate 
parity to hold this appreciation has to be so strong that it generates the expectations of a future 
depreciation of the dollar. This is the so-called overshooting effect. In this sticky price model 
the interest rate increase has an impact on real variables in the short run. US output is bound 
to fall as a reaction to the contractionary policy. The impact on foreign output is ambiguous, 
however. The reduction in US output lowers aggregate demand and thus dampens foreign 
output – the so-called income absorption effect. The expenditure switching effect on the other 
hand brings about an increase in foreign output: As prices cannot adjust in the short run, the 
nominal appreciation leads to a proportional real appreciation1 making US products more 
expensive than foreign ones. Demand is switched in favor of foreign products. The early MFD 
model put more emphasis on the exchange rate mechanism, claiming that the latter effect 
prevailed, so that an increase in the US interest rate unambiguously led to a rise in foreign 
output and thus an asymmetric movement in the output of both economies. Wohltmann and 
Clausen (2001) claim, however, that only a country with low interest rate sensitivity of 
                                                 
1 This appreciation is both in nominal and real terms when prices are sticky. Kollmann (2001) finds that real 
exchange rates follow the nominal exchange rate almost one to one, contrary to what the Real Business Cycles 
theory that postulates flexible prices predicts.  
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demand can benefit from the expenditure switching effect. For a country with a high interest 
rate sensitivity of demand, the negative effect of the crowding out through higher real interest 
rates dominates the improvement of the trade balance.2  
In a system of credibly fixed exchange rates real interest rates have to be equal because 
the expected change in the exchange rate is zero. After an unanticipated increase of the US 
interest rate, the foreign interest rate has to increase by the same amount, thus directly passing 
through the contractionary impulse to the foreign economy. In this case the output in both 
economies contracts and they exhibit symmetric movements. The standard MFD model 
therefore predicts a symmetric output reaction in the case of fixed exchange rates and an 
asymmetric (or ambiguous) reaction in the case of freely floating exchange rates.  
Do these results carry over to the modern micro-founded models of the NOEM?3 Obstfeld 
and Rogoff (1995) introduced a monopolistic supply side into their Redux model. The most 
fundamental innovation of the Obstfeld-Rogoff (OR) model was, however, the introduction of 
micro foundations by incorporating individual utility maximization. This extends the standard 
MFD model to an analysis of wealth and welfare effects. Even if one is not interested in these 
effects per se, they still have to be taken into account when analyzing output effects because 
they change individuals’ behavior and reaction to monetary shocks. In this framework, the 
real interest rates are determined by the inter-temporal rate of preference of the representative 
consumer. In two economies with identical goods and identical preferences the real interest 
rate thus always has to be the same across countries.  
In the Redux model, a permanent increase in the nominal interest rate of one country 
raises the real world interest rate in the short run – while the real interest rate in the long run is 
bound by the rate of time preference. At the same time the home currency appreciates. This 
appreciation leads to a current account deficit via the expenditure switching effect. However - 
this is where the story starts to differ from the standard MFD model -, it also decreases 
home’s long run wealth. With the current account deficit, home loses claims on future output 
to the foreign country (wealth effect). Because home now faces relatively lower wealth it 
substitutes labor for leisure (welfare effect) – increasing the output of goods. This lowers the 
price of domestic goods in the long run leading to a deterioration of the terms of trade, which 
makes an overshooting appreciation unnecessary. As a result, the nominal exchange rate 
                                                 
2 Clausen (2001:18) suggests that the structure of aggregate demand may be responsible for different interest rate 
sensitivities of demand. If a high share of aggregate demand in the foreign country is interest-sensitive 
investment, an increase in the world interest rate is more likely to lead to a contraction in foreign output. 
3 For a literary survey on the NOEM see Lane (2001). 
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immediately reaches its new long run equilibrium as in the case with completely flexible 
prices. The consequences for real variables, however, are very different.  
Through the introduction of wealth into the model, a permanent increase in the nominal 
interest rate4 can have long run effects on real variables. The main mechanism at work here is 
consumption smoothing. A reduction in wealth induced by an appreciation of the home 
currency leads to a permanently lower level of consumption. However, consumption 
smoothing leads consumption to fall by less than income in the time after the shock, so that 
the additional demand has to be satisfied with foreign products. Home demands more goods 
from foreign during the period of the appreciation. With this current account deficit they lose 
claims to the foreign country. Altogether, a rise in interest rates leads to temporarily higher 
world interest rates and lowers the international demand for goods. Consumption is decreasing 
in both countries, the effect on foreign output is ambiguous, however. Because of the 
appreciation of the currency some world demand is shifted from home to foreign products, so 
that the output effect on foreign can be positive. This would then mean that we have an 
(ambiguous) asymmetric output effect for the two economies as in the case of the standard 
MFD model.5 The OR Redux model, thus, still reaches the same results concerning the effects 
of monetary policy on output abroad. But the results do differ in their quality as there are 
different transmission mechanisms and there is no overshooting of the exchange rate. Also, it 
opened a whole world of possible transmission and interaction channels that is being 
incorporated in the new body of literature based on the OR model. In the following I will 
shortly elaborate on the different assumptions that determine the direction of the output effect.   
As in the MFD model, asymmetric output effects depend on the relative strength of the 
expenditure switching mechanism through the exchange rate.6 There are, however, extensions 
of the OR model that challenge this standard expenditure switching mechanism. Betts and 
Devereux (2000a, 2000b) augment the model by introducing the idea of pricing-to-market. In 
their model not all goods are priced in the currency of the seller. Instead, part of the goods are 
priced in the currency of the buyer. In the case of full pricing-to-market, there is no exchange 
rate pass-through to export prices. There is, therefore, no additional demand for exports and 
                                                 
4 In the OR model monetary policy is modeled by changes in the stock of money. A reduction in the money 
supply leads to an increase in the interest rate. I leave out this step in my analysis.  
5 In their analysis Obstfeld and Rogoff stress the fact, that even though output effects may be well defined, the 
effects on welfare do not necessarily provide the same conclusions. In this case, foreign output might be higher 
than domestic output, but the increased amount of labor necessary to produce this output might actually decrease 
welfare in foreign and vice versa.   
6 The expenditure switching effect is higher – an asymmetric output reaction more likely – the higher 
international capital mobility.  
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monopolist producers do not expand their production, instead they increase their profits 
because of a higher mark-up. In this case the only transmission channel for foreign output is 
the lower overall demand due to the higher world interest rate. This model, thus, predicts 
symmetric movements in foreign and home output.  
Tille (2001) also challenges the standard expenditure switching effect by allowing for 
different elasticities of substitution across and within countries in the OR framework.7 When 
there is a rise in home interest rates followed by an appreciation of the home currency, the 
demand for foreign output only increases if foreign goods are substitutes to home goods. 
Otherwise, the overall effect of the higher world interest rate will prevail and dampen foreign 
activity, so that there is a symmetric output reaction in the home and the foreign country.8  
So far, I have considered symmetric movements in output due to a lack of expenditure 
switching. Another interesting case is when the most important transmission channel is no 
longer the exchange rate, but when the co-movement of international interest rates causes a 
positive output correlation. Borondo (2000) develops an extension of the OR model in which 
central banks follow a specific interest rate rule stabilizing the price level. Through this rule, 
the interest rate becomes endogenous. In the case of a shock to the home interest rate rule, the 
currency appreciates and the terms of trade improve in favor of the home country. Import 
prices and with them the foreign consumer price level increase. This causes the foreign central 
bank to raise interest rates as well. The interest rate increase along with the overall reduced 
demand from the home country more than offset the positive expenditure effect, so that we 
end up with a symmetric output movement.  
In summary, the standard MFD model predicts an asymmetric movement of home and 
foreign output as a reaction to an unanticipated increase in the home interest rate in an 
environment of flexible exchange rates. Even though this framework also allows for 
ambiguous results, the emphasis on the exchange rate channel makes the asymmetric reaction 
of home and foreign output the most likely result. This ambiguity with a bias towards 
asymmetric reactions carries over to the Redux model. Extended versions of the NOEM, 
however, provide a theoretical background that can explain symmetric output movements.   
 
                                                 
7 Low substitutability between home and foreign goods is particularly likely for a small country whose 
production is highly specialized.  
8 Hau (2000) developed another way of allowing for a smaller expenditure switching effect by taking into 
account nontradable goods and home bias. For an overview see also Borondo (2001).  
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5.2 Empirical Analysis 
As a framework for the empirical analysis, I use a Vector Autoregression (VAR), because 
it sets a minimum of identifying restrictions and does not confine the analysis to a specific 
theoretical model.9 I estimate the reduced form equations of a structural form VAR that 
describes the economy. To ensure that structural disturbances are mutually uncorrelated I 
identify the model using a Choleski decomposition. The ordering of the variables sets the 
restrictions on contemporaneous transmissions of shocks and thus identifies them. 
5.2.1 The Econometric Model 
The model closely follows Eichenbaum and Evans (1995). It is made up of monthly data10 
for seasonally adjusted industrial production, nominal interest rates, the consumer price 
indexes and bilateral real exchange rates.11 All variables are in logarithms except for the 
interest rates. The real exchange rate is calculated by subtracting the relative consumer price 
index from the nominal exchange rate. Following Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), I order 
industrial production and prices first. More specifically, in this VAR model, I impose the 
recursive ordering {y, p, y*, p*, i, i*, q}, where y is home industrial production, p is the home 
consumer price index, i is the home interest rate and q stands for the real exchange rate. 
Foreign variables are denoted with an asterisk. 
This ordering is the only restriction that has to be imposed and it can also be questioned.12 
It seems plausible, however, that real output should not respond to interest rates within the 
same month. At the same time, the restriction that prices do not react immediately to changes 
in the interest rate is based on the assumption of sticky prices. Home variables are put ahead 
of foreign variables because in my two groups of countries the home country is always the 
large country and thus more likely to have a contemporaneous impact on the foreign (small) 
country. For the same reason I also put the home interest rate ahead of the foreign one, 
contrary to Eichenbaum and Evans (1995). This does not change the results qualitatively, 
                                                 
9 There are, however, also critics of this approach. Rudebusch (1998) criticizes, that the VAR modeling heavily 
relies on the assumption that shocks to monetary policy are exogenous and that they cannot mirror the behavior 
of a (more realistic) endogenous monetary setting (see Christiano et al. (1999) for a survey on different 
identification assumptions). While researchers are looking for feasible alternatives, the VAR model is still used 
as the econometric model for analyzing monetary policy transmissions (see for example Kim (2001)).  
10 All data are from International Financial Statistics (IFS). 
11 I do not consider the ratio of nonborrowed to total reserves which Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) used as a 
monetary aggregate for the United States. Leaving out this aggregate does not qualitatively change the results of 
the model.  
12 A whole body of literature about structural VAR models is concerned with finding theoretical arguments for 
imposing different restrictions also on long-run relationships between the variables. Authors like Bernanke 
(1986) and Sims (1986) and Leeper et al. (1996) adopt alternative approaches regarding the restrictions of the 
model. Clarida and Gali (1994) use a structural VAR in a NOEM framework.  
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however. The lag order of the variables is chosen to be 6, in accordance with Eichenbaum and 
Evans (1995).13,14  
With this VAR model, I investigate the impact of an unanticipated interest rate hike in one 
country on output in a number of other countries. The first group of countries analyzed are the 
United States, Germany, and Japan. These countries have adopted floating exchange-rate 
regimes since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system. The sample period is 1974:01 to 
2002:05. The second group of countries comprises Germany, the Netherlands, and Austria. 
The latter two countries have had their exchange rates fixed vis-à-vis the D-Mark.15 Here, the 
sample period is 1974:01 to 1998:12, because these countries have had the same monetary 
policy conducted by the European Central Bank since 1999. I include two dummy variables 
for German reunification to take into account the structural break that occurred in Germany in 
the beginning of the 1990s.16  
5.2.2 Empirical Results 
In the following I present the impulse responses for a shock to the home interest rate. To 
assess the statistical significance of these results it is essential to include the appropriate error 
bands to the impulse responses into the analysis. I use error bands computed by a Monte Carlo 
Integration following Sims and Zha (1999). The authors suggest that the use of conventional 
one or two standard error bands can be misleading as impulse responses have highly 
asymmetrical distributions. As a result, they suggest using fractiles with 0.16 and 0.84 instead 
of the one standard deviation band and fractiles of 0.025 and 0.975 rather than two standard 
deviations.  
 I am interested in the co-movements of home and foreign output after a shock to the 
home interest rate. The results are summarized in Figures 1 to 4. In a first step, I check 
whether the unanticipated interest rate increase at home has the expected effects on home 
variables. Figure 1 and Figure 2 (column ‘i-US’, row ‘Y-US’) show the impact of the shock to 
the US federal funds rate on industrial production in the United States. I find that, in line with 
theoretical predictions, output of the home country is reduced by this “contractionary shock”. 
                                                 
13 The analysis of several information criteria proved to be inconclusive, suggesting between 3 and 13 lags.  
14 A test for cointegration in the VAR suggested that there might be about 2 cointegration relations in the model. 
I refrained from estimating a Vector Error Correction model, however, following Sims, Stock, and Watson 
(1990) who claim that this is unnecessary as the cointegration relation is implicitly estimated in the general VAR 
model. 
15 In the exchange rate classification database by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002) which considers “de 
facto” exchange rates these economies are identified as fixed exchange-rate systems. In a more refined 
distinction of the database the Netherlands are sometimes listed as following a “dirty or crawling” peg.  
16 These are two 0/1 dummies. The first one takes the value of one during the period of 1991:01 and 1992:12 and 
the second one takes the value of one during the period of 1993:01 and 1993:03 (Sachverständigenrat 2001). 
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The same result holds in the case where Germany is the home country (Figure 3: i-D, Y-D; 
Figure 4: i-D, Y-D).17  
Concerning the reaction of foreign output, I find, that industrial production in Germany 
and Japan fall following the unanticipated increase in the federal funds rate (Figure 1: i-US, 
Y-D; Figure 2: i-US, Y-J).18 Surprisingly, I get the same results, when looking at the reaction 
of Dutch and Austrian industrial production to an increase in the German interest rate (Figure 
3: i-D, Y-NL; Figure 4: i-D, Y-A). One should have expected different co-movements as 
these countries belong to a different exchange-rate system. Thus, I ask, whether the impact of 
the exchange rate transmission mechanism is maybe not as big as predicted by theory. 
As discussed in Section 2, the transmission of the exchange rate works via an expenditure 
switching process. The reaction of the D-Mark and Yen exchange rates vis-à-vis the dollar are 
similar to what Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) labeled a “delayed overshooting”. The dollar 
appreciates against both currencies and – in contrast to the predictions of the Dornbusch 
(1976) model – the appreciation continues for an extended period of time (Figure 1: i-US, q; 
Figure 2: i-US, q).19 So why, then, does this depreciation of the D-Mark and the Yen not lead 
to a positive impulse for the relevant industrial production? There are two reasons why this 
transmission mechanism as described by the standard theory might fail. First, the exchange 
rate movement could leave foreign output unchanged because the depreciation of the foreign 
currency does not have the expected positive impact on foreign output. From the impulse 
responses I can indeed observe that a shock to the real exchange rate does not seem to have 
any significant impact on either German or Japanese output (Figure 1: q, Y-D; Figure 2: q, Y-
J). This could be due to pricing-to-market as described in Section 2. Second, a positive 
expenditure switching effect on output could be outweighed by a more than proportional 
negative effect of a higher world interest rate.  
To determine which variables have the highest power of explanation for the movement in 
foreign output, I conduct a forecast-error-variance decomposition. The power of explanation 
of the autoregressive part of the model becomes lower as the other variables gain importance 
                                                 
17 Surprisingly, home prices increase after the interest rate hike. This price puzzle has also been observed by 
other studies. It has been suggested by Holstein (1999), that this reaction might be due to central banks’ 
anticipation of an impending rise in prices. However, this explanation does not go along well with the theory and 
the VAR modeling in which monetary policy has to be completely exogenous and the shock to the interest rate 
has to be completely unanticipated. We experimented with including the HWWA index for world commodities 
into the model, as we suspected a misspecification. Including this index made the reaction of prices close to 
statistically insignificant. 
18 In Japan, however, the fall in production is statistically not significantly different from zero.  
19 Pierdzioch (2003) shows that adding noise trading to a pricing-to-market NOEM model helps to explain both 
nominal and real “delayed” overshooting.  
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with time. For German output, the explanatory power of the federal funds rate rises to more 
than 28 percent after four years (Table 1). Surprisingly, the U.S. interest rate seems to have 
more impact on German output than the German interest rate, which can only explain 13 
percent of the fluctuation in German output after four years. Another important message for 
my analysis is the almost negligible explanatory power of exchange rate movements. This is 
an indicator for the fact that the exchange rate transmission mechanism may be less important 
than expected.20 The forecast-error-variance decomposition for Japan provides a slightly 
different picture. Here, neither the exchange rate nor the interest rates seem to provide much 
explanatory power for the movement in Japanese industrial production. This is probably due 
to the fact that the traditional monetary transmission mechanism in Japan has been disturbed 
since the bursting of the bubble in the beginning of the nineties. If we run the regression only 
up to the year 1990, the federal funds rate has very high and the exchange rate some 
explanatory power (Table 1).  
These results suggest that the foreign interest rate is quite essential in explaining output 
abroad, while the transmission channel does not seem to be the exchange rate as suggested by 
the standard MFD theory. Rather, there is a significant co-movement in interest rates, which 
could be the reason for the symmetric output reaction. The impulse responses for the 
Netherlands and Austria give an idea of the importance of this direct transmission via the co-
movement of interest rates.21 With unilaterally fixed exchange rates the small country cannot 
follow an independent monetary policy. Therefore, the national interest rates have to move 
proportionally for the uncovered interest rate parity to hold. The empirical results confirm this 
theoretical finding. Dutch and Austrian interest rates move almost proportionally to the 
German interest rate (Figure 3: i-D, i-D; i-D, i-NL, Figure 4: i-D, i-D; i-D, i-A). These 
findings fit in well with what standard theory predicts and they provide a good explanation for 
symmetric output movements.  
If I compare these results with the ones I get for the supposedly flexible exchange-rate 
systems, I can see that the symmetric co-movements in output can probably be attributed to 
the strong co-movements in interest rates.22 They do not move proportionally (Figure 1: i-US, 
i-US; i-US, i-D; Figure 2: i-US, i-US, i-US, i-J), however, so that some of the adjustment has 
                                                 
20 Already in 1989, Baxter and Stockman (1989) challenge theoretical models that predict a strong influence of 
the exchange rate on real economic variables, the so-called “Exchange Rate Disconnect Puzzle”. Flood and Rose 
(1995) confirm their finding that output volatility does not change much across exchange-rate systems. 
21 See also Table 2 for the forecast-error-variance decomposition for Dutch and Austrian Output.  
22 Monacelli (2001) provides a NOEM theoretical background in which the model delivers positive cross-country 
correlations of interest rates even for the case of flexible exchange-rate systems. However, in his framework, the 
output correlation is still negative due to the expenditure switching mechanism.  
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to come from the exchange rate. One reason for the co-movement in interest rates could be 
that countries do not conduct completely independent monetary policies even under a flexible 
exchange-rate regime. Instead, central banks include exchange rates into their calculations to 
stabilize the price level. They raise home interest rates as a reaction to a foreign interest rate 
hike because the depreciation of the exchange rate would otherwise put upward pressure on 
prices due to an increase in import prices. 
Summarizing, I find that the reason for the strong positive correlation between home and 
foreign output as a reaction to a shock to the home interest rate can be ascribed to two facts. 
First, there is a more important channel of transmission than the exchange rate. Even in a 
flexible exchange-rate system, the interest rates perform most of the adjustment necessary to 
keep the interest rate parity intact. Second, even though the shock to the interest rate leads to a 
movement in the real exchange rate, this exchange rate movement does not have the expected 
expansionary impact on foreign output.  
5.3 Conclusion 
In this paper I estimate a VAR model to examine the international transmission of 
monetary shocks. I compare these results with what different theoretical models predict. The 
Mundell-Fleming model suggests that there should be an asymmetric transmission of 
monetary shocks with flexible exchange rates and a symmetric transmission with fixed 
exchange rates. The transmission channels at work are the world real interest rate or co-
movement in interest rates for both regimes and the exchange rate for the flexible exchange-
rate regimes. A rise of the interest rate in one country leads to higher world interest rates and 
depresses ceteris paribus economic activity in both countries so that they exhibit a symmetric 
output decline. For the case of flexible exchange rates, the lower aggregate demand can be 
more than offset by an increased demand of home for foreign products due to the appreciation 
of the home currency. Although the Obstfeld-Rogoff (1995) Redux model puts more 
emphasis on individual utility maximization and on different transmission channels, it mainly 
reaches the same results concerning output co-movements.  
The empirical result show, however, that there is no asymmetric co-movement of output, 
neither for flexible nor for fixed exchange rates. German as well as Japanese output fall after 
an unanticipated increase in the federal funds rate. The same negative output reaction can be 
observed for the Netherlands and Austria when there is a positive shock to German interest 
rates. Whereas the latter reaction is what can be expected from the theory, one could have 
expected the results for the flexible exchange-rate regimes to be different. After all, flexible 
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exchange rates should provide the necessary monetary independence to avoid a transmission 
of this contractionary shock. Even though there is a “delayed” overshooting appreciation of 
the home currency as in Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), this exchange rate movement is not 
enough to offset the contractionary pressure of the increased world interest rate. Even 
countries with flexible exchange rates raise their interest rates in response to an increase in 
foreign interest rates, instead of letting their own currency depreciate to such an extent that 
they could profit from the positive expenditure switching effect. Models from the NOEM that 
include elements of pricing-to-market, different elasticities of substitution or home bias are 
able to provide an explanation for the persistent symmetric co-movement of home and foreign 
output observed in the empirical findings.  
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Figure 2: Impulse Responses United States/Japan
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Figure 3: Impulse Responses Germany/Netherlands
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Figure 4: Impulse Responses Germany/Austria
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Table 5.1: Forecast-Error-Variance Decomposition for German and Japanese Output  
 
Country After month 
Standard 
Error Y-US P-US y* p* i-US i* q 
Germany 12 0.03 11.3 0.6 82.8 1.1 2.7 1.1 0.5 
 48 0.04 7.7 0.4 41.9 6.0 28.3 13.3 2.5 
Japan 12 0.04 6.0 0.08 92.8 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.1 
 48 0.06 8.2 1.4 84.5 0.7 1.1 0.6 3.6 
Japan ‘90 12 0.03 37.9 0.1 58.1 0.1 2.7 0.2 0.8 
 48 0.04 25.0 0.4 30.8 0.3 34.9 2.5 6.2 
 
Notes:  In this table Y-US stands for the industrial production of the United States, P-US for the consumer price 
index of the US, i-US for the federal funds rate and q for the real exchange rate. y* and p* are German 
and Japanese industrial production and consumer price index respectively. i* stands for the short run 
interest rates in these countries. Japan ’90 presents the forecast-error-variance decomposition of the 
estimation for Japan up to 1990, which was included due to a structural break in Japanese data. 
 
 
 
Table 5.2: Forecast-Error-Variance Decomposition for Dutch and Austrian Output 
 
Country After month 
Standard 
Error Y-D P-D y* p* i-D i* q 
Netherlands 12 0.03 24.8 2.6 65.9 1.0 2.0 2.9 0.9 
 48 0.04 31.3 8.0 38.7 5.2 14.3 1.9 0.6 
Austria 12 0.04 42.1 1.4 48.1 4.7 0.5 1.6 1.6 
 48 0.06 32.2 0.8 33.1 4.1 18.5 5.7 5.5 
 
Notes:  In this table Y-D stands for German industrial production, P-D for the consumer price index of 
Germany, i-D for German short run interest rates and q for the real exchange rate. y* and p* are Dutch 
and Austrian industrial production and consumer price index respectively. i* stands for the short run 
interest rates in these countries.   
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